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Informed by Iris Murdoch’s concept of attention, this thesis argues that economic and 
scientistic discourses within early childhood education misrepresent and neglect essential 
moral aspects of pedagogy. Early childhood education is built on particulars, the small and 
incremental attentive moments between individuals. Attention, described by Murdoch as ‘a 
just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality’, improves the moral imagination and 
enhances the ability of teachers to see and respond to individual children in educational 
settings. 
 
The concept of attention is utilised to critique neoliberal approaches to early childhood 
education and to question the increasing application of neuroscientific explanations of the 
child in educational policy and pedagogical practice. Standardisation, objective empiricism, 
and limited measurements of teachers and children are problematised for the ways in which 
they attempt to delineate ‘fact’ from ‘value’. Attention fosters a critical understanding of how 
teachers’ everyday pedagogical practices can be appreciated as an ‘inhabited’ philosophy of 
education. 
 
Attention is explored in relation to the Māori concept of aroha. Aroha, as a generous direction 
of focus to the divine breath within another being, is helpful in developing a deeper 
understanding of attention. Together, aroha and attention prove synergistic in efforts to 
promote an approach to education that moves beyond the empirical, quantifiable and 
scientific. Together, these concepts support another way of understanding the ‘intentional’ 
teacher through acknowledging the importance of intuition in paying attention to children. 
Underpinned by humility, aroha and attention are orientations to life that see education as a 
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Iris Murdoch (1919-1999) was a philosopher who sought to deepen our understanding of 
human morality. Responding to the increasing influence of scientism within philosophy and 
the lack of realistic depictions of the human, Murdoch sought to reconceive the ideal moral 
agent. According to Murdoch (1998), as philosophers cannot help but promote an ‘idealised’ 
version of the moral agent, they should be motivated to portray a worthy ideal. A central 
question motivated Murdoch’s philosophical ideas: “How can we make ourselves better?” (p. 
364). From this drive, Murdoch developed the concept of attention, which she succinctly 
describes as “a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality” (p. 327). The concept 
of attention supports an understanding of education as an ethical encounter; in responding to 
the moral task of the ‘just and loving gaze’, educationists can uphold aspects of education 
that, if irretrievably lost through the prevalence of neoliberal ideas, would deform the act of 
education. The focus of this study is to resist the dominance of neoliberal strategies that foster 
these limiting interpretations of education. Attention will be discussed at length to describe 
how the ‘just and loving gaze’ offers a unique opportunity for people involved in education to 
reconsider morality as a fundamental aspect of human life, to reflect upon ways to enhance 
moral vision,  and to develop a pedagogy based upon humility and love.  
Early childhood education in Aotearoa New Zealand is unique. Including early 
childhood education into the wider educational reforms of the 1980s shaped aspects that still 
impact upon present-day experiences. Neoliberal ideas produce dominant discourses of a 
world driven by fiscal concerns. Within neoliberalism, humans are scientifically measured, 
described in economic terms, and governed to maximise the potentiality of an enterprising, 
entrepreneurial, and competitive public. Neoliberal discourses are pervasive, adaptable, 
malleable, and presented as the only way of viewing and engaging in the world; the ‘there is 
no alternative’ approach (Fitzsimmons et al., 1999; Olssen, 2002; Olssen & Peters, 2005; 
Peters, 2011; Roberts, 2004, 2014; Roberts & Peters, 2008). 
Yet early childhood education in Aotearoa New Zealand started from philanthropic 
concerns and a strong community ethic remains today. Although neoliberal ideas are a part of 
the Aotearoa New Zealand early childhood education experience, there are many local 
scholars who argue against an economic vision of the human and who question the ‘there is 
no alternative’ approach (Duhn, 2012; Farquhar, 2012; Ritchie et al., 2014). Criticisms centre 
on the positioning of teachers and children as ‘knowable and measureable’ units and 
education as a technical enterprise. Varying areas of resistance attempt to reconceive 
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education as difficult to quantify, positioning diversity and complexity as a strength rather 
than a weakness. Education is a complex endeavour; it is a uniquely human experience in 
which two or more individuals are endeavouring to hear and see each other and respond 
accordingly (Biesta, 2004; Moss, 2019; Rinaldi, 2004). The bicultural nature of the early 
childhood curriculum Te Whāriki: He whāriki mātauranga mō ngā mokopuna o Aotearoa 
(New Zealand Ministry of Education, 1996, 2017, hereafter Te Whāriki) is identified as ‘both 
witnessing and resisting’ neoliberal desires (Tesar, 2015). What does Murdoch have to add to 
these perspectives?  
It is important to question how the ideas of a mid- to late-20th century philosopher can 
respond to issues in contemporary times. The English setting where Iris Murdoch developed 
her vision is far removed from present-day early childhood education in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. At present, neoliberal ideas predominate. Although Murdoch wrote philosophy in a 
similar time-frame to writers later identified as informing neoliberal ideas (Hayek, 1948), she 
wrote prior to its broader implementation in governmental policies worldwide in the 1980s 
(‘Reganism’ in the United States of America, ‘Thatcherism’ in the United Kingdom, and 
‘Rogernomics’ in Aotearoa New Zealand).  
This thesis argues that attention speaks directly to contemporary times. Attention is a 
way of enhancing the moral imagination to see others in the world and defend the complex 
ambiguity of human life while enhancing our personal appreciation of it. Attention offers the 
opportunity to reclaim the critical role of the attentive teacher within the educational 
relationship. Economic and scientistic discourses within early childhood education 
misrepresent and neglect essential moral aspects of pedagogy. Attention offers a novel 
depiction of the role of the inner life to support an appreciation of education as an ethical 
encounter.  
As an early childhood educator and researcher in Aotearoa New Zealand, I value the 
unique shaping of early childhood education by the position of Māori as tangata whenua and 
the bicultural character of the national early childhood curriculum Te Whāriki (New Zealand 
Ministry of Education, 2017). I involve this unique positioning within this study to extend my 
investigation into attention, particularly the notions of love and humility. I argue that 
attention can reorient consciousness to support bicultural development1 and suppress the 
                                                 
1 This study will maintain the view that ‘development’ does not represent a linear progression of capability, consistent with 
contemporary early childhood critiques of universalizing theories (Cannella, 1997; Ritchie & Rau, 2008). Furthermore, in order to 
progress ‘bicultural development’, there must be a recognition that change cannot only occur at the level of individuals, but must 
also involve reexamination and transformation of structures of power and governance, at a local and nationwide level (Ritchie, 2003).  
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potentially colonising effects of the ‘knowable’ human. Together, aroha and attention prove 
synergistic in the efforts to promote an approach to education that moves beyond the 
empirical, quantifiable and scientific. Together, these concepts support another way of 
understanding the ‘intentional’ teacher through a promotion of the intuition teachers develop 
from focussed attention to children. Underpinned by humility, aroha and attention are 
orientations to life that see education as a moral and ethical undertaking. Seen in this light, 
education informs rather than limits rational investigation. 
Murdoch was concerned with the moral-philosophical direction of her time and the 
promotion of a narrow form of scientistic rationality within philosophical ideas. Murdoch 
was affected by the influence of World War II, both upon the philosophical milieu and her 
personal life. She argued against many of her contemporaries who presented an increasingly 
dominant model of moral agent. She criticises this model, labelling it the “ideally rational 
man”2 (Murdoch, 1998, p. 303). The ‘ideally rational individual’ is depicted as a rational 
decision-maker whose agentic capacity extends to dominion over moral decisions and whose 
moral character is defined by an external assessment of behaviours and actions. Like the 
‘there is no alternative’ of neoliberal ideas, the ideally rational individual was widely 
considered indisputable, stemming from a Kantian and post-Kantian idea of the human 
indebted to Hume and Hobbes. The ‘ideally rational individual’ stemmed from the field of 
psychology and a scientistic and analytical approach to morality, endorsing practical moral 
action. The ‘ideally rational individual’ can divide fact from value and is therefore ‘value-
free’ in moral assessments. Murdoch argues that there are many problems with this model of 
the human, the most crucial of which is the relegation of the moral to the periphery. For 
Murdoch, morality is not a subsidiary or additional aspect of human experience for it 
comprises its totality; morality is not a “hole and corner” (p. 380) matter but a part of our 
whole mode of living.  
The segmentation of the moral domain originally stemmed from the desire to preserve 
moral values from the encroachment of scientific ideas, but developed into a scientific 
approach to moral philosophy. Scientistic ideas promoted an objective view of moral 
decisions, assessed and determined by the rational moral agent who can to “survey all the 
facts, then use reason” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 26). The ‘ideally rational individual’ is capable of 
                                                 
2 Murdoch uses the term ‘man’ in much of her writing. At times when her text is quoted it is necessary to use the gendered term ‘man’ 
in order to remain consistent with Murdoch’s writing. However, this is not to say that Murdoch was only referring to the male 
gender in her arguments. At the time of Murdoch’s writing, using the term ‘man’ was common, consequently the term ‘man’ must 
be considered according to this contextual usage.  
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assaying and selecting appropriate moral action as though making a selection from a shop. 
Murdoch argued that this approach to moral philosophy invoked an unnecessary 
compartmentalisation, ‘measurable’ aspects of morality were included and ‘unmeasurable’ 
aspects became superfluous. One unquantifiable aspect was the role of the ‘inner life’. The 
‘inner life’ is a term that will be explored throughout the thesis, but can be loosely described 
at this point as the thoughts, musings, and ‘inner’ deliberations of the individual that bear 
upon moral decisions and actions. Murdoch’s contemporaries argued that the inner life is a 
‘shadowy domain’ and has no bearing upon the rational moral individual. Conversely, 
Murdoch defended the ‘inner life’ as an essential aspect of humanity that informs moral 
choices. The inner life strengthens knowledge of moral concepts, preparing people for moral 
decisions and ethical engagement in the world.  
Murdoch contends that the demarcation between ‘fact’ and ‘value’ was never fully 
explored or understood by philosophers. In the desire for autonomy and freedom from an 
externally determined goodness, empirical ‘fact’ is promoted over ‘mutable’ value and 
philosophy lost the metaphysical background to moral decisions. The dangers of a mutable 
vision of value were understood clearly by Murdoch through her experiences in the war; but 
she argued what was needed was not the eradication of moral concepts but a deepening and 
broadening of them. In order to enhance clarity of moral vision, important points of 
difference need to be explored. Reclamation of the metaphysical background offers the 
opportunity to develop a richer understanding of moral concepts and a better vision of shared 
human morality. When value was compartmentalised in order to venerate ‘fact’, the depth 
and breadth of moral concepts were lost. Opportunities for rich philosophical debate about 
their substance, to elicit moral growth, were traded in order to satisfy the desire for autonomy 
over moral choices; freedom, honesty and sincerity, took precedence at the expense of 
goodness, humility, and love.  
Many parallels can be drawn between the ‘ideally rational individual’ and 
contemporary neoliberal ideas. In contemporary neoliberal forms of governance, the ‘rational 
autonomous individual’ or the homo oeconomicus (Foucault, 2008) predominates. Similar to 
the ‘ideally rational individual’ the neoliberal individual is a ‘rational utility maximiser’ 
(Peters, 2011, p. 34). Further similarities lie in the shared regard for empirically based 
scientistic approaches that are critical of a metaphysical background. Neoliberal ideas 
epitomise the ‘knowable’ human shaped by external action. These ideas intensify focus upon 
strategies to form individuals to fit neoliberal moulds; education systems are frequently 
targeted to create competitive individuals and encourage ‘rational’ knowledge and skills in 
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order to compete within the market. Murdoch’s arguments against the ‘ideally rational 
individual’ offer another way of apprehending the ethical dimensions of neoliberal forms of 
education.  
There are multiple issues within early childhood education that can be reconsidered 
through Murdochian philosophy. Murdoch (1998) writes, “Man is a creature who makes 
pictures of himself and then comes to resemble the picture” (p. 75). For Murdoch, images of 
the human hold the potential to affect moral actions in the world. The ways in which the 
‘ideally rational individual’ misrepresents everyday moral thought and action motivates 
Murdoch to review this questionable image and offer a commendable alternative. Drawing 
from Murdochian attention, images of the human can be reconsidered in light of her demands 
for realism and worthiness. According to Murdoch, the desire to retain autonomy through 
reason drove philosophers to produce an image of the human built from shaky premises. 
These unstable images impart a precarious foundation for the image of ‘the neoliberal 
human’ in contemporary times. Can the ‘shaky premises’ of the human be reconsidered in 
our time, or is there no alternative? Anxieties about the ineffectiveness of early childhood 
centres, the low levels of academic achievement, and the ways in which children are put ‘at 
risk’ by varied educational approaches are frequently identified to highlight ‘problems’ 
within early childhood education (Franks, 2019). At times the discourse shifts to the stress, 
workload, and conditions of work for early childhood teachers (NZEI Te Riu Roa, 2018; One 
News, 2018), but infrequently are the mechanisms that underpin these conditions commented 
upon – the neoliberal systems that shape early childhood education.  
The notion of education as an ethical encounter is in tension with an economic vision of 
education. Murdochian attention supports the reconsideration of the ‘indisputable truths’ of 
an education system built from economic rationality. In order to deviate from the dominant 
image of her time, Murdoch reconsiders ‘indisputable truths’ in order to expose the erroneous 
suppositions upon which they are built and question their substance and validity. I argue that 
Murdoch’s philosophy offers the opportunity to reconsider the ‘indisputable truths’ of our 
time and reflect upon contemporary problems anew. She developed a substantive 
philosophical argument that can highlight the devalued ethical and moral dimensions of 
education in contemporary times. Through the concept of attention, an ethical rationale for 
education can be revived.  
Murdoch (1998) contested the image of the ‘ideally rational individual’ and its 
categorical inculcation of the capacity to separate fact from value; morality cannot be easily 
divided into these distinct realms as morality is a ubiquitous concern underpinning and 
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influencing all human actions and decisions. This image is not the worthy ideal Murdoch 
sought to identify. Contesting this image motivated Murdoch to investigate alternatives and, 
through the philosophy of Plato and Simone Weil, explore the notion of attention. Attention 
resists the limitations imposed by scientistic images of morality and supports the role of the 
moral imagination3 as a medium to comprehend the world. Through attention, the 
metaphysical background is revitalised. Considered deliberation of moral concepts, such as 
love and goodness, deepens and strengthens our understanding of human morality and 
supports everyday human interactions. Attention advocates for people to expand their 
understanding of moral values enhanced by the development of the “inner life” (p. 306).  
Today, the scientific search for the activity of the inner life and the workings of the 
mind has expanded widely in the study of neuroscience, with concurrent effects upon the 
image of the child in education. Developments in neuroscientific research have highlighted 
the ways that the early childhood years impact upon overall life development and amplified 
governmental focus upon the education of very young children (Millei & Joronen, 2016; 
Shonkoff & Levitt, 2010). Murdoch’s concerns with the primacy of science are of critical 
relevance here. Although science can be used to seek some functions of the child’s mind, 
there is an inextricable moral element to life which, when glossed over, will misrepresent the 
human.  
When augmented with economic concerns, neuroscientific ‘findings’ are utilised to 
position children as human capital and highlight how spending money on educational 
experiences earlier in life may have a positive correlation with less later spending in health, 
justice, and welfare (Vandenbroeck & Olsson, 2017). To determine the conditions to reduce 
later spending, importance is placed upon standardised assessment of early education 
(Aronsson & Taguchi, 2018; Cowell & Decety, 2015). But these images are determined 
through dominant neoliberal lenses; economic productivity is the concern and aim of 
assessment, rendering other visions unnecessary or irrelevant (Stack, 2013). Additionally, 
these forms of assessment are primarily concerned with what can be empirically measured, 
compared, and contrasted. Diversities in educational experiences and the particulars of 
individual situations can be overlooked in preference for trends and positive correlations 
(Moss, 2017; Moss et al., 2016). These externalised measurements can produce an image of 
                                                 
3 Although the moral imagination will be explored further throughout the thesis, here it can be briefly explained that Murdoch asserts 
that human have a rich imaginative capacity, and it is through the direction of this imaginative capacity towards an understanding of 
morality, ethics, and values that a deeper apprehension of reality can be attained. Furthermore, the moral imagination supports a 
clearer understanding of the ubiquity of morals in life. 
7 
 
the young child as a ‘product’ of educational experiences and a site of improvement for 
pecuniary gains. The narrowing effects these measurements can have upon teachers, children, 
and whānau need to be brought into conversation with Murdoch’s philosophy. Murdoch’s 
concerns with the fact/value divide and defence of inner life need to be considered against the 
advance of these images that shape early childhood education. Murdoch’s critical lens can be 
applied in order to ascertain their limitations. Consideration must be given to the tensions 
Murdoch highlights in order to reconsider the utilisation of neuroscientific findings to 
reconceive education.  
Murdoch’s centrality of the inner life contests arguments that delegate individual 
knowledge and experience to the fringes merely because they cannot be standardised or 
externally analysed. Although, as Murdoch posits, humans are opaque to each other, careful 
attention is required in order to move beyond initial judgements and respect the individuality 
of others. Through attention, we are called to negotiate our understanding of the world 
against a metaphysical background that can illuminate the world in the light of goodness. 
When applied to education, attention defends pedagogy as a uniquely human experience and 
reinforces the benefits of viewing other beings through a just and loving gaze. Attention 
defends the crucial value of the inner life and illustrates how the moral imagination can be 
developed to support ethical thought and action. Education can benefit from such an 
understanding of the human; one in which it is the ethical and moral task of the teacher to 
carefully attend to the child in order to respond in pedagogically appropriate ways, delimiting 
the role of standardised practices and technical forms of pedagogy. There is potent potential 
in recognising the role of the inner life in education, the function and benefits of which can be 
developed through a deeper investigation into Murdoch’s attention.  
Attention demands the moral individual to look and re-look in order to move beyond 
self-interest and to “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 376-7). Attention presents the opportunity to expand upon our 
understanding of the inner life of teaching and offers new ways of considering the 
educational relationship between teachers and children. This thesis will argue that Murdoch’s 
claims hold as much relevance now as they did then and argue that the inner life of the 
teacher is critical to pedagogy. Even though the inner life cannot be empirically evaluated, it 
should not be rendered insignificant. Attention supports the notion of education as an ethical 
encounter, but attention can also be understood as a practice; it is both a moral task and an 
orientation into interactions with others, set before every individual and individually refined 
and cultivated over time. Objective and standardised measurements are brought into question 
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by the practice of attention, as attention reorients individuals to focus upon the particulars in 
life. Through the attentive gaze, the small, unique, and specific experiences of each 
individual can enhance moral concepts and actions. The task of attention demands the 
educator to listen to the child and engage the moral imagination to develop a philosophical 
approach to pedagogical practice. The concept of attention has much to offer the domain of 
education and the conceptualisation of pedagogy in the early years.  
 
Following this introduction, Chapters One and Two are specifically concerned with 
contextualising Murdoch, outlining the concept of attention and explicating other major 
themes of her philosophy. Given that this study focusses upon the concept of attention, a 
chapter is devoted to exploring this concept in depth. However, there are other philosophical 
ideas Murdoch developed which are important to the concept of attention. Rather than 
developing these within one large chapter, two chapters are devoted to exploring Murdoch’s 
philosophical ideas. Chapter One contextualises Iris Murdoch and develops a broad picture of 
her philosophy to illustrate common themes. This chapter provides some background 
material, describing Murdoch’s involvement within wider social, personal, and philosophical 
scenes. Brief attention is given to her concurrent careers as a philosopher and a novelist, to 
discuss why many scholars of Murdoch’s work identify the significance of this unique 
position upon her writing in both spheres. Following this discussion, some prominent 
philosophical influences upon Murdoch’s concept of attention are identified, specifically her 
indebtedness to the philosophy of Simone Weil and Plato. The philosophical ideas of these 
significant individuals are explored to illustrate their impacts upon Murdoch’s own vision. 
Next three major themes of Murdoch’s philosophy are discussed prior to a more in-depth 
exploration of attention in the following chapter.  
Chapter Two will provide a detailed account of the concept of attention. This chapter 
serves as the philosophical basis for arguments developed later in the study and offers the 
opportunity to understand the concept of attention through a very detailed and thorough 
exposition. Although later chapters also explore Murdochian philosophy, this chapter serves 
as a foundation for later arguments. Within this chapter, the image of the human supported by 
Murdoch’s contemporaries are explained and critiqued, followed by the description of the 
moral ‘problem’ of M and D4. Next, multiple aspects of the concept of attention are explained 
                                                 
4 ‘M’ and ‘D’ are abbreviations for ‘Mother in law’ and ‘Daughter in Law’ utilised by Murdoch in her description of the moral ‘problem’ 
she develops to illustrate the concept of attention. This moral problem is further explicated in Chapter Two.   
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in order to enable a clear and comprehensive picture to support arguments presented in later 
chapters.  
Chapters Three through Seven comprise the substantive argument. The concerns 
outlined in this introduction about the ‘ideally rational individual’ are critically extended in 
Chapter Three. This image is compared with contemporary neoliberal ideas and later brought 
into conversation with the arguments Murdoch developed in order to reconsider the 
projection of a predominant economic vision of early childhood education.  
Chapter Four expands upon Murdoch’s concerns with the ‘fact-value’ divide in order to 
raise questions about the utilisation of neuroscientific research within education and question 
a scientistic vision for deriving educational policy to inform pedagogical practice. Murdoch’s 
concerns about the diminishment of moral concepts are considered in light of educational 
visions that relegate moral and ethical concerns to the margins, or obscures them entirely.  
Chapter Five offers a detailed exposition of the role of love in attention and explores 
the possibilities of recognising love as a critical element within pedagogical relationships. 
The conceptualisation of the ‘professional’ early childhood teacher is explored. Additionally, 
the implications of neoliberal ‘professionalisms’ upon the role of emotions in pedagogy is 
examined. Following this is an exposition of Murdochian love. The professional’ teacher is 
re-examined through the demands of attention to reconsider the role of the moral within 
pedagogical relationships and the benefits of a just and loving gaze.  
Chapter Six involves a short autobiographical positioning statement in order to 
contextualise my position as a teacher and researcher within Aotearoa New Zealand. Later, 
this chapter explores the Māori concept of aroha as a notion that holds synergistic 
possibilities with attention. Commencing with a brief account of my own professional 
context, this chapter moves into a detailed critical investigation into the concept of aroha to 
identify and explore commonalities between aroha and attention.  
Chapter Seven explores the concept of attention as an ‘inhabited’ philosophy and 
carries through the analysis of aroha and attention to offer a synergistic approach. This 
chapter critically examines Murdochian understandings of the role of the ‘inner life’ and 
explores the encouraging possibilities of attention as a singular, unique, but also ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘everyday’ philosophical endeavour. Attention as an ongoing exercise or practice, aroha 
as a focused attention upon the light within another individual. Together, these concepts 
support an appreciation that the inner life is wholly opaque and unable to be represented 
through language or external observation. Teaching is built from the inner life and needs to 
be appreciated as an obscure but significant element.  
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Finally, a concluding chapter discusses the main arguments developed over the study, 
with a view to highlighting the ways in which an enhanced understanding of attention can 
enrich education. Some limitations of the research are discussed and some suggestions for 




Introducing Iris Murdoch  
 
Introduction 
In this study, the philosophy of Iris Murdoch provides a critical lens through which 
contemporary issues in early childhood education will be reviewed and reconceived. But, an 
important initial question is, why draw from Murdoch’s philosophy to illuminate the current 
situation of early childhood education? Murdoch’s philosophy is at times elusive. Nicol 
(1999) characterises her as a philosopher who “has consistently taken up an unfashionable 
position” (p. 1). Murdoch identified herself as a “Wittgensteinian neo-Platonist” (Hobson & 
Murdoch, 2003, p. 92), a position which Hämäläinen (2014) argues is paradoxical due to the 
incompatibility of the concepts of transcendentalism and essentialism with linguistic 
philosophy. Furthermore, Murdoch’s consideration of morality is characterised by a 
pragmatic approach to the metaphysical realm (Jordan, 2014). Somewhat more 
complimentary, Conradi (2001) describes her as ‘at odds’ with orthodox philosophy due to 
her interest in everything and her refusal to be limited or confined; a “half-artist and half 
intellectual” (p. 268) who was never at home in either group. Browning (2018) describes 
Murdoch as a philosopher who “strikes a subtle balance between the styles and objects of 
thinking to which she attends” (p. 2). Murdoch promotes the centrality of morality, human 
individuality, and human relationships within any consideration of human existence. 
Although the introduction offered a brief insight into the possibilities of considering 
Murdoch’s concept of attention in early childhood education, it will take the length of this 
study to broach its subtleties. This first chapter will serve as a preliminary introduction to 
Murdoch’s philosophy to establish the relevance of her oeuvre for contemporary early 
childhood education and indicate some major themes of her philosophy. It is important to 
explain these major themes to prepare for later discussion on the concept of attention and to 
support a clearer understanding of the more nuanced aspects of Murdoch’s philosophy for 
later argumentation. 
At the outset, this chapter will briefly describe some important moments in Murdoch’s 
life. There will be a brief mention of her undergraduate studies and early philosophical 
influences, particularly the tutors and life experiences that her philosophical writing. 
Stemming from an interest in Sartre, Murdoch’s movement away from existentialist thought 
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will be described and a concise description of her thoughts on writing as a novelist and 
philosopher will be offered. Murdoch discouraged readers from attempting to gain an idea of 
her philosophy from her novels, but also highlighted the important role that fiction played in 
her abilities to express philosophical situations and problems within the everyday world. 
Although this study only draws from Murdoch’s philosophical writings, this introductory 
chapter allows the opportunity to address her fictional writing as a critical aspect of her 
career. Following this, I will give a brief outline of her publications and describe ways in 
which her thought influenced her contemporaries and present-day philosophy, demonstrating 
the increasing interest in and validity of her thought.  
Following this initial section, there are two sections dedicated to the two major 
philosophical influences upon Murdoch’s thought: Plato and Simone Weil. Although there 
are other philosophical influences upon Murdoch’s thought, there is not the space within this 
study to explore these in depth. However, these influences are highlighted due to their impact 
upon Murdoch’s development of the concept of attention, which is central to this thesis.  In 
the sections discussing Plato and Weil, important points of alignment and departure will be 
described, for as the study unfolds, it will become increasingly apparent why these 
differences are critical when the concept of attention is considered in relation to early 
childhood education. After discussing these two major philosophical influences, three 
fundamental aspects of Murdoch’s philosophical vision will be expounded in three separate 
sections. The purpose of clarifying these aspects within this initial chapter, rather than in the 
next, is to offer a separate exposition of how they can be understood discretely from the 
concept of attention. These aspects - the ubiquity of morality, Murdoch’s resistance of a 
behaviouristic vision, and her devotion to making philosophy inclusive of diversity and 
relatable to all individuals – underpin Murdochian attention, differentiating her from Weilian 
and Platonist thought. Exploring these three aspects prior to a concentrated investigation into 
the concept of attention will provide a necessary foundation to comprehend Murdochian 
attention more clearly.  
 
A Brief Synopsis of the Life and Work of Iris Murdoch.  
Iris Murdoch was born in Dublin in 1919 and studied at the universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge (Antonaccio & Schweiker, 1996). At Somerville College in Oxford, Murdoch 
studied in the analytical tradition, taking an undergraduate degree which trained her analytic 
capacity (Conradi, 2001, p. 86). Murdoch (Conradi, 2001) comments that at the start of her 
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studies, Oxford was “bohemian and fantastic” (p. 109). However, World War II altered this 
atmosphere, with Murdoch describing wartime Oxford as “more earnest and more timid and 
no more careless rapture” (Conradi, 2001, p. 109). Heavily populated by women students 
during this time, Oxford was a dramatically altered space for study and, as an excellent 
scholar, Murdoch was afforded time with tutors who influenced her philosophical direction. 
Donald Mackinnon is identified as a tutor who had a significant impact on Murdoch. 
Described as a “Kantian and post-Kantian realist” (Conradi, 2001, p. 125) who refused the 
demise of metaphysics, Mackinnon influenced Murdoch’s philosophical considerations 
through his adherence to the fundamental consideration of moral philosophy as a lived 
experience and philosophy as central to how life is lived (Conradi, 2001, pp. 126-7).  
Following graduation, Murdoch took up a season of employment within the Treasury 
and a period working for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to help 
with the war effort. Soon after Murdoch reengaged with philosophy through her interest in 
Wittgenstein and Sartre. She writes of Sartre, “his writing and talking on morals – will, 
liberty, choice – is hard and lucid and invigorating. It’s the real thing” (Conradi, 2001, pp. 
215-6). Firchow (2007) identifies Murdoch’s interest in Sartre as pivotal in her philosophical 
development; although she never ‘converted’ to existentialism and remained critical of its 
tenets, this inspiration was influential. Later, this interest motivated her to move to 
Cambridge in 1947, spending most of her time at Trinity College with other postgraduates 
who encouraged her to read Wittgenstein. Although she just missed the opportunity to study 
under his tutelage, she later met in Wittgenstein in person (Conradi, 2001). Murdoch’s first 
philosophical book Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (published in 1953) is representative of the 
approach to philosophy that Murdoch was to undertake within the course of her life; akin to 
Sartre, Murdoch would write novels as well as philosophical tomes and seek to comprehend 
philosophical questions within the boundaries of the personal domain, connected to concrete 
experience (Firchow, 2007).  
Murdoch’s (1999) book on Sartre was the first English monograph produced on his 
work, gaining her esteem and prominence in her exposition of existentialism, but Sartre and 
Wittgenstein’s diminishment of the inner life invoked her refusal to adopt their ideas in toto.  
Murdoch is critical of the individualistic tone she identifies in existentialism and refused to 
displace consideration of the other (Conradi, 2001, pp. 269-70). Sartre’s interest in issues 
rather than people shaped his writing in ways that cannot represent the intricacies of real 
human life, alienating Murdoch (Bove, 1993). These points of difference shaped her concerns 
with the authority of the will and the prominence of rationality in moral philosophy (these 
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aspects of Murdoch’s philosophy will be discussed at length later in the study). Moving on in 
1948 to a philosophy tutorship at St Anne’s College at Oxford, Murdoch’s philosophical 
career flourished. Her oeuvre developed during her time teaching moral philosophy and 
focussing upon Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Descartes, and Hume. She was further inspired by the 
climate of Oxford, described as situating itself as “the philosophical centre of the world” 
(Conradi, 2001, p. 301).  
Murdoch’s contemporaries never fully accepted her approach to philosophy. Later she 
is characterised as ‘retrospective’ (Nicol, 1999) due in part to the classical philosophy she 
drew from to inform her thought. Even as late as 1998, following the publication of ‘Elegy 
for Iris’5 in The New Yorker by her widower John Bailey (Bayley, 1998b), the New Statesman 
Magazine’s comments that Murdoch’s philosophy was marginalised, stating she was 
“admired by the public more as a novelist than as a philosopher [and] The same opinion is 
probably shared by most academic philosophers” (p.48). However, the journal Philosophy 
(“Editorial,” 1998) paints a different picture, identifying Murdoch as “a guiding light…[who] 
sounded a clarion call against the conventional wisdom of the age” (p. 535). It was only much 
later that appreciation of Murdochian philosophy generated philosophical work in her vein, 
notably in the philosophy of Charles Taylor and Martha Nussbaum. Despite this lack of 
credence, Murdoch’s (1998) philosophical consideration continued to resist the ‘dryness’6 of 
“behaviouristic philosophy” produced within a “scientific age”, producing an image of 
humankind as “monarchs of all we survey” (p. 290, 293).  
Additional to her career in philosophy, Iris Murdoch was a prolific novelist. Over the 
course of four decades, she wrote twenty-six novels and several plays. There is an 
interrelationship between her fiction and philosophy that many scholars consider at length 
(see Lazenby, 2014; McMenamin, 2017; Nicol, 1999; Roberts & Freeman-Moir, 2013). It is 
also a topic of consideration Murdoch broached herself within interviews. With Brian Magee 
(Magee & Murdoch, 1998), Murdoch outlined some important differences between the 
philosopher and the novelist and perhaps, due to this self-determined distinction, she was 
careful to dissuade scholars  away from determining her philosophical position from her 
novels. She states “The philosopher engages with the philosophical field in the form which it 
                                                 
5 ‘An Elegy for Iris: Scenes from an Indomitable Marriage (Bayley, 1998b) was written by John Bayley prior to the time of her death, 
but at a time when she had succumbed to total memory loss from Alzheimer’s disease. Bayley describes the situation, stating “She 
is not sailing into the dark: The voyage is over, and under the dark escort of Alzheimer’s she has arrived somewhere. So have I” (p. 
44). Arguably, this article was written to announce the death of her cognition, prior to her corporeal death, for through her 
philosophy and literature, Murdoch’s thoughts and ideas were a part of the wider public domain.  
6 Murdoch’s (1998) essay ‘Against Dryness’ is precisely about these aspects, and the following quotes are taken from this essay.  
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has when he appears on the scene…The artist by contrast seems an irresponsible 
individual…he has no given problems to solve. He has to invent his own problems” (pp. 9-
10). Within this interview, Murdoch proposes several differences between philosophy and 
literature. She asserts that philosophical arguments need to be clearly defined and structured, 
but literature can involve many forms; few individuals undertake philosophy, but literature is 
accessible to the wider public. The philosopher seeks to create form out of muddle, whereas 
the artist breaks forms and obfuscates to reveal a grander unifying narrative behind the signs 
and symbols.  
Although this study will only draw from the philosophical writings of Murdoch, within 
this overview it would be remiss to disregard Murdoch’s fictional work entirely. While once 
novels were considered to be of less philosophical worth than traditional academic writing, 
the contemporary view holds that literature can enhance and deepen individual philosophical 
engagement, develop individual stances, and deepen meaning (Nussbaum, 2012, p. 261). 
Murdoch defended literature as an art form that can elicit attention and improve the moral 
imagination. There are many important similarities between philosophy and literature, the 
foremost of which is that they are both truth-seeking activities. Both philosophy and literature 
involve a form of exposition that includes “exploration, classification, discrimination, 
organised vision” (Magee & Murdoch, 1998, p. 11), and a concern for moral truth. However, 
a common criticism for both forms is whether they represent human life truthfully and 
reliably. When an artist or philosopher fails to represent moral truth within his or her work, 
more often than not that work is viewed as a failure. The main similarity between Murdoch’s 
philosophy and fiction is the moral truth she seeks to reveal.  
Murdoch’s philosophical writing theorised morality and moral concepts, but fictional 
writing supported her exploration of these concepts in everyday human situations. Murdoch 
contended that philosophy surfaced in her novels because this was her area of knowledge and 
expertise, rather than to instruct (Magee & Murdoch, 1998). Although there are common 
threads between Murdoch’s philosophy and fiction, it is important to remain sensitive to the 
stance that Murdoch took to separate the two. She argued that it was important to distinguish 
her fictional writings from her philosophy; although both literature and philosophy are truth-
seeking activities, fiction is not the place in which to instruct or proselytise a particular 
philosophical view (Magee & Murdoch, 1998). Murdoch argues that literature which pushes 
a particular view too strongly, or is too full of the writers’ personality, is frequently 
recognised as ‘bad’ literature. Although she wishes to present a style of writing as her own, 
she never sought to be personally present within her work (p. 9). Whether contemporary 
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scholars accept this as an accurate representation of Murdoch’s work is still an area for 
debate (see Lamarque, 1978; Nussbaum, 2004; Robjant, 2015; Widdows, 2005).  
Due to the value Murdoch placed on the unique human position in her philosophy, her 
fictional characters are placed in situations to provoke moral and ethical consideration. In 
fiction, Murdoch explored the ways in which the individual’s moral decisions are influenced 
by the group dynamic. She outlines varying moral standpoints to illustrate the tensions the 
individual can face in relation to the group. Murdoch’s representation of communities of 
individuals experiencing moral issues aids our common understanding of how different moral 
stances can influence human relationship and the complexities of living in a “world driven, 
on the one hand, by individualism and, on the other, by ideological or moral frameworks that 
obliterate the individual” (Stan, 2014, p. 1173). This point of tension raises moral and ethical 
questions about the pressures of seeking individuality within the dynamics of a group that 
promotes a collective image. The tensions between freedom, community, and individuality 
are strong within Murdoch’s fictional and philosophical writing (the philosophical aspect will 
be further discussed in Chapter Three). 
Similar to the length and breadth of her fictional-writing career, Murdoch published in 
many philosophical journals over many decades. The essays collected for Existentialists and 
Mystics (Murdoch, 1998) span from 1950 to 1986. Three essays in this book, entitled ‘The 
Idea of Perfection’, ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’, and ‘The Sovereignty of Good over Other 
Concepts’ are collected in a book entitled The Sovereignty of Good (Murdoch, 1970) and 
reprinted in paper (Murdoch, 2001) and digital format (Murdoch, 2013), opening up 
Murdoch’s work to a new generation of scholarship. Late in her career, Murdoch also wrote a 
book of her philosophical entitled Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Murdoch, 1992). As 
outlined above, her philosophical work took the distinctive role of ‘truth-seeking’ seriously. 
One of Murdoch’s major contributions to modern philosophy was her persistent work to 
rescue the role of consciousness within moral decision-making. She reclaimed the validity of 
‘the particulars’ of human experience from relegation by the dominant trends in philosophical 
thought of her time7. Soon after the completion of Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals 
(Murdoch, 1992) came the untimely ending of her life in 1999 from Alzheimer’s disease. 
Following Murdoch’s death, there was a brief focus upon the more sensational periods of 
Murdoch’s life. However (as articulated above) the focus of this study is upon her 
                                                 
7 Widdows (2005) argues that this movement towards promoting the individual human standpoint in her philosophy caused her to 
desist her short involvement in the communist party. This was in part due to the primacy of the human individual within her 
philosophical stance, but equally reflective of “her recognition that totalitarian regimes become dehumanizing” (p. 3). 
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philosophical work and the application of her conceptual ideas to the domain of early 
childhood education. To read more about Murdoch’s personal life, see the authorised 
biography Iris Murdoch: A Life (Conradi, 2001).  
As outlined earlier, Murdoch’s philosophy was contrary to the dominant direction of 
philosophical thought and, due to her criticisms of analytical traditions and the use of 
scientific empiricism in moral philosophy. Murdoch was an outlier within philosophy circles 
of her time. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that her philosophy was ahead of 
her time. Currently, there is a renewed focus upon Murdochian thought, with multiple books, 
papers, and studies being dedicated to her philosophical concepts (see Antonaccio, 2012; 
Browning, 2018; Catton, 2017; Hämäläinen & Dooley, 2019; Olsson, 2018; Roberts, 2016; 
Roberts & Saeverot, 2018 for some examples). Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Murdoch, 
1992) is regarded as a “brilliant, erudite but sprawling work” (Antonaccio & Schweiker, 
1996, p. xv). Equally the essays she wrote over her life, collected into the text Existentialists 
and Mystics (Murdoch, 1998) covered diverse topics. There are central themes in Murdoch’s 
work that persist throughout her writing. This study will explore these themes. However, at 
this point it is pertinent to discuss significant influences upon Murdoch’s philosophy to 
inform later discussion. The next two sections are devoted to philosophical influences. Firstly 
Plato, secondly Simone Weil.  
 
The Influence of Plato 
The philosophy of Plato was highly influential upon Iris Murdoch’s writing and integral to 
the concept of attention. The section in Existentialists and Mystics (Murdoch 1998) 
containing the essays collected for The Sovereignty of Good are given the sub-heading ‘Re-
reading Plato’. Despite an early distaste for Plato’s philosophy in her undergraduate studies 
(Conradi, 2001, p. 87), Murdoch was inspired to reconsider Plato. This ‘re-reading’ is 
attributed to her fascination with Weilian philosophy (which will be discussed in the 
following section). Murdoch refers to Plato as a significant voice within her thought, stating 
“I think Plato is one of the most religious of all thinkers, and he is one of the greatest” 
(Sagare & Murdoch, 2001, p. 713). This statement by Murdoch demonstrates not only the 
instrumental role of Plato in the development of her philosophical thought, but also the 
influence of Plato’s religious direction upon Murdoch’s philosophy. Inspired by Plato, the 
place of morality and the concept of the good became central within Murdochian philosophy.  
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In articulating the concept of goodness, Murdoch draws directly from Plato, stating 
“Plato says of it [goodness] ‘It is that which every soul pursues and for the sake of which it 
does all that it does’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 380). Through Plato, Murdoch’s develops an 
argument that goodness is the sovereign concept in morality, unifying others and yet 
remaining separate and indefinable. Light becomes a metaphor for goodness through 
Murdoch’s use of Plato’s analogy of the cave; the prisoners in the cave are at first seeing the 
shadows from the objects in the light of the fire, but the true light that calls them out of the 
cave is the light of the sun. At first, the prisoners only see the shadows of the objects cast by 
the light of the fire and fail to see the objects themselves. This false light deludes them into 
thinking they are seeing reality, but they are only seeing a limited image. Once the prisoners 
see the fire as the source of the light that made the shadows, these illusions no longer hold 
sway. However, the light of the fire becomes the new source of attention, a point of focus that 
may cease the search for anything more. The light of the fire is a false light within us. Forms 
of self-scrutiny that generate pride and selfishness is an investigation of this ‘false light’. To 
move towards the sun, out of the cave, into the world illuminated by its light is to move “right 
away from the self towards a distant transcendent perfection, a source of uncontaminated 
energy, a source of new and quite undreamt-of virtue” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 383). The notion 
of goodness will be discussed later in this section.  
It is important to identify some points of departure between Murdoch and Plato, 
because they will be important in discerning the subtle differences in their philosophical 
positions. Murdoch highlights art and literature as two modes of expression that hold 
potential for developing a moral vision, but she is equally clear that Plato does not share this 
view. For Plato, art (including poetry/literature) is not a source of inspiration for discerning 
goodness. In the essay ‘The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists’, Murdoch 
(1998) asserts that Plato placed limitations upon his definition of beauty to exclude the 
consideration of art. She writes, “Plato wants to cut art off from beauty, because he regards 
beauty as too serious a matter to be commandeered by art” (p. 401). She states that Plato 
finds artists ‘morally weak’ and situates art as a medium that develops the lowest forms of 
awareness, or “eikasia, a state of vague image-ridden illusion” (p. 389). Eikasia characterises 
the experience of the prisoners of the cave when they view the shadows on the wall. As the 
movement through the cave is a successive progression from illusion to reality, Plato’s 
argument is that art can only indulge false understandings of the world. Furthermore, art 
depicts wicked individuals and situations, tainting the possibility of developing goodness. An 
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appreciation of art will encourage people to indulge the base emotions that are elicited. She 
aligns Kant with Plato’s assertion that “almost all ‘real’ art turns out to be impure” (p. 402).  
Murdoch (1998) also highlights Plato’s concern with the ‘fixed nature’ of art in relation 
to his dialectical approach to philosophy. In Plato’s view, philosophy should be lived and 
discussed, but the work of art is statically represented (p. 405). Art exacerbates the distance 
between us and knowledge, involving the introduction of further systems and signs. Art 
distracts the mind away through attention to the signs rather than the knowledge that is 
sought. Artistic symbolism adds another layer of interpretation onto the already dark mode of 
communicative language we endure in order to represent the reality of the world. To explain 
Plato’s position, Murdoch writes, “the ideal of knowledge is to see face to face, not (eikasia) 
in a glass darkly” (p. 413, original emphasis). However, Murdoch does not fully agree with 
this position and argues for the educational benefits of contemplating art. In her view, art can 
present an opportunity to reconsider morality and enhance philosophical considerations (p. 
461).  
For Murdoch, there is a distinction between the ‘material art’ as the fixed object and the 
‘work of art’ as a “sustained experienced mental synthesis” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 3, author’s 
emphasis). In this respect, art is not solely the ‘thing’ itself but also our engagement with it, 
particularly how we employ our moral imagination to consider the artwork. Art offers the 
opportunity for people to develop their moral vision by encouraging a state of consciousness 
that supports reflection and discernment. These opportunities for reflective discernment 
support our developing moral ideas. There are forms or ‘bad art’ that may produce egotistical 
responses and can damage us by “prompting a false egotistic fantasy” (p.19), but there is also 
good art that develops our understanding and appreciation of the world illuminated through 
transcendent goodness.  
Now that some differences between Murdoch and Plato have been explored, some 
alignments will be discussed. As explained above, Murdoch develops her understanding of 
goodness as a transcendent, external, and fixed actuality from Plato. In the analogy of the 
cave, the sun is the representation of goodness. Goodness is something outside of us, constant 
and unwavering. We never fully know what goodness is for it “is difficult to look at the 
sun…it is easier to look at the converging edges than to look at the centre itself” (Murdoch, 
1998, p. 382). The light of goodness enhances our vision of the world, but this vision is only 
for those individuals who make the moral pilgrimage out of the cave. Although Murdoch 
supports Plato’s view that goodness is transcendent, there is work involved in developing an 
accurate vision of the world illuminated by the good. Unlike later Platonists in a ‘post-
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Freudian age’, Murdoch’s Plato is not optimistic on the search for the good. Moral progress is 
difficult and the search for the good is a moral task that is an arduous, incremental, and 
lifelong pursuit (Tracy, 1996). There is no assurance of comprehensive enlightenment. Plato 
is the source of Murdoch’s distrust of consolatory philosophical positions, as they both turn 
away from a consolatory philosophical vision to “strip away the layers of benighted self-
mythologizing and approach the transcendent concepts of the Good and the True through a 
process of ascesis” (Nicol, 1999, p. 15). Through the process of unselfing8 and the work of a 
just and loving gaze, attention is means to move into the metaphysical ‘light’ of the sun. 
Although it may console us to think of our own desires and needs, unselfing develops the 
attentive focus to resist this egotistical pull. Murdoch (1998) writes “there are false suns, 
easier to gaze upon and more comforting than the true one” (p. 382). Yet our task is not to 
follow a degraded philosophy that substitutes goodness with the fascination of the self. To 
explicate this progression, Murdoch draws from the Platonic image of the energy of Eros, 
Freudian psychoanalysis and Simone Weil’s concepts of gravity and grace to illustrate the 
interplay between energy and love. 
Eros, drawn from Plato, is both spiritual energy and the orientation of desire. Eros is a 
significant part of moral life, as “most of our moral problems involve an orientation of our 
energy and our appetites” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 497). The shape of Eros stems from the focus, 
with good energy drawn from morally truthful objects and the opposite equally true. 
Corrupted desires may summon immense destructive energy, whereas a better world is built 
through the love of the good. The influence of Plato and in the earlier outlined description of 
the corrupting force of art can be seen in this position; Eros is simply the energy, but the 
focus of that energy determines whether it will summon up positive energy or “great energy 
[that] may prove to be a great demon” (pp. 497). The ‘great demonic’ energy reduces our 
progress out of the cave. This ‘negative’ energy comes from the degradation of love and the 
desire for “ambition, vanity, cruelty, greed, jealousy, hatred” (p. 496).  
As egotistical beings, Murdoch (1998) asserts that the picture of the human, created by 
psychology – the most accurate creation conceived by Freud (p. 341) – explicates the 
demonic ‘Luciferian’ compulsion within the human condition. The desire to seek consolation 
drives the psyche to create a fantasy, redirecting attention from reality in order to avoid its 
                                                 
8 The term ‘unselfing’ is not one that is used by Murdoch herself. The closest approximation that is used by Murdoch is contained 
within the following quote “Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself” (Murdoch, 1998b, p. 376). However, many 
contemporary scholars have deemed the term ‘unselfing’ appropriate to use in order to explain the form of ego-repression that 
Murdoch was seeking to represent in her writing (Griffin, 1993; Olsson, 2018; Ruokonen, 2002).  
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unpleasant aspects (Murdoch, 1998). As an egotistical system, the psyche feeds its inherent 
selfish nature by drawing our focus to objects that distort moral truth. Through a just and 
loving gaze, the moral imagination moves away from the selfish pull of the ego. Murdoch 
(1998) aligns Freud and Plato in their depiction of Eros as universal energy. She promotes 
Freud as a preferred psychological theorist, as Freud understands Plato’s representation of the 
binary nature of Eros – as a force for good or destruction (Tracy, 1996, p. 60). Freudian 
theory presents an image of the human analogous to a machine, drawing from energy in order 
to operate. This cynical (yet, according to Murdoch, accurate) image of the psyche 
demonstrates the human desire for consolation and subsequent degradation, a point at which 
the Weilian influence comes to the fore.  
Murdoch’s connection to Weil is expanded upon in the next section, but at this point it 
is necessary to highlight this association in relation to Plato. For Weil, goodness is a 
transcendent reality above us. Where gravity is the spiritual equivalent of physical gravity, 
drawing us downwards and exhausting us, grace is the lifting counterbalance offering us the 
opportunity to experience fulfilment and peace. Weil (2002) asserts, “Everything we call base 
is a phenomenon due to gravity. Moreover, the word baseness is an indication of this fact” (p. 
2). Selfish and individualistic acts are the gravity that lowers us; to move beyond gravity, we 
must take actions towards grace. Weil stipulates we must have an “attitude of supplication” 
(p. 3), which is also an act of lowering ourselves but described as “the descending movement 
of the second degree of grace” (p. 4). The act of humility invokes a re-evaluation of what we 
‘need’. We may still feel the press of desire to resist our moments of privation and may even 
succumb to these desires. In these moments, Weil reminds us that gravity lowers us towards 
baseness, but grace allows us to access the spiritual and moral energy that we need to thrive. 
In humility, the second degree of grace, we experience a moral gravity that “makes us fall 
towards the heights” (p. 4).  
Murdoch was clear to articulate that Weil was a strong influence upon her philosophy. 
Weil inspired Murdoch to reconsider her initial assumptions about Plato’s philosophy and 
encounter him “anew” (Conradi, 2001, p. 260). According to Murdoch, Plato was 
instrumental in Weil’s overall development of thought. She writes that Weil “believes in a 
transcendent reality and that Good and Evil are connected with modes of human knowledge” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 158). Like Plato, Weil was critical within the development of Murdoch’s 





The Influence of Simone Weil  
I have used the word ‘attention’, which I borrow from Simone Weil, to express the idea 
of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality. I believe this to be the 
characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent. (Murdoch, 1998, p. 327) 
The concept of attention was integral to the philosophical theories of Simone Weil, and 
Murdoch’s extension of the concept of attention originates from Weil’s writings. Weilian 
attention differs from Murdochian attention. These points of divergence are essential to 
understand to support the wider argument developed in this study: That Murdochian attention 
can resist the dominant neoliberal approaches that limit novel possibilities for early childhood 
education.  
Murdoch was forthcoming regarding the influence of Weil’s philosophy upon her own 
oeuvre and wrote comments to this extent within her own philosophy. The initial quote of this 
section is from the essay entitled ‘The Idea of Perfection’ (Murdoch, 1998). Another, taken 
from ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’ (Murdoch, 1998), is equally pertinent:  
Let me now simply suggest ways in which I take the prevalent and popular picture to be 
unrealistic. In doing this my debt to Simone Weil will become evident. (p. 340) 
Weil’s philosophy affected Murdoch’s ongoing development of philosophical concepts, but 
the esteem with which she held Weil was crucial to developing her own vision. Within a 
review of Weil’s notebooks, Murdoch writes, “To read her is to be reminded of a standard” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 157). However, Murdoch did not merely copy Weilian attention, but 
expanded upon it. As with Sartre and Plato, Murdoch was inspired by Weil’s philosophical 
ideas to progress and develop her own philosophical vision. Weil’s vision, combined with 
Murdoch’s dissatisfaction with the image of the human promoted by her contemporaries, 
inspired her to develop a unique conceptualisation of attention.  
Physical pain and distress shaped Weil’s (1973) philosophical vision. Throughout her 
life, Weil was plagued by illness. Her belief that she could alleviate her suffering through 
concentrated attention shaped the development of this concept. Despite admitting that this 
belief was “practically unsupported by any hope of results” (p. 64), she endeavoured to 
sustain long periods of concentration during her headaches, chanting a poem as a mantra to 
direct her attention. It was during these experiences that Weil felt she was able to focus and 
pay attention to God and, through patient attention, open herself to the grace of God. She 
writes, “it was during one of these recitations that…Christ himself came down and took 
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possession of me” (p. 69). ‘Love’ was the title of the poem she recited and the centrality of 
love within Murdochian attention stems from Weil’s consideration of it. Through attention, 
Weil experienced a feeling of love, which she attributed to Christ. The experience of love 
became a crucial and central element in Weil’s concept of attention.  
In Weil’s (2002) view, attention is a prerequisite for love. Like a poet who produces 
beauty through attention to reality, love is generated through attention to the real. The values 
of truth, beauty, and goodness are understood through “a certain application of the full 
attention to the object” (p. 120). Weil writes, “attention, taken to its highest degree is the 
same thing as prayer. It presupposes faith and love” (p. 117). It is important to identify that 
love is necessary to attention, but it is equally significant to recognise that Weilian attention 
presupposes love. Without love, there can be no attentive state. Claims to attention 
undertaken without love are erroneous. Love is central to Murdochian attention, described as 
“a just and loving gaze towards an individual reality” (Murdoch, p. 327). Later in this study, a 
chapter will be devoted to the consideration of love within attention. At this point, it is 
important to outline the influence of Weilian love and Murdoch’s departures from it.  
Weil’s (2002) acknowledgment that “Among human beings, only the existence of those 
we love is fully recognized” (p. 64) influences Murdoch’s development of the concept of 
attention as the opportunity to apprehend reality through the medium of the moral 
imagination. Love renders others more clearly and without love, the other is less ‘real’. 
Through love, we can see the other illuminated through the light of goodness. Without love, 
we are seeing ‘through the glass darkly’. According to Murdoch (1992), love “indicate[s] the 
connection of the good and the real” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 437). We not only see others more 
fully through the vision of love, but we become more attuned to reality through the medium 
of the moral imagination.  
The notion of surrender is critical to Weilian attention, as it is necessary to relinquish 
the ‘self’ to the focus of attention. Moments of pure attention foster the conditions for a total 
suspension of self. Weilian attention is an act of deference; it is necessary for the attentive 
individual to let go of the self. However, this is not an act of will. Willing involves a rupture 
in attention through the sense of tightening that is experienced in its activation. Weil (2002) 
writes, “What could be more stupid than to tighten up our muscles and set our jaws about 
virtue, or poetry, or the solution of a problem. Attention is something quite different” (p. 
117). In contrast to the ‘tightening’ action, Weilian attention is concerned with desire, love 
and consent. To be open to the divine inspiration within us, we must desire it, be open to it, 
and not refuse it. This is where attention is akin to consent and relaxing, rather than will and 
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tightening. She writes that attention involves “all that I call ‘I’ to be passive” (p. 118). 
Deference of the self is not ‘optional’, it is necessary to elicit an attentive state “so full that 
the ‘I’ disappears” (p. 118).  
This is a critical point of departure between Murdoch and Weil. Where Weil 
surrendered the self to attain the attentive state, Murdoch defends the uniqueness of the 
individual in the concept of attention. This is an important distinction to outline, for it will 
prove significant in later discussions, particularly in the notion of liberal freedom (Chapter 
Three) and the unique role of the teacher in pedagogy (Chapter Seven). Although the next 
chapter outlines the concept of attention more fully, to illustrate this point of difference 
requires reference to some indispensable aspects of Murdochian attention. First, moral 
concepts are taken internally and contemplated. The ‘inner life’ that was discussed in the 
introduction is a critical aspect of Murdochian attention. This inner life must be defended, as 
the moral imagination is critical to determining moral choice and actions. Second, the inner 
life is not accessible to others and is built from unique experiences and musings upon moral 
concepts. The inner life is a part of a singular consciousness. Murdoch does not relinquish the 
opaque and individual self in order to attend to others, Murdochian attention is built from this 
unique position and the moral imagination develops through it, enlarging a personal 
understanding of goodness. This is not to argue that goodness is as unique and varied as 
people are, nor that goodness is a label affixed to things. Attention reveals a greater 
understanding of goodness (and other moral concepts), but this clearer image is dependent 
upon the knowledge, experiences, and understanding of the individual consciousness to 
render it more clearly. These philosophical ideas are discussed in more depth within the 
subsequent chapters (particularly Chapter Seven). However, it is critical to outline them here 
to clarify the point that Weilian notions of the obliteration of the self are not part of 
Murdochian attention. Weil seeks to withdraw, to disappear so that love may pass through her 
from God to the people she meets. However, Murdoch asserts that the attentive individual 
cannot disappear, for an individual’s history builds and forms their moral imagination 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 320).  
Murdoch and Weil both assert that all individuals are offered the opportunities that 
grow from attention. For Weil (2002), attention is underpinned by from mystical 
understandings. Failing to develop attentiveness and draw energy from the grace of God, or 
to “feed on light” (p. 3), is the fault all other faults stem from. For Murdoch (1998), the 
centrality and acceptance of God is in question. Murdoch asserts, “…there is, in my view, no 
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God in the traditional sense of that term; and the traditional sense is perhaps the only sense” 
(p. 365). Any allusion to our τέλος as a species is disdained, particularly where she contends: 
…the various metaphysical substitutes for God – Reason, Science, History – are false 
deities. Our destiny can be examined but it cannot be justified or totally explained. We 
are simply here. And if there is any kind of sense or unity in human life…it is of some 
other kind and must be sought within a human experience which has nothing outside it 
(p. 365).  
In Murdoch’s fictional writing, she explores the behaviours of those who consider themselves 
to be cast “in the role of god”9 (Griffin, 1993, p. 106) and produces characters who are 
egotistical and destructive (of self and other). The relationships of these ‘god-like’ 
individuals fail due to an inattentiveness to the other. It is through their egotism that they are 
‘god-like’. Murdoch’s understanding of ‘god-like’ is depicted as despotic, repressive, and 
pursuing the light of the ego.  
Murdoch’s own relationship with the concept of god was convoluted. Bayley (1998a) 
discusses her affinity for Buddhism, but mainly through her admiration of Buddhists (Bayley 
points out that Peter Conradi was a Buddhist admired by Murdoch). Murdoch discussed the 
complexities of the role of religion in her life, stating: 
I have a Puritan background. I don't feel that religion departed from my life when God 
the Father departed. I used to think that when God the Father went it was the end of 
religion for me, but I have learnt better. I feel now that I don't have to have this image 
or to believe in a personal God in order to have religion (Chevalier, 2013, paragraph 
10)  
Despite the validity of God, god, or gods, Murdoch (1992) argues that the role that religion 
has played within our history must be considered, writing, “our huge jumbled history is a 
religious history from which we must learn” (p. 139, original emphasis).  
Murdoch explored spirituality and spiritual aspects of human experience, attempting to 
make sense of how attention connects to a clearer understanding of goodness. For Murdoch, 
there is a distinction between religion and spirituality. Spirituality can be a part of religious 
structure, but the individual may need to defend their understanding of spirituality within the 
religious context (p. 481). Murdoch asserts there is an interconnection between spirituality, 
morality and religion, but there are also careful distinctions between them. The dutiful 
                                                 
9 See Griffin’s (1993) analysis of The sea, the sea  
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individual, the virtuous individual, and the religious individual can illustrate these 
distinctions. The dutiful individual may follow the rules of religion, akin to the religious 
individual, but the virtuous individual can reconsider religious dogma in order to evaluate its 
connection to virtue. This is not to eschew the rules of religion. Some individuals may need a 
strict list of rules (religion) to guide them away from ‘sin’. Murdoch argues that the criminal 
may break multiple ‘moral rules’ but later come to adhere to religious rules and redirect their 
conduct. The religious individual may be guided into a higher form of consciousness through 
devotion to morality and a search for the good of God (p. 484). Religious ideals may prove 
more inspirational and accessible than the “unadorned promptings of reason” (p. 484). 
Nevertheless, the religious life can be distinct from the moral and spiritual life, for religion 
and spirituality are “both one and not one” (p. 483).  
There are continual adjustments when considering the intersections between morality, 
spirituality and religion, and none are undertaken simply. Where religion and spirituality are 
considered moral, institutional structures of religion that oppress free thought and promote 
cruelties are an enemy of morality (Murdoch, 1992, p. 487). High aspects of morality can 
often be associated with individuals who have departed from ‘religion’. However, Murdoch 
argues that the positive benefits of prayer have been lost through the diminishment of religion 
in everyday lives. She writes, “whatever one thinks of its theological context, it does seem 
that prayer can actually induce a better quality of consciousness and provide energy for good 
action which would not otherwise be available” (p. 368). The concept of attention is an 
examination of ‘prayer’ that can aid the secular individual in their development of the moral 
imagination, concepts, and character. In explaining the possibilities of the concept of 
attention, she considers her development of the concept of attention as an exploration into the 
benefits of prayer without the notion of God (Murdoch, 1998, p. 344). Murdoch asserts, “I 
think that useless confusion arises from attempts to extend the meaning of our word ‘God’ to 
cover any conception of a spiritual reality” (Murdoch, 992, p. 419). Although she is 
concerned with the wide application of the word ‘God’, she equally argues that the presence 
of the mystery of God can shape our thoughts. It would be dangerous to conceive of this 
presence as a ‘parent figure’ due to the consoling fantasy it would produce, detracting from 
the moral pilgrimage (Mulhall, 2007), but there are opportunities to be had in developing an 
appreciation of goodness beyond ourselves. 
The actuality of the mystical realm was essential to Weil’s (2002) development of the 
concept of attention. She proposed that attention offers the opportunity to experience eternity 
in the mortal realm, as the capacity to pay full attention endows the individual with the 
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“capacity to drive a thought away once and for all” (p. 118). This ability is “the gateway to 
eternity. The infinite in an instant” (p. 118). Weil emphasised a distinction between reason 
and biological functions in order to access this plane of existence. She writes, “the 
discursively reasoning part of the soul, which inhabits time, and the vegetative part, which 
controls the biological functions and is below time” can support the access to infinity.  In the 
same way that “there is an infinity of points in the length of a yard” (Weil, 1970, p. 292), 
attention can access an eternal state of being within the mortal realm. To do so, we must lose 
the concept of the ‘I’ to allow space for God to access the individual’s soul.  
A sense of eternity can only be summoned when the part of the soul that “reasons 
discursively and measures” (Weil, 1970, p. 292) is destroyed. Murdoch shares this suspicion 
of rationality, discursive reason, and limited forms of measurement. As outlined within the 
introduction, discussed in more depth later in this chapter and within Chapter Four, Murdoch 
was concerned with the ‘fact/value’ divide and the precedence of scientism.  She argued that 
the promotion of fact over value elicited the loss of the metaphysical background of 
philosophy. However, the critical point of departure between Murdoch and Weil is in the 
destruction of the self in order to achieve the attentive state. There are aspects of the portion 
of the soul which ‘reasons discursively and measures’ that could be essential to the moral 
imagination. Although this study is not the space to expand upon this issue, it would be a 
point of interest to explore.  
Mudroch’s vision of the spiritual pilgrimage is also indebted to Weil. In Murdoch’s 
review of Weil’s notebooks, Murdoch (1998) wrote: 
Spiritual progress is won through meditation: A view which is contrast (and some may 
think a welcome corrective) to contemporary English ethics with its exclusive emphasis 
on act and choice, and its neglect of the ‘inner life’. (p. 159) 
This quote encapsulates Murdoch’s admiration for Weil, her criticisms of dominant 
rationality and promotion of the spiritual pilgrimage as attainment of an improved ethical 
standpoint. For Murdoch, ethics should not be a set of guiding principles manifested through 
actions. Ethics should extend beyond the behaviouristic, beyond only externally visible 
actions. Morality should be at the heart of ethics, and ethics should support an understanding 
of moral values (Antonaccio, 2007). The spiritual journey, in this case through Weil’s 
experiences with meditation and detachment through the act of attention is congruent with 
Murdoch’s interpretation of the ‘moral pilgrim’ and the ‘endless task’ of the individual who 
is developing moral concepts (more on the moral pilgrim is discussed in Chapter Two).  
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Through Plato and Weil, Murdoch reconsidered the diminishment of the metaphysical 
background in the philosophy of her contemporaries. Through Weil, Murdoch gained 
renewed interest in Plato. From the influence of these philosophers, Murdoch developed a 
substantive argument to contest the diminishment of metaphysics and the assumption that 
moral values can be separated from ‘fact’ in order to rationally determine a course of moral 
action. Murdoch’s argument against this divide, and her support for an image of human 
experience as ‘saturated’ with moral value is discussed in the next section.   
 
Morality Covers the ‘Whole of Our Mode of Living’ 
This title comes from the following quote: 
The area of morals, and ergo moral philosophy, can now be seen, not as a hole-and-
corner matter of debts and promises, but as covering the whole of our mode of living 
and the quality of our relations with the world (Murdoch, 1998, p. 380, emphasis 
added).  
Murdoch was critical of any vision of the world that reduced morality to a subsidiary issue. 
The diminishing place of moral concepts in the philosophy of her time incensed Murdoch and 
drove her to write extensively on this demise. The effects of fascism, Nazism, and 
totalitarianism deeply affected Murdoch; in the introduction to Existentialists and Mystics 
(Murdoch, 1998) Conradi writes, “it might be surmised that the madnesses of Europe hurt Iris 
Murdoch into moral philosophy” in which she witnessed the “total breakdown of society” (p. 
xix). This ‘madness’ became inspirational and instructive for her thought. As articulated 
earlier, Murdoch (1998) argued that the creation and promulgation of human images have 
ramifications for human actions; humans are creatures who make pictures of themselves, then 
become shaped by this picture (p. 75). The moral philosophy of her contemporaries, which 
promoted the human capacity to determine and choose moral actions without a notion of the 
metaphysical background, may have been viewed by Murdoch as a form of moral relativism 
too similar to the arguments that underpinned various war atrocities.  
Murdoch established arguments for the retrieval of the metaphysical background and 
appreciation of the spiritual aspects of philosophy whilst maintaining the critical importance 
of philosophy to explore and understand the world (Antonaccio, 2012, p. 3). The 
philosophical position that thought, action, and language are inherently evaluative and value-
laden was considered by Murdoch in 1951 in ‘Thinking and Language’ (1951), in 1956 in 
‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, and the essays within The Sovereignty of Good written from 
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1962, to 1969. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals in 1992 further develops this position, 
marking over 40 years of considered argumentation upon the role of morality within human 
thought. In Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, Murdoch writes, “almost all our thoughts and 
actions are concerned with the infinitely heterogeneous business of evaluation, almost all our 
language is value language” (p. 32).  
Using language to represent the workings of the human moral mind is problematic. 
Although language is an attempt to move us towards a communal understanding of the 
signifying of ‘things’, the conceptual language required within discussions of morality is 
more slippery than that for external objects10 (See Chapter Seven for further discussion on the 
problems of moral language). The problem of ‘value-free’ analytical forms of philosophical 
inquiry is that they miss the foundational moral backdrop to arguments. Morality is not an 
option, not something added onto the world. Morality is woven into the fabric of existence 
and pervades our existence. The performance of ‘stepping back’ into an assumed ‘value-free’ 
rationality is redundant (more on the fact/value divide is discussed in Chapter Three). The 
description ‘value-free’ illustrates the desire to demarcate a preference for ‘facts’ over 
‘values’ (Murdoch, 1992). Murdoch (1992) argues that the divide between fact and value 
sought by her contemporaries may seem like a practical measure in order to reduce value 
preferences, but this delineation generates the illusion of a non-biased stance. A problem of 
analytical forms of philosophical enquiry, which seek to be ‘value-free’, is that they miss 
foundational premises based upon value. The distinction between fact and value and the 
movement to protect facts from value stemmed from the desire to liberate the human, harness 
the will, and discern appropriate action from the world of facts (Murdoch, 1992). In order to 
represent moral choices through actions, a demarcation was determined, but this schism is 
value-driven.  
Murdoch contested the position that a person’s moral worth can be measured via 
actions and movements; the capacity to report the inner workings of the mind does not 
represent the thing itself. When one attempts to explain one’s inner thoughts, descriptions fail 
                                                 
10 The problem of language  – that it is difficult to find commonality in moral conceptual language to sustain a philosophical argument 
about morality – is recognised as a characteristic of her own writing style. Murdoch is identified as a philosophical writer who 
undertook a style of writing which does not reflect a standard approach to building a philosophical argument; her sources are varied 
and wide-reaching, and her arguments are built from ‘talking around’ issues from multiple angles (Widdows, 2012). Antonaccio 
(2000) characterises Murdoch as mediating a position between contrasting pairs of ideas in moral philosophy, producing a form of 
argumentation which is “complex and rarely yields a straightforward synthesis” (p. 24). But this more open-ended, “unsystematic 
and sometimes obscure” (Widdows, 2012, p. 19) writing is necessary in order to develop an argument about moral philosophy. In 
order to approach moral concepts, and indeed to argue about them, it appears necessary for Murdoch to take a meandering and 
oscillatory approach and, through this approach, produce a philosophical position on morality quite unlike her contemporaries, and 
all the more interesting for it. 
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to represent all the small details that comprise its totality. Murdoch quotes Wittgenstein to 
belie this undertaking, stating, “‘What is this ceremony for?’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 310). The 
problems of (in)accurate representation are not grounds for dismissal or disregard. In 
accepting the difficulty of explication, some philosophers have jumped to assume there is no 
value to the workings of the inner mind. Murdoch argues that doing away with the entirety of 
the inner life based upon the problems of accurate depiction is excessive. She asserts, “‘Not a 
report’ need not entail ‘not an activity’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 318). There is value in the moral 
imagination, as developed through the practice of attention. Humans have the potential for a 
rich imaginative capacity. Humans can attain a greater understanding of the ubiquity of 
morals and the reality of the world through their imaginative capacity. In Murdoch’s words, 
“it is important to remember that language itself is a moral medium, almost all uses of 
language convey value. This is one reason why we are almost always morally active. Life is 
soaked in the moral” (Magee & Murdoch, 1998, p. 27, emphasis added).  
This line of argumentation is strongly represented within ‘The Sovereignty of Good 
over Other Concepts’ (Murdoch, 1998), particularly in the extended version of the initial 
quote from the start of this section. In this quote Murdoch identifies how an appreciation of 
the good within human relationships develops a ‘unifying theory’ for life. She writes:  
The scene remains disparate and complex beyond the hopes of any system, yet at the 
same time the concept Good stretches through the whole of it and gives it the only kind 
of shadowy unachieved unity which it can possess. The area of morals, and ergo of 
moral philosophy, can now be seen, not as a hole-and-corner matter of debts and 
promises, but as covering the whole of our mode of living and the quality of our 
relations with the world. (Murdoch, 1998, p. 380) 
Goodness ‘stretches’ throughout human relationships and therefore morality permeates 
human life. Morality is not an option to the side or an overlay of values on top of reality; it 
saturates reality and is an integral element in comprehending reality. It is erroneous to assume 
that individual choice establishes values. Values are discernible but not containable through 
our evaluative capacity: “We are not usually in doubt about the direction in which Good lies. 
Equally, we recognise the real existence of evil: cynicism, cruelty, indifference to suffering” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 380).  
Although morality pervades existence, moral concepts develop and shift over time are 
infinitely refinable (which is discussed further within Chapter Two in the section ‘Attention: 
The Endless Task’). Murdoch (1992) identifies that there is something about the human spirit 
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that seems “to demand a search for ‘deep foundations’” (p. 55). In attempting to contain these 
foundations they can be inappropriately transformed into something idolatry and, through the 
attempts of objective representation, lose their quintessence. Yet this does not negate the 
existence of values, nor prove that they are created by choices. Rather they demonstrate the 
vast complexity and pervasiveness of morals within the world, and the necessity for humans 
to move into ways of understanding values beyond the rational, objective, analytical, and 
‘value-free’ definitions. 
 
Morality is More than Actions 
Another central theme that informs the concept of attention (and arguably one of her major 
contributions to the domain of moral philosophy) was Murdoch’s argument that ethics 
extends beyond the domain of the behaviouristic (Antonaccio, 2007). As articulated earlier, 
Murdoch argued that morality is not only a question of the right thing to do, but also, “How 
can we make ourselves better?” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 364). Murdoch moved the argument 
away from a reductive consideration of goodness as solely a matter of conduct that can be 
externally measured and assessed, to one that supported the criticality of consciousness, the 
development of the moral imagination, and the defence of the singular and wholly opaque 
‘inner life’. Judgement of an individual’s ethical conduct cannot be limited to an assessment 
of their behaviours, but must also consider the role that moral vision plays in moral choice 
and action (Murdoch, 1998).  
Murdoch contends, “difficult concepts which cannot be explained in simple terms are 
classified as ‘emotive’ or dismissed as meaningless” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 236). Although it 
can be difficult to relate these concepts to actions, this is not sufficient grounds to abandon 
them. A simple correlation between actions and morality cannot illuminate depth of 
conceptual understanding, nor subtle variations between individuals. Murdoch (1992) argued 
that good people can be recognised by their ‘rhythm’ as much as their actions, and the 
relationship of this rhythm to our ‘inner space’. She writes, “An obsessed egoist…destroys 
the space and air round him and is uncomfortable to be around…an unselfish person enlarges 
the space and the world, we are composed and calmed by his11 presence” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 
347). In this example, Murdoch asserts that it is not only behaviours that illuminate moral 
impact, but more ‘difficult’ concepts as rhythm and space. Murdoch (1992, p. 347) identifies 
space and light as essential a deeper comprehension of morality. Additionally, Murdoch 
                                                 
11 See Note 2 
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argues that metaphors tied to vision are crucial to understanding morality, rather than solely 
those tied to movement. In outlining the ideas she seeks to refute, Murdoch (1998) writes:  
The image whereby to understand morality…is not the image of vision but the image of 
movement….Good must be thought of, not as part of the world, but as a moveable label 
affixed to the world; for only so can the agent be pictured as responsible and free. (p. 
301)  
For Murdoch, goodness is not just a matter of ‘choose this’ and freedom is not the option to 
act differently, but also “freedom to think and believe differently…[for]…Moral differences 
can be differences of concept as well as differences of choice” (p. 73, emphasis added). 
Murdoch argues against the ‘trivial’ sense of goodness, which she attributes to her 
contemporaries, and seeks to retrieve a greater appreciation of the good (p. 333). 
There is another point to consider, moral principles cannot be the only way of 
communicating moral concepts. As Murdoch (1998) writes, “communication of a new moral 
concept cannot necessarily be achieved by specification of factual criteria open to any 
observer (‘Approve of this area’) but may involve the communication of a completely new, 
possibly far-reaching and coherent, vision” (p. 82). The philosophical visions that relegate the 
role of the inner life and focus upon observable activities (a behaviouristic vision of human 
morality) prescribe and proscribe particular behaviours or actions to guide moral conduct. 
These two philosophical conceptions, that there is no inner life and that moral concepts must 
have externally verifiable meaning, develop the picture of the ‘ideally rational individual’, 
which Murdoch seeks to refute. Murdoch understands morality as an awareness of the 
particulars, guiding individuals to respond to unique situations in unique ways (this is 
discussed in depth within the next chapter, for it is central to the concept of attention). 
Murdoch was concerned with the ‘behaviouristic’ image of the human and offers a sketch of 
an alternative, writing, “My point is that here the ‘universal rules’ model simply no longer 
describes the situation” (p. 86). There is an important philosophical difference between an 
individual who understands morality as a set of observable rules and an individual who 
understands moral values through a vision of the metaphysical world (p. 96). Murdoch’s 
concept of attention is the search for the benefits of such a vision.  
 
A Philosophy for Human Life…in all its Multiplicity, Ambiguity and Complexity 
Writing within her journal in 1947, Murdoch contended, “for me philosophical problems are 
the problems of my own life” (Nussbaum, 2012, p. 261). Central to Murdoch’s rejection of 
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the ‘value-free’ approach was the concern that moral philosophy had become disassociated 
from a multifaceted and multitudinous appreciation of humanity (Widdows, 2005). For 
Murdoch, the purpose of philosophy is not to obfuscate. Philosophy should not be written in 
jargon so that the everyday person cannot comprehend its message and benefit from its 
opportunities. Nor should philosophy be written only for the benefit of philosophers. Instead, 
the purpose of philosophy is to deal with issues faced by ordinary individuals in their lives. In 
the preface to Existentialists and Mystics (Murdoch, 1998), Conradi states, “The interested 
reader can find here a concern with ordinary moral issues and decisions that everyone faces” 
(p. xxv). In this explanation of Murdoch’s writing, her desire to reshape moral philosophy to 
be appreciated and lived by everyday individuals appears to have come to fruition.  
As explained earlier, Murdoch’s philosophy “defies easy categorization” (Antonaccio, 
2007, p. 15). Again, in the preface to Existentialists and Mystics, (Murdoch, 1998) Conradi 
explains that Murdoch’s seemingly eclectic philosophical approach is the symptom of a 
philosopher who does not neatly follow ideas. There are many recurrences of themes and 
overlapping of ideas within her collected writings. He also points this out in his biography of 
Murdoch (Conradi, 2001), where he highlights Murdoch’s refusal to be confined to one area 
of investigation. This approach is reflected in the book Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals 
(Murdoch, 1992), described as “‘a huge hall of reflection full of light and space and fresh air, 
in which ideas and intuitions can be unsystematically nurtured” (Antonaccio & Schweiker, 
1996, p. xv). Recently a readers companion entitled Reading Metaphysics as a Guide to 
Morals: An Introduction (Hämäläinen & Dooley, 2019) was released in order to “offer 
accessible readings of chapters and themes in the book, connecting them to Murdoch's larger 
oeuvre” (SpringerLink, 2019).  
Murdoch’s unique approach to philosophy can be attributed, in part, to her desire to 
explore nuances and subtleties between binary positions. As an atheist, she sought to redeem 
religion from analytical philosophy, as a Platonist, she resisted the move to Aristotelian 
thought. She defends the value of art despite Plato’s rejection of this mode of expression. 
However, within the nexus point of tension, Murdoch’s philosophy negotiates between two 
seemingly incongruent ideas to mediate a novel position with an “awareness of a 
contradiction in the description [which] promises no simple solution” (Hämäläinen, 2014, p. 
193). Some critics may argue that this approach to the incongruities of two contrasting 
positions demonstrates either a naïve consideration of the points, or the shifting of theoretical 
positioning over time. However, Jordan (2014) contends that the theories proposed by 
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Murdoch are consistent and “prima facie tensions can be explained away as merely apparent 
given some richer understanding of her position” (Jordan, 2014, p. 372).  
Murdoch’s position is based upon her stance that morality can be viewed as 
independent of experience, but must be moderated on reflection of experience through the 
medium of consciousness. Murdoch promotes an approach to objective morality, yet equally, 
Murdoch’s moral theory is viewed to be response-dependent; that properties of moral 
concepts are only able to be viewed from a “peculiarly human standpoint” (Jordan, 2014, p. 
378). Although contradictory at a first glance, the subtleties of Murdoch’s reflexive approach 
to morality can illustrate a clear line of argument, that the specificity of the individual is 
important within the search for metaphysical moral truth. The search for moral truth involves 
a reflexive process in which “the good is discovered through the medium of consciousness as 
it reflects on itself; yet at the same time, the act of reflexivity reveals the good to be a 
perfection or ‘higher condition’ that transcends or surpasses consciousness” (Antonaccio, 
2000, p. 119). The primacy of individual human experiences and perspectives in tandem with 
an external actuality of morality is essential to her position.  
Murdoch’s oeuvre carves out a philosophical space to recognise of the complexity of 
human lives and the defence of the individual human being. Murdoch argues for the self as an 
individual capable of self-reflection, living a life with developing ideas of moral value and 
goodness. In response to analytical arguments that promote the ‘knowable/visible’ aspects of 
human morality, Murdoch reconceived morality to situate the variety and diversity of human 
life as a critical aspect. Consciousness is a medium to comprehend and develop moral 
concepts that is singular to each individual. While some commonality can be understood in 
the sharing of ideas, each individual’s grasp of concepts is singular and unique. These 
understandings grow from individual experiences and the reflections of consciousness upon 
these experiences.  
Murdoch (1998) was concerned with advancing a defence of the ‘real impenetrable 
person’ (p. 294), discussed earlier in the ‘opaque’ individual. Although the task of attention 
attunes oneself to reality, it is necessary to expose the tensions of conceiving of reality as a 
singular truth (as cautioned earlier in relation to empiricism). For Murdoch, the ‘truth’ of 
reality hinges upon moral vision, moderated by the respect for the contingent, and 







This chapter has outlined a brief history of Iris Murdoch and some of her significant 
philosophical themes. The purpose of this broader view was to contextualise Murdoch’s 
philosophical vision and to prepare readers for the investigation of the concept of attention 
within the next chapter. Over this chapter, the influence of World War II, in shaping the 
Oxford experience and Murdoch’s approach to moral philosophy, was outlined. Significant 
figures in Murdoch’s life, guiding her to Plato, Wittgenstein, and Sartre, also honed her 
vision. However, her critical approach to philosophical ideas meant that no form of 
philosophical thought was embraced in toto; through the ideas of these other thinkers, 
Murdoch developed her own extraordinary and inimitable vision. This vision became a part 
of her fictional writing, but she was clear to articulate that novels were not the place to 
discern her philosophical ideas. Given her extensive corpus of scholarly work, there is ample 
philosophical material to perceive and understand Murdoch’s oeuvre.  
Plato and Simone Weil are singled out as major influences. Throughout forty years of 
philosophical writing, Murdoch consistently refers to their writing. They are two 
philosophers who significantly supported the development of Murdoch’s concept of attention. 
Despite this critical influence, as with other philosophers, Murdoch did not embrace all of 
Plato or Weil’s thought entirely, there are important points of departure that were critical to 
outline within this chapter in order to inform later argumentation. While Murdoch adopts the 
image of the cave from Plato and the notion of goodness as a fixed external actuality, she 
rejects his assertion that art does not develop of the moral imagination. Murdoch echoes 
Plato’s lack of optimism in the search for the good and the difficulty in attaining a clear 
vision, but supports different notions about the sources of the good. Murdoch is enamoured 
with the passion of Weil’s vision as a ‘standard’ to be upheld, but questions her obliteration 
of the self to be a conduit for the love of God. Murdoch’s concept of attention is dependent 
upon the individual and all that comprises it – thoughts, experiences, memories – for this is 
the substance of consciousness working to moderate and develop moral vision. These 
experiences cannot be removed in order to ‘act as a screen’ for God, or to seek a space to 
‘step back’ in order to assess the direction of moral actions in a ‘value-free’ form. Morality is 
not only ‘actions’ but a part of a singular consciousness, which develops moral vision 
through the practice of attention. This practice is offered to all individuals and set before 
them as a moral ‘task’. In every walk of human life, attention offers the opportunity to see the 




The Concept of Attention  
 
Introduction 
The concept of attention is integral to the substantive theoretical foundations of this study. 
Described by Murdoch as “the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual 
reality” (p. 327), attention can be partially understood as an exercise of the moral imagination 
with concurrent implications for an understanding of individuality, consciousness, love, 
justice and freedom. This chapter will explore the concept of attention as outlined by 
Murdoch and other scholars who expand upon her work. To establish the tension that gave 
rise to Murdoch’s concept of attention, I will introduce Murdoch’s concerns and articulate the 
problem Murdoch sought to address. I will then paraphrase the situation of M and D the 
moral ‘problem’ Murdoch invented to illustrate the concept of attention, and extend the 
discussion of this concept further. Later sections of this chapter will address differing aspects 
of attention: a just and loving gaze; an individual reality; the endless task; the role of 
freedom; and the concern of the ‘ordinary and everyday’. Finally, Murdoch’s alternate ideal – 
the ‘humble individual’- will be discussed.  
 
The Problem of the ‘Ideally Rational Individual’ 
The position in question, in current moral philosophy, is one which seems to me 
unsatisfactory in two related ways, in that it ignores certain facts and at the same time 
imposes a single theory which admits of no communication with or escape into rival 
theories. (Murdoch, 1998, p. 299) 
Murdoch’s concept of attention generated from a dissatisfaction with a prevalent image of the 
human in her time. Murdoch asserts that the image of human personality held by her 
contemporaries is “shallow and flimsy” (p. 287) and cannot be related to what she considers 
to be the ‘everyday’ human. As stated in the previous chapter, Murdoch considered 
philosophy to be an everyday concern; philosophy is “the problems of my own life” 
(Murdoch, cited in Nussbaum, 2012, p. 261). The idea that philosophy can remain relevant 
and reflective of everyday human lives was lost in the Murdoch sought to refute, inspiring her 
to reconsider the image of the moral individual.  
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The contemporary image Murdoch refutes is heavily indebted to the influential role of 
Kant. Murdoch asserts, “we are living in the age of the Kantian man12, or Kantian man-god” 
(p. 365). The legacy of Kant’s image is presented within her analysis, which includes 
multiple references to Thought and Action (Hampshire, 1959) and Disposition and Memory 
(Hampshire, 1962) by Stuart Hampshire13 (1914-2004), a contemporary of Murdoch’s. She 
draws from Hampshire’s image to articulate wider problems with the image of the human 
presented in “modern moral philosophy” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 302). Murdoch critiques the 
contemporary ‘Hampshirian’ iteration of the ‘Kantian man-god’ in order to highlight the 
extensive problems this image produces in moral philosophy. Initially in this section, 
Hampshire’s image will be discussed to contextualise Murdoch’s arguments. Later, other 
philosophical influences will be identified 14.  
Murdoch states that Hampshire promotes an image of the human as “an object moving 
among other objects in a continual flow of intention into action” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 302). 
Hampshire’s image of the human seeks to displace ‘vision’ for ‘action’ as the prominent 
metaphor in moral philosophy. Murdoch describes Hampshire’s main point to be the 
following: morality should be relegated to the movement of the will and not to individual 
concepts or visions. Driven by the metaphor of movement and not vision, the ‘ideally rational 
individual’ is described as a “neo-Kantian existentialist ‘will’” based on movement 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 345). Central to this description, and critical to Murdoch’s counter-
argument, is Hampshire’s stance that “There is no point in talking of ‘moral seeing’ since 
there is nothing morally to see” (p. 327). In this explanation of humanity, moral decisions are 
only identifiable as actions. Visible actions are of paramount importance as “nothing counts 
as an act unless it is a ‘bringing about of a recognizable change in the world’” (p. 302).  
The ‘inner’ world is conceived as holding a “‘parasitic and shadowy nature’” (p. 302) 
and, as this shadowy domain cannot be shared externally, thoughts can only be considered 
noteworthy if they are directed towards conclusive visible action. Thoughts are solely “an 
introduction to action” (p. 303) and moral character is determined by others according to 
                                                 
12 See Note 2 
13 In fact, the original print of The Sovereignty of Good (Murdoch, 1970) was dedicated to Stuart Hampshire. Although Murdoch and 
Hampshire disagreed, Conradi (2001) identifies that Hampshire was a long-time acquaintance of Murdoch’s with whom she was 
not always at odds.   
14 Within ‘The Idea of Perfection’, Murdoch (1998) primarily draws from Hampshire and Moore to present a contrasting pair to 
mediate between. In this essay Murdoch aligns Hampshire’s image to Hume and Kant, and later in ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’ and ‘The 
Sovereignty of Good over other Concepts’ she speaks more directly to the Kantian image rather than Hampshire’s own. She 
describes Hampshire’s image as the inheritance of “a happy and fruitful marriage of Kantian liberalism with Wittgensteinian logic 
solemnised by Freud” (p. 306). Consequently, while it is important to identify Hampshire specifically, as Murdoch argues directly to 
this depiction in her text, it is important not to restrict the argument solely to the writings of this particular philosopher; Murdoch’s 
vision is beyond engaging directly with one person, and seeks to respond more broadly to the wider philosophical milieu. 
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these visible actions. Our moral identity is defined in relation to these visible actions. The 
actions themselves are defined and judged by “objective observers [whom] are actually and 
potentially at hand to decide” (p. 318). What we are as individuals, therefore, is the product 
of the ‘objective’ observations of others and the ‘subjective’ “footloose, solitary, 
substanceless will” (p. 311). 
Murdoch argues that this image of the human is pervasive. It is the image seen within 
moral philosophy, politics, and contemporary literature. This ‘hero’ is presented to inculcate 
the impression that we “ought to know what we are doing” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 304) and that 
this ‘doing’ is “not something private and personal, but is imposed…in the sense of being 
identifiable only via public concepts and objective observers” (p. 355). Reason combined 
with knowledge and unconstrained will situates our engagement with morality like “a visit to 
a shop” (p. 305). The authority of reason and the unfettered nature of the (central) will 
enables the individual to view all options objectively and choose appropriately. Through this 
image of the human, there is no need to draw from a more detailed terminology for morality, 
nor become involved with an inquiry into virtues. There is only the need to discern what is 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ based upon an objective reading of actions.  
Sketched in this way, humans are presented with the spurious belief that “we should 
aim at total knowledge of our situation and a clear conceptualisation of all our possibilities” 
(p. 304). Murdoch expands upon the image she wishes to contest, stating:  
…this man is with us still, free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible, 
brave…He is the offspring of the age of science, confidently rational and yet 
increasingly aware of his alienation from the material universe which his discoveries 
reveal. (p. 365) 
Murdoch argues that the ‘ideally rational man’ cannot remove this sense of alienation due to 
the Kantian legacy of ethics. This legacy demands moral duty to be fulfilled through 
rationality. However, this sense of alienation is inappropriately entangled with a feeling of 
detachment and an ability to objectively (empirically) observe oneself. In the hopes that this 
alienation represents moral freedom, philosophers single out this ‘experience’ as evidence of 
autonomy via objective rationality. Scientific reason and detached objectivity are idealised, 
and presented as the means through which moral action can be understood, determined, and 




Science can instruct morality at certain points and can change its direction, but it cannot 
contain morality nor, ergo, moral philosophy…Moral concepts do not move about 
within a hard world set up by science and logic. They set up, for different purposes, a 
different world. (Murdoch, 1998, p. 321) 
The world of moral concepts is not the world of scientistic rationality, instead it is informed 
by a metaphysical backdrop which must allude to the history of the human individual. The 
ideally rational individual only seeks to understand the certainties of the past (rather than 
imagining alternatives) and only these ‘facts’ will serve to guide his or her future actions. 
Furthermore, the ideally rational individual considers the past to be a fixed constant, which is 
objectively viewed from a distance. This is an image driven by the doctrine of 
psychoanalysis.  
Murdoch questions Hampshire’s allusion that a ‘perfect psychoanalysis’ would “make 
us perfectly self-aware and so perfectly detached and free” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 340). 
Murdoch questions the validity of psychoanalysis and the elevation of the psychoanalyst who 
would serve as the detached ‘omniscient’ observer of external movements to explicate 
internal motivations. She writes: 
…why should some unspecified psychoanalyst be the measure of all things? 
Psychoanalysis is a muddled embryonic science, and even if it were not, there is no 
argument that I know of that can show us that we have got to treat its concepts as 
fundamental. The notion of an ‘ideal analysis’ is a misleading one. (p. 320) 
Instead, the elevation of this ‘science’ as a desired method of producing rational and free 
individuals, through the emancipative power of psychoanalysis, moves the focus away from 
the centrality of morality. Murdoch’s rejoinder is to reiterate, “This is a moral question; and 
what is at stake here is the liberation of morality, and of philosophy as a study of human 
nature, from the domination of science” (p. 320, original emphasis). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, although Murdoch is wary of psychoanalysis, she defends aspects of 
Freudian theory, particularly the clarity with which Freud has detailed the image of the 
“fallen man” and a “thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature” (p. 341).  
The ‘ideally rational individual’ is the being who considers the centre of his or her own 
decision-making to be hinged upon objective rationality and conjoined with comprehensive 
knowledge of the external ‘facts’ in any decision-making process. In this image, the 
individual is governed by his or her choices, as “freedom, indeed moral quality, resides in his 
choices” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 343). This individual is unmoved by external models, preferring 
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rational self-guided assessment to ascertain his or her own impressions and subsequent 
decisions for action. She identifies this individual as “the offspring of the age of science” and 
“the ideal citizen of the liberal state” (pp. 365–366). She ultimately denounces this image of 
the human for the selfish and egotistical nature that it encourages stating “Kant’s man had 
already received a glorious incarnation nearly a century earlier in the work of Milton: his 
proper name is Lucifer” (p. 366). She extends this criticism, writing:  
Briefly put, our picture of ourselves has become too grand, we have isolated, and 
identified ourselves with, an unrealistic conception of will, we have lost the vision of a 
reality separate from ourselves, and we have no adequate conception of original 
sin…the moral agent…is pictured as an isolated principle of will, or burrowing pinpoint 
of consciousness, inside, or beside, a lump of being which has been handed over to 
other disciplines, such as psychology or sociology (p. 338). 
This image of humanity does not satisfy Murdoch. She asserts, “I find the image of 
man…both alien and implausible” (p. 306), and seeks to theorise a space where the ‘ideally 
rational man’ can be brought into question to allow room for an alternative. Although this 
image of the human is based upon the role of choice, Murdoch argues that there is no 
sufficient exposition of “what prepares him for the choices” (p. 343). Murdoch’s concept of 
attention develops from the rejection of this image of the human. Attention seeks to reclaim a 
connection between everyday moral experiences and philosophical images of the moral 
agent, and admit a conceptualisation of reality “infinitely more complex and various than that 
of science” (p. 326). Attention reinstates the value of the ‘inner life’ and the importance of 
moral vision for human beings. In order to set the moral ‘problem’ to illustrate the concept of 
attention, and give credence to the value of the inner life, Murdoch offers the situation of M 
and D. 
 
The Situation of M and D 
The image of the human sketched out in this next section is characterised as a “rival picture” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 306) to that of the ‘ideally rational man’ (p. 312). Murdoch proposes an 
“ordinary and everyday” (p. 312) situation involving two individuals: a mother (M) and a 
daughter in law (D). M is characterised as a “very ‘correct’ person” (p. 312), and her capacity 
M to exercise moral vision is critical to the picture created by Murdoch. D is essential to this 
picture as the object of attention. At the outset, Murdoch is very keen to illustrate that M’s 
outward behaviour to her daughter-in-law remains constant throughout the event, specifically 
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identifying that there is no external change in M’s behaviour to D. M is unfailingly 
considerate with D in her manner when she is present with her – she maintains a certain 
‘standard’ of politeness throughout her interactions. What Murdoch seeks to argue is that the 
change in M is an ‘inner’ event: the way in which M sees D.  
At the start of the story, M is critical of D, viewing her to be “unpolished and lacking in 
dignity…pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, 
always tiresomely juvenile” (p. 312). As stated above, despite this internal view of D, M 
treats D with the utmost respect, concealing these internal feelings. For the purposes of the 
hypothesis, Murdoch proposes that D is taken out of the equation, in a way to ensure that the 
assessment of D is entirely within M’s mind and not due to any subsequent interaction. She 
proposes that perhaps the young couple immigrates, or that D is dead. Essentially, the 
purpose of this finality is to ensure that there are no opportunities for M and D to interact, 
opening the possibility for critics to consider the shift in M’s inner picture to be caused by an 
external action by D. Without any grounds for further interaction between M and D, the shift 
in thinking by M can be considered to be entirely internal. There are some problems with 
suggesting that D be considered ‘dead’ – this raises questions about how M could “behave 
beautifully to the girl throughout” (p. 312). Furthermore death could be a ‘final movement’ 
that encourages M to reconsider her thoughts of D, as such reassessment can occur when it is 
realised that an associate is dead. For the purposes of this exposition of the concept of 
attention, I will support the idea that D has immigrated.  
A span of undefined time passes following this immigration. Murdoch suggests that M 
could become ingrained in her perceptions of D, “imprisoned (if I may use a question-
begging word) by the cliché: my poor son has married a silly vulgar girl” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 
312). However, M is characterised as an “intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of 
self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just attention to an object which confronts her” 
(p. 313, original emphasis). These qualities support a reassessment of her initial thoughts of 
D. Upon reflection, M’s view shifts to reveal an image of D as “not vulgar but refreshingly 
simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but 
delightfully youthful” (p. 313). Through the practice of attention, M has altered her 
perception of D, seeing D in a ‘new light’. Murdoch states that she describes M as 
‘intelligent’ and ‘just’ to cast her in a positive light. Although the decision M makes 
regarding how she will see D could be interpreted by others as a form of delusion, Murdoch 
articulates that M is “moved by love or justice” (p. 313). It is this vision, viewing another 
being through a ‘just and loving gaze’, which is at the heart of the concept of attention.  
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Attention and Moral Vision: The ‘Just and Loving’ Gaze 
The act of attention must be guided by the intention to see the other ‘justly’ and ‘lovingly’. 
The concept of attention is expressed by Murdoch (1998) to be “the idea of a just and loving 
gaze directed upon an individual reality” (p. 327). As outlined in Chapter One, an 
underpinning rationale for the concept of attention can be understood through Murdoch’s 
respect for the ways in which prayer can enhance moral thought. Murdoch considers prayer 
to be “not petition, but simply an attention to God which is a form of love” (p. 344). However 
Murdoch does not support a philosophical view defending the notion of a ‘personal God’ and 
seeks a secular understanding of the benefits of prayer, asking “What is this attention like, 
and can those who are not religious believers still conceive of profiting by such an activity?” 
(p. 344). In addressing this question, the indebtedness to Weilian philosophy, and the 
influence of Plato are highlighted.  
Building on from the discussion of energy and eros in the previous chapter, Murdoch 
(1998) conceives of God as a “source of energy” (p. 345) and grace. Grace flows from our 
connection to God, streaming a flow of “supernatural assistance” (p. 344) towards devotees 
in order to overcome their personal limitations. Murdoch asserts that it is a ‘psychological 
fact’ that attention to God is “a powerful source of (often good) energy” (p. 344). As argued 
in the previous chapter, the energy of eros is determined from its source, with good objects 
providing the power to enhance and bad objects having the power to destroy. However, as 
Murdoch did not instil a deity in her philosophy, she sought an alternative justification for the 
source of our good energy; she sought moral direction without divine intervention and the 
power of prayer without religion. Over the course of her writing within ‘The Idea of 
Perfection’, ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’, and ‘The Sovereignty of Good’, the argument is pieced 
together that love of a transcendent form of goodness can be an alternate positive source of 
energy to the attentive individual. This energy is attained through the enactment of a just and 
loving gaze directed upon individuals. Goodness is the source of this energy, but it is 
harnessed through the act of love (p. 354).  
At this point, some further explanation is required to illustrate why love is considered 
the means to acquire good energy, and to do so it is important to revisit the analogy of the 
cave. As described in the previous chapter. Murdoch’s concept of attention is indebted to 
Plato’s analogy of the cave; the sun becomes a metaphor for goodness and although the 
prisoner’s vision is occluded from this light at the outset, the intention is for the prisoners to 
move from the cave out into the light of the sun. The sun is the “distant transcendent 
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perfection, a source of uncontaminated energy, a source of new and quite undreamt-of virtue” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 383). Getting to this source of energy is tricky because the pull of the 
ego, the source of energy produced through the light of the fire, is strong and encourages the 
prisoners to remain within the cave. The fire is not a true light, only the light of self-
reflection. In this aspect, Murdoch is supportive of Kant, as she identifies that he went to 
great lengths to draw attention away from the empirical psyche, towards objective rationality 
(p. 383). Although Kant “abolished God and made man God in His stead”, he was still 
prepared to endow humanity with an “exiguous metaphysical background” (p. 365).  
In the concept of attention, Murdoch (1998) expands upon the relationship between the 
human, goodness, and love to reveal the tensions between them. Love is irresistibly pulled to 
the good and when love is directed towards the good, then individuals are pulled out of the 
cave towards the sun and afforded the opportunity to see the world enhanced through the 
light of goodness. The love of goodness is a positive source of energy, enhancing moral 
understanding and the inspiration to use this understanding to guide moral action in the 
world. Through love, the human is drawn to goodness and enlivened through goodness; we 
flourish in the light of the sun. This is why it is critical to defend the inner life. An 
understanding of love and goodness is a built from the practice of attention; through attentive 
relationships, humans are supplied with the right form of energy to continue with moral 
progress. Attention stimulates our desire to search and gives us the energy to do so. Our 
moral actions stem from this inner ability, the sources of moral energy and the quality of 
attachments to others (p. 375).  
Yet love is often interpreted as a difficult and fraught undertaking. Murdoch (1998) 
argues that love between humans is too-often interpreted incorrectly, affected by a natural 
selfishness (p. 364). Furthermore “our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, 
usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world” (p. 369). 
Falseness is drawn from the negative energy of the ego – the source of inner light. Sometimes 
the ego causes us to see a mistaken unity and forms a delusionary perspective; that our 
centrality within events is the foundation of purpose. The ego fabricates reasons to place our 
‘self’ at the centre of things, before consideration of others. In doing so, the ego prevents us 
from the difficulties of attention through the belief that “‘it all somehow must make sense’ or 
‘there is a best decision here’” (p. 346). The challenge lies in resisting the selfish desire to 
contort consolation into a misrepresentation of reality. Fabrication of the world, generated 
through the energy of the ego and harnessed by the misdirection of will, reduces the ability to 
see the world as it is and to appreciate others as real and unique beings. This is not to say that 
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there is no unity, as engaging in the act of attention enables humans to reflect upon moral 
concepts and develop an increasing moral sophistication, which ‘reveals increasing unity’. 
The purpose of pointing out the fabricating role of the ego at this point is to identify that 
selfishness gets in the way of clear thinking, obscuring what is in front of us through the 
creation of the ‘falsifying veil’, distracting us from exiting the cave. The ego gets in the way 
of our innate abilities to seek and discern the good.  
Through careful attention, the difference between falsification and reality can be 
understood. Reality is the proper object of love (Murdoch, 1998, p. 355) and attention 
consists of and is guided by love. Our misunderstanding of love in human lives needs to be 
reconsidered in light of the role of the ego. The ‘fantastical’ illusion that is at times confused 
with love is not to be understood as love. Selfishness generates a ‘false love’ concerned with 
consolation in order to satisfy the ego. The ego produces a false understanding of love, which 
is fictitious and fanciful insomuch as it is unconnected with reality. This fantasy is “the 
proliferation of blinding self-centred aims and images…a powerful system of energy…most 
often…called ‘will’ or ‘willing’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 354). This system of energy needs to be 
kept in check in order to resist consolation. “Fantasy (self)” Murdoch argues, “can prevent us 
from seeing a blade of grass just as it can prevent us from seeing another person” (p. 357). 
Although most of our contemporary examples of ‘love’ are instances of ‘false love’ due to 
their possessive and self-absorbed nature, when we happen upon real instances of love we 
can immediately distinguish it from lesser forms and understand how goodness is present 
within the world through this love. Goodness has many ‘false doubles’, ‘false love’ can be 
dishonest, deceitful, or simply misdirected, but when brought together, true love and 
goodness cannot be lead astray. What “counteracts the system” of the ego is attention to 
reality that is “inspired by, consisting of, love” (p. 354). Through attention, the human 
individual is rewarded with a clearer vision of reality.  
At this point, it is important to clarify Murdoch’s assertion that M is not deluded but 
rather motivated by love and justice. When the aforementioned separation of the ego from the 
light of goodness is considered, it becomes increasingly clear that the moral decisions 
discerned through attentive relationships cannot be delusion, for the magnetic tension 
between love and good pulls us away from the light of the ego. Only fantasy can delude us 
from attending to the proper direction of love. Love is directed towards reality and through 
love, our understanding of reality is illuminated through goodness. Love reveals moral truth, 
and is magnetically drawn to the good, clarifying our vision of reality. Other forms of 
emotion may invoke delusion (anger, hate, fear) but love always draws us towards the good 
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(Murdoch 1992, p. 357). Love is the call to see beyond the delusions of the ‘veil’. Murdoch 
(1998) writes: 
It is in the capacity to love, that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy 
consists. The freedom which is a proper human goal is the freedom from fantasy…the 
realism of compassion. (p. 354) 
In this way, an understanding of reality is quite different from that promoted in empirical 
science (this will be discussed more at length in the next section).  
We are all connected through this inner struggle, guided by the external magnetic force 
of the good, which draws us in similar directions when we exercise or moral imagination and 
enhance our attentiveness. Furthermore, this ‘just love’ is magnetised towards goodness. 
Murdoch (1998) writes: 
Good is the magnetic centre towards which love naturally moves…when true good is 
loved, even impurely or by accident, the quality of the love is automatically refined, 
and when the soul is turned towards the Good the highest part of the soul is enlivened. 
(p. 384)  
The energy of the ‘good object’ needs to be reconsidered more subtly in Murdoch’s 
understanding of the magnetic tension between goodness and love, for if ‘false love’ 
accidentally happens upon the good, then this love is refined and purified, enlivening the 
soul. Within the attentive act, a loving view of the information is described as a “rethinking 
[of] phronêsis in a world deprived of shared morality” (Stan, 2014, p. 1175). The ability to 
grasp the particulars of a situation, and view them in a loving manner in order to promote a 
positive view of others in the world, promotes a form of obedience to others originating from 
an appreciation of the reality of the other, generated through an exercise of love.  
In the same way that there is a ‘false love’, there is “a false transcendence” and a “false 
unity” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 347). This false transcendence dismisses the moral world to a 
“shadowy existence in terms of emotive language, imperatives, behaviour patterns, attitudes” 
(p. 347). However, Murdoch wishes to seek out a unifying transcendence in which a form of 
moral realism can exist, one which is based in the reality that surrounds the individual, 
comprised of their conscious work to interpret it; a transcendence stemming from the exercise 
of the moral imagination, but directed towards an ‘ideal limit’. This is connected to the role 
of the attentive individual to see the other ‘justly’. In this way, morality is not considered to 
be solely within the domain of knowledge, and certainly not within the domain of scientific 
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knowledge, but within “a patient and just discernment and exploration of what really 
confronts one” (p. 330). Murdoch’s the concept of attention is concerned with envisioning the 
other justly and lovingly. Morality can then be understood as “our complex apprehension of 
ourselves and the world which cannot be reduced to a rational scrutiny of the facts” 
(Antonaccio, 2000, p. 87). Murdoch asserts that M’s attention to D is not understood through 
a form of knowledge that rests within the domain of science, stating: 
M’s independence of science, and of the ‘world of facts’ which empiricist philosophy 
has created in the scientific image, rests not simply in her moving will but in her seeing 
knowing mind. (Murdoch, 1998 p. 321) 
Within attention, the idea of a ‘just love’ is the guiding principle. Without this moral aim 
guiding the view of the individual, true attention to the other cannot be obtained. Attention is 
dependent upon the ‘seeing knowing mind’ and this is built from the moral imagination.  
 
Attention: An Individual Reality 
As described by Murdoch (1998), attention is “a just and loving gaze directed upon an 
individual reality” (p. 327, emphasis added). The role of ‘reality’ within Murdochian 
philosophy is important to outline at this point, for it is critical to understanding the role of 
the ‘inner life’ and the moral imagination in the concept of attention.  
The Murdochian notion of ‘reality’ is considered at length by scholars who study 
Murdoch’s philosophical work. Antonaccio (2000) identifies Murdoch’s understanding of 
reality as the framework for human morality and the setting for human existence. 
Importantly, Antonaccio (2000) highlights Murdochian reality as always more than our 
attempts to border and describe it (p. 11). For Murdoch (1998), reality is an ideal end-point; 
inexhaustible and infinitely difficult to apprehend. Due to the infinitely complex nature of 
reality, it is difficult to apprehend yet it is important to understand that reality is not a ‘given 
whole’ in the sense that misuses of the empirical sciences would maintain. An understanding 
of reality is honed though an obedience to it, as an exercise of love (p. 333). As described in 
the outline of the magnetic force between the human, goodness, and love, there is a close 
connection between love, the good, and the real (p. 333). In the exploration of the magnetic 
force between goodness and love in the analogy of the cave, the broader spiritual progression 
from the inside to the outside of the cave is described by Murdoch (1992) as “a spiritual 
pilgrimage from appearance to reality” (p. 10).  
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Reality is not understood through the removal of moral values, but the discernment and 
refinement of them. Goodness is indefinable, it is limitless (more will be discussed on this 
point later in the chapter). This is not because “what is ‘real’ is potentially open to different 
observers” (p. 302), but because of the infinite difficulty in the moral task of “apprehending a 
magnetic but inexhaustible reality” (p. 333). Within the parable of the cave, our apprehension 
of this inexhaustible reality is sensed in an intuitive awareness of the many things around us 
whose proximity and presence we feel, but cannot fully apprehend or appreciate (Murdoch, 
1992, p. 228). There are ‘levels of awareness’. In progressively moving away from the ego, 
towards a clearer, and therefore more moral, understanding of reality we progress through 
these levels towards the true perception of reality and the good (Widdows, 2005, p. 101). 
Reality can be considered “as that which is revealed to the patient eye of love” and is “an idea 
entirely comprehensible to the ordinary person” (p. 332). When we develop the moral 
imagination through the task of attention, we are given not only the opportunity to see reality 
more clearly but also ourselves more clearly. We can see ourselves as something more than 
rationality, something more complex, and inherently capable of engaging in the work to 
develop our moral vision. Murdoch identifies that reality may be ‘non-empirical’ (p. 332), but 
even though M might not be able to clearly articulate it for the purposes of an objective 
external analysis, she knows what she is doing when she is trying to be just to D. 
Furthermore, “we know what she is doing too” (p. 332).  
In the image of the ‘ideally rational individual’, the abilities to determine total 
knowledge over our moral situation and clearly conceptualise all potential possibilities (p. 
304) are of central importance. When this is compared with an understanding of the concept 
of attention, it is clear that knowledge over the situation and a clear understanding of all 
possibilities is impossible; reality cannot ever be fully understood and certainly not through 
exposition or analysis. The idea of the ‘knowable’ human has already been queried, the 
‘knowable’ cannot be related to the notion of reality. Reality is mediated through 
consciousness and our understanding of reality is built from the inner life and the moral 
imagination. Where the reality of the ‘ideally rational individual’ can be discerned from a 
thoroughly rational assessment and an understanding of the human as ‘knowable’, substance 
of reality is not as easily characterised or defined. As articulated earlier, in the image of the 
‘ideally rational individual’ there is a desire to retain autonomy by resisting 
‘compartmentalisation’ through an externalised goodness. But human understandings of 
‘goodness’ are not shaped only by predilections, will or choices, but because of the qualities 
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of attachments, and how these attachments develop a different notion of freedom. This point 
is the focus of the next subsection.  
 
Attention and Freedom 
The differences between Weilian attention and Murdochian attention outlined in the previous 
chapter are important to this discussion, for in asserting “the highest love is in some sense 
impersonal” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 361), Murdoch promotes a selfless love reminiscent of 
Weil’s attention “which is so full that the ‘I’ disappears” (Weil, 2002, p. 118). Like Weil, 
Murdoch explores the relationship between selflessness and attention, but as outlined before, 
there are critical points of departure that need to be understood in order to appreciate 
Murdoch’s defence of the personal.  
Murdoch (1998) asserts, “We cease to be in order to attend to the existence of 
something else” (p. 348). Such a view could be seen as incongruent with personal freedom, 
and more akin to Weilian attention. However, acquiescence to the other is not obliteration of 
the self. Murdochian freedom takes on a different form and purpose. Selflessness valued for 
the ways it affords us the ability to see “things of the world in their true relationships” (p. 92), 
but these ‘true relationships’ are understood through moral vision. Selflessness is 
interconnected with the role of the seeing knowing mind (p. 321). The act of attention is to 
see the other justly and lovingly and resist the pull of the ego. Murdochian selflessness is 
articulated by some scholars as the removal of certain personal emotions connected to the ego 
and the ability to focus on others “not at the expense of the self, but, so to speak, without 
considering the self at all” (Blum, 1986, p. 362). In order to appreciate the role that the 
individual and his or her ‘seeing, knowing mind’ has to play within the practice of attention. 
this disregard of the ‘self’ needs to be understood as not the entirety of the self, but of the 
desires of the ego, identified as “ambition, vanity, cruelty, greed, jealousy, hatred” (Murdoch, 
1992, p. 496).  
Although this could be considered a way of suspending the emotive response, 
McDonough (2000) reinforces the critical role that emotions play within the Murdochian 
attention. The dialectic between reason and emotion is unnecessary. Murdoch’s act of 
attention promotes an alternative that encapsulates both faculties. McDonough (2000) writes, 
“For Murdoch, reason and emotion are conjoined in the call to be ‘just’ and ‘loving’ in our 
orientation toward another. They are positioned not in opposition to each other, but rather in a 
way that refuses to distinguish between the two” (p.223). The interplay between reason and 
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emotion are part of Murdoch’s reflexive realism (Antonaccio, 2000), an approach to moral 
philosophy that is grounded within the reality of human relationships.  
In Murdochian attention, freedom is not about the ‘unfettered will’, but rather the 
submission of certain qualities and the promotion of others in order to attend to the other. The 
search for freedom is not contained by scientific reason as has been championed by the image 
of the ‘ideally rational individual’; venerating the point at which detached objective reason 
gives rise to the unimpeded will. As Murdoch (1998) states: “Freedom is not the sudden 
jumping of the isolated will in and out of an impersonal logical complex, it is a function of 
the progressive attempt to see a particular object clearly” (p. 317). Human freedom in 
attention is conceived quite differently to that of the ‘ideally rational individual’. In the act of 
attention, the role of the will is given over to a form of submission, for true attendance to 
another is “represented as a kind of ‘necessity’…present[ing] the will not as unimpeded 
movement but as something very much more like ‘obedience’” (p. 331). She writes:  
If we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and how 
imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall not be surprised 
that at crucial moments of choice, most of the business of choosing is already over. 
This does not imply that we are not free, certainly not. But it implies that the exercise of 
our freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time and not a 
grandiose leaping about unimpeded at important moments. (p. 329) 
Our call to be ‘just’ and see the world clearly is an act of freedom not the preclusion of it. 
The suppression of the ego is not the oppression of our ‘self’ but the movement to free 
ourselves from the veil that obscures the world and the possibilities of the pilgrimage. 
Attention is the call to apprehend reality more clearly, and enhance our moral self. Attention 
is a task that is ‘small’, ‘piecemeal’ and endless.  
 
Attention: The Endless Task 
Within the image of the ‘ideally rational individual’, moral character can be determined by 
‘rational’ choices, which then results in action. Yet, Murdoch (1998) is concerned with a 
general lack of consideration about the conditions that prepare the individual to make these 
choices (p. 343). She asserts that the image of the ‘ideally rational individual’ presents an 
image of moral choice, relegating the inner life to the irrelevant or non-existent, an unhelpful 
and unrealistic (p. 343) image that diminishes the progressive development the individual can 
make towards enhancing moral concepts. She writes:  
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The analysis pictures M as defined ‘from the inside in’: M’s individuality lies in her 
will, understood as her ‘movements’. The analysis makes no sense of M as continually 
active, as making progress, or of her inner acts as belonging to her or forming part of a 
continuous fabric of being. (p. 316)  
An understanding of M as defined from the ‘outside-in’ disregards M’s inner contemplation, 
rendering this mental effort redundant in relation to her outward movements. According to 
Murdoch’s contemporaries, M’s thoughts are hazy and untrustworthy and, if they were to be 
taken into consideration at all, a group of ‘objective’ others would assess them based upon 
M’s capacity for disclosure. Murdoch rejects the necessity for revelation as evidence of moral 
development. The act of attention demands the attentive individual to look, and re-look with a 
just and loving gaze in order to see what is really there, not base their assessment upon the 
judgement of an external group of individuals. Attention is not the ability to determine moral 
‘choices’ through the leaping of the will from decision to decision. Instead, attention is “the 
progressive attempt to see a particular object clearly…something infinitely perfectible” (p. 
317). 
Earlier, it was identified that reality is inexhaustible, this ‘infinitely complex’ quality of 
reality enriches the endless task of attention. Attention is as endless as reality is limitless and 
attentive individuals are incrementally refining their understanding of reality. M is engaged in 
this endless task (p. 317) and rewarded not only in her heightened understanding of D, but 
also in her enrichment of moral concepts. Through attention, an appreciation of the subject of 
a just and loving gaze is deepened and moral concepts are enhanced. Furthermore, the moral 
task of attention is endless because reality is endless, moral concepts are evolving, and our 
efforts to understand reality are imperfect, requiring ongoing refinement. Attention is a 
practice as well as a task. It is something to be honed and developed. As we develop this 
practice our understanding of the world shifts and moral concepts develop, necessitating us to 
look and look again (p. 321). Furthermore, the idea of perfection stimulates the desire for 
deeper comprehension of moral concepts and/or experiences in the light of goodness and 
reassess them according to this light. Impulsively, one set of behaviours may appear best, but 
just and loving reflection will show whether different behaviours would have improved 
matters. Murdoch (1992) argues that the possibilities for learning moral concepts are infinite 
(p. 322).  
A just and loving gaze is guided by the idea of perfection, the idea that we can seek 
perfection beyond our present state and arguably beyond our comprehension. In acquiescing 
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to the idea of perfection, the attentive individual acknowledges there is no end point to this 
task and there is always room for improvement. Morality is not contained by external 
limitations or definitions by objective observers (as explained within the earlier section ‘The 
Problem of the ‘Ideally Rational Man’). The feasibility of moral principles are called into 
question; human individuals are specific and particular and our attentive responses to them 
are grounded within experiences. Through multiple attentive relationships over time, our 
responses to others will vary greatly according to the knowledge we have grown through 
attention. Even our responses to a specific individual will shift and change through the 
refinement of our moral vision. Additionally, the focus of attention is also continually active 
and making progress; humans are not the same from the first time we gave our attention to 
the last. We must attend to what is in front of us. It is the constant looking and re-looking that 
effects a change in our affiliations to moral principles. Within Murdochian theory, the task of 
the individual is not to “generate action based on universal and impartial principles but to 
attend and respond to particular persons” (Blum, 1986, p.362). A consideration of the 
individual as specific and unique illustrates the inappropriateness of general moral principles. 
Additionally, with incremental exposure to manifold attentive relationships, principles 
become increasingly obtuse and lose generality as the individual’s morality shifts and 
deepens over the course of the lifetime. As Murdoch (1998) identifies, we are “human 
historical individuals” (p. 322) and through attention our conceptual development moves 
away from a general impersonal understanding, towards increasing personal relevance and 
privacy in the direction of the ideal limit. Against the idea of perfection, we can look and 
relook in light of the call to the good, without an impartial limit.  
The spiritual pilgrimage was an integral element in the act of attention as the 
pilgrimage was viewed as “the centre and essence of morality, upon whose success and well-
being the health of other kinds of moral reaction and thinking is likely to depend” (Murdoch, 
1992, p. 367). The pilgrimage is the journey towards the ideal, seeking a moral perfection. As 
the attention is guided by a reflexive vision of the good, the individual’s path towards the 
moral ideal is guided by the idea of perfection. Murdoch contended that the search for moral 
perfection is an essential characteristic of moral activity. Murdoch (1998) asserts, “where 
virtue is concerned we often apprehend more than we clearly understand and grow by 
looking” (p. 324).  
If virtue is an area of growth, then morality cannot be seen as static and therefore to be 
contained within the boundaries of the scientific. Morality does not consist of singular neutral 
definitions of moral properties, instead it is “essentially connected with change and progress” 
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(Murdoch, 1998, p. 322). Murdoch (1992) perceives consciousness as mobile, constantly 
reflexive, and containing a “polymorphous complexity” (p. 237) that belies attempts to 
represent moral positions as calcified. Moral concepts shift and deepen over time as 
individuals cogitate upon them. As Murdoch articulates “we have a different image of 
courage at forty from that which we had a twenty” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 322). Moral concepts 
understood by the individual shift, deepen, and have the potential to mature over the course 
of the lifetime. Because the understanding of concepts is grounded within individual 
experience affected by personal history, comprehension of moral principles become 
increasingly private and less “towards a genesis in the rulings of an impersonal public 
language” (p. 322). Murdoch urges us to become attuned to nuance and respectful of the 
particular (Stan, 2014). 
When guided by the idea of perfection, the magnetic connection between love and 
goodness supports a deeper understanding of the analogy of the cave as continuous and 
unending. The ideal end-point of the parable is to arrive in the light of the sun, but in life, 
moral development is inexhaustible. The removal of an ‘end-point’ also introduces an 
element of “necessary fallibility” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 317). Empirical science seeks universal 
truth: within the perceived world, evidential and replicable. But what occurs within 
consciousness is not capable of meeting these conditions. As Murdoch asserts “what is real 
may be ‘non empirical’” (p. 332). An appreciation of reality is deepened when it is not 
considered an objective fixed reality, but “in relation to the progressing life of a person” (p. 
320). Moral concepts cannot be contained by science because, due to their lack of 
‘completion’, they are beyond finality.  
 
The Concern with the ‘Ordinary and Everyday’  
The situation Murdoch (1998) sketches of M and D is described as “ordinary and everyday” 
(p. 312). This point is important to Murdoch’s moral vision and a significant aspect of her 
argument. Murdoch argues that human life has “no external point or τἐλoϛ” (p. 364). Life 
cannot be justified nor totally explained, and neither can the reasons for our destiny. Instead, 
“We are simply here” (p. 365). In making this claim, Murdoch is asserting her position that 
omniscient beings (God) or substitutes for these beings (“Reason, Science, History”, p. 365) 
cannot offer comprehensive explanation for humanity’s sense of the occluded unity of life. If 
unity exists, then an understanding of it must be sought in a deeper examination of human 
experiences nestled in everyday lives.  
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According to Murdoch, individuals who are negotiating within the world and honing a 
moral vision of it, are ‘everyday’ and ‘ordinary’ individuals. They are not the Kantian or 
post-Kantian image of rationality; those who are bound to moral action through shared 
rationality. They are not bound by the judgements of their moral actions. Instead Murdoch 
(1998) accuses these constructions to be as “thin as a needle” (p. 343) and seeks an alternate 
image that is connected to the everyday experiences of the human, as “it is surely in the tissue 
of life that the secrets of good and evil are to be found” (p. 344). Some attention to this area 
has been presented in the first chapter, but it is necessary here to outline some more important 
nuances of Murdoch’s position.  
Murdoch (1998) argues that it is not only philosophers who can claim an understanding 
of goodness, ‘everyday individuals’ can also make a claim of knowledge, whether it be part 
of a religious doctrine or not. Murdoch asserts “I think there is a place both inside and outside 
religion for a sort of contemplation of the Good, not just by dedicated experts, but by 
ordinary people” (p. 383).Within this theme of the ‘ordinary’ and ‘everyday’ is the notion 
that “moral philosophy should be inhabited” (p. 337). Through living and enacting these 
moral concepts in life, individuals develop an increasingly private understanding based upon 
public definitions, but increasingly private and familiar. To explain further, Murdoch 
proposes that a person who is privately trying to determine the level of his or her ‘repentance’ 
is engaged in a private act of introspection. Through such cogitation, the individual is 
“making a specialised personal use of a concept. Of course he derives the concept initially 
from his surroundings; but he takes it away into his privacy” (p. 319). Furthermore, 
conceptual understandings are hinged upon the personal history of the individual and the 
particular historical experiences the person underwent in relation to this idea (p. 319). 
Murdoch writes, “Repentance may mean something different to an individual at different 
times in his life, and what it fully means is a part of this life and cannot be understood except 
in context” (p. 320). This is not to assert that an analysis of an individual’s history will afford 
a way to understand his or her moral concepts. Murdoch is careful to argue that the inner life 
of the individual must also be taken into account.  
The displacement of the ‘ordinary and everyday’ experiences in favour of a scientific 
approach to philosophy motivates Murdoch to argue for the necessity of the ‘inner life’ of the 
individual in moral philosophy. Murdoch “insists on philosophy’s responsibility to picture 
the human being in the fullness of her experience” (Lazenby, 2014, p. 48), demonstrating 
concern with the departure from the everyday and the particular. Murdoch is dissatisfied with 
a segmented image of life, abstracted from reality rather than respecting ‘indwelling’ 
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(Lazenby, 2014). The ‘ideally rational individual’ misrepresents the human by demarcating 
the individual’s decisions from the history of their personal experiences. Furthermore, this 
image removes the ability to claim an individual comprehension of moral concepts unless 
they are shared and accepted within the wider public domain. Murdoch seeks to reconstitute 
the individual and restore the ability to make the claim for the ‘inner life’ and private 
concepts. These abilities are a part of what sets each individual apart from one another, and 
enables each human to negotiate, deepen, and extend his or her own vision through an 
engagement in the world (Antonaccio, 2000). They are a part of a detailed moral vocabulary, 
which Murdoch (1992) argues is necessary to moral philosophy:  
We need a moral vocabulary, a detailed value terminology, morally loaded 
words…Important moral partings of the ways are implied in the complex relations 
between these concepts. (pp. 35–36). 
Our individual and particular moral visions, through detailed and complex relations between 
moral concepts become clearer when we can navigate the ways in which they align and part; 
the ways they are divided and conjoined.  
Antonaccio (2000) extends this point by arguing that the example of M and D is “an 
instrument of the individual’s knowledge of herself and the world, rather than determined by 
a public context on which all agents can agree” (p. 90). The individuality of M’s observations 
of D are both a part of her individual moral vision and a justification for it. The unique way in 
which she pictures (and then re-views) D is particular to her own vision, signifying that she is 
indeed engaging in a form of individual deliberation, but also demonstrating the growth in 
her particular moral vision rather than the development of shared concepts (Antonaccio, 
2000). Alterations to her vision are based on her ordinary and everyday experiences with D, 
and may not be understood when articulated to individuals who are not privy to this 
relationship. This is no reason to exclude this process from the consideration of a 
development of morality; although the alterations may be inimitable, they are nonetheless 
extant.  
Furthermore, as attention is a moral task that is available to all humans, there is no 
justification in arguing that philosophers will be more advanced in their knowledge of 
goodness compared to others. Murdoch (1998) is clear to articulate that not all individuals 
who make their way out of the cave need have been enthralled by the fire prior to their 
departure, and identifies the ‘everyday individual’ as someone who may well have avoided 
the trappings of moral philosophical images of will, reason and exposition, stating “Perhaps 
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the virtuous peasant has got out of the cave without even noticing the fire” (p. 383). At this 
point, it is important to outline the Murdochian ideal, offered as a response to the ‘ideally 
rational individual’.  
 
The Offering of the ‘Ideally Humble Individual’ 
In her rejection of the ‘ideally rational individual’ Murdoch is not only seeking to remove this 
image from moral philosophy, but to suggest a new image. She articulates over the course of 
‘The Idea of Perfection’ and ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’ that the current image of the moral 
individual is concerned with freedom, honesty and sincerity, but that these values are skewed 
by narcissism and personal self-interest. Murdoch seeks to justifiably argue that self-
fascination is a hindrance to the moral life, to highlight the dominance of the ego and to offer 
ways to deal with this conundrum. According to Murdoch (1998) “In the moral life the 
enemy is the fat relentless ego” (p. 342). It is important not only to identify the problem, but 
also to consider ways to live differently.  
Moving against the explanation for human conduct in the ‘ideally rational individual’, 
Murdoch (1998) suggests that the human is “more like an obscure system of energy out of 
which choices and visible acts of will emerge at intervals in ways which are often unclear and 
often dependent upon the condition of the system in between the moments of choice” (p. 
344). She continues, if this is how human life should be represented, then the main question 
of moral philosophy would be: “are there any techniques for the purification and reorientation 
of an energy which is naturally selfish, in such a way that when moments of choice arrive we 
shall be sure of acting rightly?” (p. 344).  
The quality of humility is offered as holding the possibility of supporting individuals to 
refine the practice of attention, as the humble person is able to displace personal needs, 
desires and wants in deference to the other. This is the point at which Murdoch’s philosophy 
comes closest to that of Simone Weil. Murdoch (1998) is drawing directly from Weilian 
philosophy and identifies this connection by stating, “Simone Weil tells us that the exposure 
of the soul to God condemns the selfish part of it not to suffering but to death” (p. 385). 
Although Murdoch’s position is not to maintain a religious notion of a personal God (or god), 
she embraces the vision of the individual who is humbled by something greater than his or 
herself. A contrast to the Kantian image who “confronted even with Christ turns away to 
consider the judgement of his own conscience and to hear the voice of his own reason” (p. 
365). Humility can offer significant opportunities to move beyond the ego and beyond 
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selfishness. Humility offers us the possibility of developing attention. What she seeks to 
refute in the ‘Kantian Man-God’ culminates in the ‘humble individual’. Murdoch writes:  
The good man is humble; he is very unlike the big neo-Kantian Lucifer...the humble 
man, because he sees himself as nothing, can see other things as they are. (Murdoch, 
1998, p. 385) 
The selflessness articulated previously as the key to attention and the access to seeing the 
world through the light of goodness, is inherent in the humble individual. This is not a form 
of selflessness that obliterates the self, but is built from the experiences of the individual over 
the course of his or her life.  
The humble individual is able to love others and through this love can see things as 
they are; able to “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 376-7). The humble individual is motivated to act morally through the 
quality of his or her attachments to others in their world, through specific life experiences and 
attentive relationships with others. In this understanding of the world, moral choices are not 
the function of an unimpeded will, but rather the humility to embrace the ties that connect us 
to others in the world and act accordingly. Murdoch writes: 
If I attend properly I will have no choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed 
at. This is in a way the reverse of Hampshire’s picture, where our efforts are supposed 
to be directed to increasing our freedom by conceptualising as many different 
possibilities of action as possible…The ideal situation, on the contrary, is rather to be 
represented as a kind of ‘necessity’…the idea of a patient, loving regard, directed upon 
a person, a thing, a situation, presents the will not as unimpeded movement, but as 
something very much more like ‘obedience’. (Murdoch, 1998, p. 331)  
To accede to this obedience requires humility. Humility is an integral element in engaging in 
the endless task of attention, as it enables individuals to embrace the understanding that there 
are others in the world, as equally real as oneself. The moral task before us is to attend to 
them justly and lovingly so that we may understand reality through connections and human 
relationships, and not just objective measures and the unfettered will.  
Humility is also important in the idea of perfection to encourage attentive individuals to 
see their efforts as steps along the way and not the end point in the journey. Yet the humility 
necessary to engage in the act of attention is hard to attain as “humility is a rare virtue and an 
unfashionable one and one which is hard to discern” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 385). The ‘ideally 
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rational individual’ promoted through literature, politics and philosophy is not humble; this 
pervasive image endorses humans to look inward for their answers. However, the humble 
individual avoids the “avaricious tentacles of the self” (p. 385) and eschews self-
aggrandisement. The humble individual is the person who “is not by definition the good man, 
[but] perhaps he is the kind of man who is most likely of all to become good” (p. 385).  
 
Summary 
This chapter has provided a detailed description of the concept of attention to build a 
substantive philosophical foundation for arguments presented later in the study. At the outset 
of this chapter, Murdoch’s concerns with the ‘shallow and flimsy’ image of humanity 
presented within the philosophy of her time were described. The legacy of Kant, in which the 
human supplanted ‘god’, produced an image of the human as an ‘ideally rational individual’. 
This image of the human situates morality as a problem of sufficient rationality and reason: to 
make a moral decision a survey and assay of the ‘facts’ (and separation of values) offers a 
rational direction for action. The primary metaphor for the ideally rational individual is action 
and movement. Vision or moral insight is considered incomprehensible, unmeasurable and 
therefore superfluous, but Murdoch argues that this understanding of morality confuses the 
measurement of the inner life with the value of the inner life. She seeks to defend the 
important role of the inner life through the concept of attention, the ‘just and loving gaze’.  
Attention is described as a moral task and a practice; something every individual may 
morally benefit from, but a skill to be honed and refined. Rather than reclaim the role of 
‘God’ within human lives, Murdoch explores attention as a form of prayer without the need 
for ‘God’. To direct attention appropriately, Murdoch seeks to reclaim the metaphysical 
background through external goodness. Through Plato’s analogy of the cave goodness can be 
understood as a guiding light that, through a magnetic connection to love, calls attentive 
individuals away from the narcissistic light of the fire towards the light of the sun. A clearer 
understanding of reality requires a deeper understanding of morals, not a movement away 
from them; through the light of goodness, the world is clearly illuminated. Perceiving the 
world ‘as it really is’ is contingent upon the unique understanding of the individual and their 
progressive moral development.  
This understanding of morality is different to that of the ‘ideally rational individual’. 
The ‘ideally rational individual’ is concerned with extending the breadth of his or her moral 
decisions, assessed and determined by a committee of peers through exposition and 
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assessment of behaviours. The ‘ideally rational individual’ is concerned with freedom, 
honesty and sincerity and affixes ‘goodness’ like a label to certain actions in the world. 
Murdoch counters this image for its lack of plausibility, validity and commendation. She 
argues that this image stems from egotistical individualism, desiring to be ‘free’ to determine 
moral actions. A more accurate understanding of our moral conduct in the world needs to 
take into account the role of the inner life in preparing the individual for moral decisions and 
highlight the humility that is required to accept some choices as already ‘decided’ through 
our loving attachments to others. This is an endless task, and a greater understanding of the 
moral life is incrementally revealed through attentive relationships. Contemporary substitutes 
for god – reason, science, history – cannot offer an accurate account for purpose in life, but a 
deeper examination of human experience in everyday lives through the practice of attention 





Neoliberalism, Ethics, and Education 
 
Introduction 
As articulated within Chapter One, Murdoch’s philosophy negotiates between incongruent 
ideas to negotiate her own unique philosophical position and this is particularly true of her 
illustration of the moral human being; her philosophical argumentation oscillates between 
rejections of particular images of the human and the development of her own image of what 
the human is and should be. As articulated by Murdoch (1998), philosophy is often perceived 
to make no progress due to movements that build and break elaborate theories. But such 
argumentation is necessary in order to enact a return to contemplating truths held as 
‘obvious’, yet underpinned by questionable first premises.  
Neoliberalisms15 are situated as the only way, a ‘there is no alternative’ approach to 
governance and the direction of human life (Fitzsimmons et al., 1999; Olssen, 2002; Olssen 
& Peters, 2005; Peters, 2011; Roberts, 2004, 2014;  Roberts & Peters, 2008). Neoliberal 
effects on early childhood education in Aotearoa New Zealand are felt strongly due to the 
advancement of the competitive business model, shaping governmental policy and 
educational practices. Despite changes in government, the market model of governance for 
early childhood education has remained since the late 1980s. The influence of neoliberal 
forms of governance upon the landscape of early childhood education and colonising effects 
upon Māori tamariki (children) cannot be overstated (May, 2019; Ritchie et al., 2014; Sims, 
2017). Although Murdoch wrote philosophy in a similar time to schools of thought that 
underpin modern neoliberal approaches (Hayek; The Chicago School), her philosophy did not 
specifically address ‘neoliberalism’ as it has been conceptualised and debated in 
contemporary times. Yet, enacting a return to contemplating the ‘truths’ of neoliberalisms can 
support a reconsideration of what is held to be ‘obvious’. Murdoch was concerned with many 
concepts that can speak to the issues faced from the enactment of neoliberalisms today, such 
as the depiction of the moral agent, individualism, and the notion of freedom. Murdoch’s 
                                                 
15 The use of the term neoliberalisms rather than neoliberalism is drawn from Stewart and Roberts (2015) who argue for this plural 
term due to the ways in which neoliberalism is multiplied into numerous forms, each with their own set of distinct features but 
underpinned by common characteristics. Although this point will be made later in the discussion of neoliberalisms, it is important 
to explain why this term is being used in the plural prior to this later discussion, and to avoid a jarring transition from the singular 
to the plural within this section. 
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arguments hold relevance for our times and as a response to the impacts of neoliberal policies 
upon early childhood education in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
The next section of this chapter will outline neoliberalisms in depth as it is important to 
understand the complexities of these ideas to illustrate the contemporary early childhood 
situation. This section will focus on neoliberalisms with reference to early childhood 
education is explored. The ‘slippery’ nature of neoliberalisms is articulated in order to clarify 
the ways in which neoliberal theories, practices, and the lived experiences of those affected 
by these theories and practices, are inseparable. 
The moral individual as described by Murdoch and her contemporaries is then brought 
into conversation with contemporary neoliberalisms. Murdoch’s main points of argument 
against the ‘liberal’ individual is sketched out, with reference to some critical points of 
departure. Liberalism will only be regarded in light of Murdoch’s interpretations of the limits 
of the ‘ideally rational individual’ with subsequent implications for the Murdochian image. 
Liberalism(s) and neoliberalism(s) are important concepts in this chapter for differing 
purposes. It is not the focus of this chapter to consider the many aspects of (and fissures in) 
liberalism. Parallels between a ‘liberal’ image and contemporary neoliberal ideas are drawn. 
While it would be remiss to disregard Murdoch’s arguments against ‘liberalism’, it would be 
distracting to consider her image against a wider analysis of liberalism; this is not the focus of 
this study. However, Murdochian arguments against the limitations of the ‘ideally rational 
individual’ will present a particular understanding of ‘liberalism’. Murdoch drew upon this 
specific image of the liberal individual in order to articulate problems in relation to the 
concept of attention, a notion of ethics, and a consideration of freedom. Her description of 
this image’s overreliance on the scientistic image of the human and the demise of 
metaphysics is explored in depth. The notion of freedom invoked by this image is contrasted 
with Murdoch’s responses, with a view to building towards the later argument in relation to 
neoliberal ideas. 
Following this, a section devoted to a critique of neoliberalisms in relation to 
Murdoch’s concerns will be discussed. Some questions about how education is shaped 
through the dominant economic gaze will be raised. Considerations of freedom and autonomy 
are strengthened by the concept of attention as a means to enhance an approach to freedom 
that is less about ‘autonomy’ and more concerned with human connections and 
responsiveness. These ideas resonate strongly with early childhood education in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. As the dominant image of the human within the neoliberal modes of 
governance is that of the homo oeconomicus (Foucault, 2008), or the ‘rational autonomous 
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individual’, and neoliberalisms as a form of governance that promotes the neoliberal vision 
for the world through a “hybrid discourse insinuating the economic into the democratic and 
vice versa” (Roberts & Peters, 2008, p. 31), this vision needs redress within the collective 
values of early childhood education. Murdochian attention offers an opportunity to explore 
this facet of human ‘freedom’ and a response to the individualism of neoliberalisms. It is this 
vision, and the projection of this image into educational policy (and subsequent practice) that 
is brought into question by Murdochian theory within the conclusion of this chapter.  
 
The Neoliberal Subject and Early Childhood Education 
It is the purpose of this section to illustrate the image of the neoliberal subject within 
contemporary society. In this section, the neoliberal subject is discussed in relation to the 
adult, the child, and the domain of education, but due to the pervasive nature of neoliberal 
discourses, these subjects and domains cannot be fully extracted from each other and will be 
discussed in a more fluid format to illuminate their intricacies. Furthermore, the slippages 
between neoliberalisms in educational systems, educational policies, and human experiences 
are unable to be extracted from one another. In order to illuminate an image of the neoliberal 
subject, it is necessary to coalesce images drawn from more than one source. As the concept 
of neoliberalism is diversely discussed, debated and interpreted, this section will draw from 
multiple sources to make sense of the theory, practices and lived experiences of neoliberalism 
within early childhood education.  
Neoliberal effects on governance have been felt most strongly within educational and 
social policies due to the advancement of the competitive business model in these domains. 
Within neoliberalism, economic rationality is considered to be the appropriate approach to 
governance, built from the notion of human freedom in liberalism as the enactment of the 
‘unfettered will’. The underpinning logic of neoliberalisms doesn’t simply reduce 
governance, but seeks to refine systems and boundaries of governance it so that governance is 
experienced by citizens in such a way as to enhance their productivity. Productivity 
enhancement becomes self-reinforced over time through internalisation, self-management, 
and depiction of competition as a ‘truth’ of human existence. Furthermore, neoliberal modes 
of governance are reinforced as ‘the only way’ due to the requirement for humans working 
within these conditions to comply with these forms of governance; in order to remain 
‘competitive’ (Peters, 2011, p. 6) it is necessary to ‘play the game’ to survive. Peters and 
Tesar (2018) assert that the theory of neoliberalism “takes the view that individual liberty and 
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freedom are the paramount goals of human subjects in the civilisation” (p. 2), but the 
practices of neoliberalism are varied and diverse and do not always align with the theory. 
Likewise, in articulating the necessity of considering neoliberalism within early childhood 
education, Vintimilla (2014) highlights the distinction between neoliberalism as a set of 
economic policies and the experiences of neoliberalism as a lived rationality, something 
pervasive “which expands its normative ideology and values to other spheres of our lives 
through specific discourses and practices” (p. 80). As such, neoliberalism is a “doctrine, an 
ideology, which argues that free market – and the market exchange – is an ethic in itself, 
constantly capable of re-inventing itself and acting as a guide for all human subjects’ actions” 
(Peters & Tesar, 2018, p. 5, emphasis added).  
Early childhood education experiences differing forms of growth under varied 
governments (see May, 2009), yet economic ‘sensibilities’ have been adopted by both of the 
majority16 governmental parties, leading to commonalities in governance. Despite changes in 
governance, there has been little movement away from the market model for early childhood 
educational provision; due to the pervasiveness of the neoliberal mode of governance within 
Western society (Olssen & Peters, 2005) several governments, organisations and industries 
maintain the tenets of neoliberalism. Functioning as “a malleable, adaptable ideology, 
capable of surviving and indeed flourishing under both centre-left and centre-right 
governments”, Stewart and Roberts (2015, p. 239) argue that neoliberal discourse is 
conceived more clearly as a set of discourses rather than as a single unitary perspective or 
position. It is important to identify multiple neoliberalisms “each with their own distinctive 
features, but with some underlying ideas in common” (p. 239) and remain sensitive to the 
slippery nature of neoliberalisms as policy, practice, and lived experience(s) within early 
childhood education. The ubiquitous nature of neoliberalisms within education flow into 
other lived experiences of children, families and teachers. Resisting the temptation to codify 
neoliberalism into a single homogeneous entity moves the focus away from a singular 
narrative, towards a vision that embraces complexity. In respecting the difference between 
ideology and lived experience, there are the grounds to generate an understanding of 
neoliberalism in accordance with the Murdochian drive to respond to persons and develop a 
theory that is grounded within human experience.  
Peters (2011) writes that “Neoliberalism represents a struggle between two forms of 
welfare or social policy discourse based on opposing and highly charged ideological 
                                                 
16 Within Aoteaora New Zealand, two major parties predominate: Labour and National.  
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metaphors of ‘individualism’ and ‘community’” (p. 1). The individual citizen is exemplified 
as the “rational optimiser” (Peters, 2011, p. 44) who must be viewed as having the knowledge 
to most suitably discern his or her own interests and needs. Furthermore, individuals should 
be given the authority to act within society as “rational utility maximisers” (Peters, 2011, p. 
34), guiding political actions towards minimalist intervention and shaping communities to be 
based “fundamentally in competition” (Peters, 2011, p. 39). Peters (2011) asserts that 
Hayek’s discussion can be considered to have constituted much of the present definitions of 
neoliberalism (Peters, 2011). According to Hayek (1948), true individualism contains a 
singular truth of human existence, that “if left free, men will often achieve more than 
individual human reason could design or foresee” (p.11). One of Hayek’s central themes is 
that localised understandings enacted in the market are more valid than externalised ‘textbook 
planning’ (Peters, 2011). Hayek (1948) argues in favour of an “unorganised knowledge 
which cannot be called scientific” (p. 80) and is respectful of “the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place” (p. 80). He argues localised knowledge, which is responsive 
to the immediate demands of the community, is displaced in favour of externalised experts 
who are deemed “better equipped with theoretical or technical knowledge” (p. 81). 
In Hayek’s view, freedom is incompatible with equality. Hayek (1948) clearly asserts 
that individuals are not equal and it is only through recognition of this inequality that all 
humans can be treated equally. Hayek claims “If all men were completely equal in their gifts 
and inclinations, we should have to treat them differently in order to achieve any sort of 
social organization” (pp. 15-16). Consequently, in applying a universalised approach each 
individual can be left to “find his own level” (p. 16). He differentiates between making 
individuals equal and treating them equal, writing, “there is all the difference in the world 
between treating people equally and attempting to make them equal…the first is the condition 
of a free society, the second means, as De Tocqueville described it ‘a new form of servitude’” 
(p. 16). Hayek’s economic theory is not concerned with redressing the social order and 
redistributing societal assets to put all individuals in an equal position, rather Hayek seeks a 
mechanism in which all individuals will be treated in the same fashion. He argues that this 
mode of governance will furnish individuals with the autonomy necessary to make their own 
place within the economic market. Hayek argues that rationality does not govern the 
individual, rather that a person is “by nature lazy and indolent, improvident and wasteful” 
(p.11) and it is only through the circumstantial power of the market that she or he can be 
made to behave carefully; individuals actions are rewarded for the value attributed to them by 
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others within the social setting, forcing individuals to be responsive to the demands of the 
community.  
Echoes of Hayek’s assertions can be heard within the speeches of Ronald Reagan, 
Margaret Thatcher, and Deng Xiaoping as identified by Peters and Tesar (2018). Regan 
asserted “government is the problem” (Peters & Tesar, 2018, p. 4), Xiaoping argued, 
“planning and market forces are not the essential difference between socialism and 
capitalism” (Peters & Tesar, 2018, p. 4) and it is worth quoting Thatcher at length to 
understand the full influence of Hayek’s philosophy:  
I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been 
given to understand “I have a problem it is the Government’s job to cope with it! ...they 
are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There 
are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do 
anything except through people and people to look to themselves first. (Thatcher, 1987, 
cited in Peters & Tesar, 2018, p. 5) 
The ‘lazy, indolent’ individual is viewed through Thatcher’s words: If you are not looking to 
yourself first you are casting your problems out to others to deal with; You are improvident 
and wasteful. The government must set up the situation where the circumstantial power of the 
market will enable individuals to ‘behave carefully’ and reward those who are engaging in 
acts valued within their community. The story that is ‘woven into reality’ (Moss, 2019), 
situates competitiveness at the heart of human existence and the best way for encouraging 
individuals, families, communities, and nations to thrive. This is the theoretical understanding 
of neoliberalism, but as articulated earlier, the practices and indeed lived reality of 
neoliberalism are quite different.  
Originally conceived as a community driven venture (May, 2013), early childhood 
education presently functions in the neoliberal competitive market. This situation has been 
written about at length by numerous scholars within many socio-political and cultural 
contexts (Lee, 2012; Moss, 2009; Osgood, 2006; Ritchie et al., 2014; Sims & Waniganayake, 
2015; Smith, Tesar, & Myers, 2016). ‘Integral’ aspects of children’s experiences and the 
overall direction and constitution of early childhood education in many countries have been 
heavily affected by the neoliberal model. Families are characterised as ‘individual 
consumers’ seeking to participate within the competitive market (Peters, 2011, p. 6) and 
children are positioned as (future) human capital to advance the value of the state (Buchanan, 
2016; Smith et al., 2016). Community based-organisations are in demise, while corporate-run 
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early childhood centres flourish due, in part, to the presentation of the neoliberal model as 
‘the only truth’ (Moss, 2009). Rather than being seen as one option amongst many, the 
market model is presented as the optimum means to promote competition (which is argued to 
drive up ‘quality’) to allow families the ‘choice’ to determine the experiences they want for 
their children. The discourse of ‘choice’ has origins in a sentimentalised understanding of 
children as agentic, co-opted to reconceive child ‘autonomy’ as a proxy for the child-
consumer who maintains self-sufficiency (De Bie et al., 2010).  
Families who participated within early childhood education as a part of being in the 
local community are now encouraged to do so for the educational advancements of their 
children and the betterment of their children as individuals who will compete in the future 
market. Privatised education situates education as an individual benefit and responsibility – 
the responsibility for education is placed within the hands of the individual rather than being 
a state responsibility. Thatcher’s vision of a populous that looks to themselves first, in action.  
However, these are the subtleties of governance and individual responsibility in early 
childhood education. Within neoliberal governance, the state “seeks to create an individual 
that is an enterprising and competitive entrepreneur” (Peters, 2011, p. 44). Rather than 
position early childhood education as an individual benefit, neoliberal positioning of children 
as ‘future human capital’, situates early childhood education as an ‘investment’ into which 
governments can realise high rates of ‘returns’, reducing later spending on other social 
welfare areas - health, justice, social welfare (Delaune, 2017; Jenson, 2009; Lister, 2004). 
Within this mode of understanding, the relationship between government and children can be 
likened to a producer and a product. The experiences of children’s present lives are based 
upon their future productivity. In order to minimise the negative impacts to the child-
‘product’ educational institutions are ‘irresponsibilised’ in order to delimit the areas of affect 
they hold under their welfare agenda (Cradock, 2007). Teachers are ‘irresponsibilised’ 
through increasing levels of surveillance; self-regulation, external measurement, and 
governmental directives. At best, these forms of governance reduce the educational 
relationship, at worse they transmute teaching into a technical set of performances between 
teacher and child.  
With the prelation of the mechanisms of competition came the concurrent ascendancy 
of discourses of measurement, performativity, and outputs. Early childhood teachers are 
expected to perform within these conditions “under the threat of spot inspections, or visits 
from regulatory bodies and the promise of funding” (Smith et al., 2016, p. 130). Early 
childhood settings are produced as spaces where children’s ‘potential’ needs to be realised, 
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with ramifications for subsequent pedagogy. Calls for answerability in response to ‘crises’ in 
which such potential is not realised create the conditions to illicit “demands for 
accountability, performativity and standardised approaches to [educators’] practice, all of 
which mark a pronounced movement towards centralised control and prescription, which 
poses a potential threat to professional autonomy and morale” (Osgood, 2006, p. 6). Such 
occurrences can be seen within the experience of Suzi Sluyter (Strauss, 2014) who has 
chosen to publicly resign rather than teach within the standardised neoliberal mode. Or 
locally within the debate of the effectiveness of Te Whāriki (see Blaiklock, 2010, 2013; and 
Smith, 2013 for more on this debate); there is an intensification of workload characterised by 
the increase in measurement and assessment and a decrease in the range of responsibilities 
given to teachers (Apple, 2013). The intention of the technical approach to education is to 
contain the outcomes of children’s learning and attempt a level of control to produce children 
in particular ways. It is important to consider the notion that childhood is produced by 
political, social, cultural, and economic forces operating on it, a critique of positivist and 
normative constructions of ‘childhood’ and opening to “antipositivist, hermeneutic 
epistemological orientations” (Steinberg, 2011, p. 5).  
Education is not a ‘product’ in the common consumable (and returnable) sense for 
experiences cannot be unlived, and the effects of these experiences become part of the fabric 
of a child’s life. Additionally, the point is made that “when it comes to ‘childcare’, parents 
prove more reluctant to switch their custom” (Moss, 2009, p. 18) under the assumption that 
their experiences are comparable to those within other early childhood settings. The ‘rational’ 
aspect of the decision making process within the free-market provision of early childhood 
education is brought into question here, as there are marked differences in the provision of 
quality between education providers, particularly between ‘for-profit’ and ‘not-for-profit’ 
providers (Mitchell, 2002; Mitchell & Brooking, 2007; Moss, 2009). However, parents, 
situated as ‘consumers’, frequently do not have the means (options/funds) or understanding 
(experience/knowledge of a ‘good product’) to make rational economic decisions (Moss, 
2009). The equation is not simply an economic one, but one that is impacted upon by other 
aspects of human life. Hayek’s assertion that ‘acts of value’ within the community will be 
rewarded is brought into question in the domain of early childhood education. In 
neoliberalisms, ‘value’ and ‘rationality’ are measured economically, and ‘similar enough’ 
quality means that decisions will be encouraged to be made based solely upon cost. The 
theory that the free-market would enhance product quality is contested by the actuality of a 
‘user-pays’ system in which varying quality and costs are generated in response to parent’s 
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levels of affordability (Morabito & Vandenbroeck, 2014). The idea of equality enhanced 
through a system which treats individuals indiscriminately (as argued by Hayek) is exposed 
as an illusion in light of the growing educational gap in an education system enabled to 
generate profit. In the early childhood ‘market’, enhanced educational experiences give cause 
for higher prices, low-cost early childhood education invoke reductions in quality indicators 
(ratios, group-sizes, qualifications) (Moss, 2009). Furthermore, consideration needs to be 
given to the re-colonisation of te ao Māori early childhood practices. The tensions between 
the collectivism that underpin Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017), and 
the individualism of neoliberalisms need to be brought to the fore (Ritchie et al., 2014; 
Ritchie & Skerrett, 2014).  
As articulated above, privatisation situates education as an individual benefit and 
responsibility; benefits enhanced through increased ‘knowledge’ (situated as a commodity in 
the market) and responsibility is placed upon families to utilise their personal resources to 
acquire this knowledge in order to promote individual advancement. On the other side of the 
equation, the dominance of the market model produces early childhood spaces where children 
are enculturated into the neoliberal climate, prompting them to be “compliant, productive, 
employable citizens” (Sims & Waniganayake, 2015, p. 336). A reconsideration of the 
discourses, constructions and institutions of the child can serve to re-examine the colonising 
effects they may produce (Cannella & Viruru, 2004). Children are introduced into the wider 
culture of competitiveness through participation in a ‘user pays’ system, potentially 
channelling them into high or low quality educational provision based on their parent’s 
economic resources. A dominant discourse within present neoliberal early childhood 
education is the drive to produce ‘life-long learners’. The notion of continually learning, 
growing and developing is not at odds with Murdochian philosophy, however, the rationale 
behind this movement – to enhance the position of the (future) nation-state by manufacturing 
a generation of citizens capable of adapting, evolving and maintaining a competitive edge in 
the future market – is. This discourse is promoted by international bodies such as the World 
Bank (2003) who argues that ‘life-long learning’ equips individuals to participate within the 
shifting market of the “global knowledge economy”, which is:  
…placing new demands on citizens, who need more skills and knowledge to be able to 
function in their day-to-day lives. Equipping people to deal with these demands 
requires a new model of education and training, a model of lifelong learning. A lifelong 
learning framework encompasses learning throughout the lifecycle, from early 
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childhood through retirement…Lifelong learning is crucial to preparing workers to 
compete in the global economy. But it is important for other reasons as well. By 
improving people’s ability to function as members of their communities, education and 
training increase social cohesion, reduce crime, and improve income distribution. (p. 
xvii, emphasis added).  
Participation in the community is based upon participation in the ‘knowledge economy’, 
enabling individuals to ‘function as members of their communities’ not for ethical purposes, 
but as a means of reducing state costs and improving ‘income distribution’. Functional 
community membership is inextricable from the directives of education to produce neoliberal 
beings: rational autonomous individuals who can compete within the free-market (Baltodano, 
2012). In general, the situation of education within the discourse of a ‘knowledge economy’ 
is “taken for granted by governments, mass media, public opinion, and most scholars today” 
(Livingstone & Guile, 2012, p. xv). For pre-service teachers in institutions of higher learning, 
neoliberalisms shape university policies to mask how educational values can be redefined to 
reflect economic ideas (Chapman et al., 2015). In early childhood education, children are 
prepared for their future employment and produced into ‘life-long consumers’ in an 
‘educative’ space in which “market-driven identities and values are both produced and 
legitimated” (Giroux, 2004, p. 494). 
In summary, neoliberalism is a theory, a practice and a lived experience, each with very 
differing effects/affects upon the individuals in the society. Neoliberalism casts individuals as 
‘rational utility maximisers’ whose autonomy to participate within the free market is 
paramount. Indeed freedom is equated with such participation, and people who are not 
maximising their utility or are seeking support from social services are the ‘lazy, indolent’ 
individuals characterised by Hayek (1948). He argued that external governance and scientific 
rationalisation of the market was erroneous. Rather, individuals were more able to respond to 
the immediate demands of the market due to their intricate knowledge of the situation and, if 
they did not behave rationally, the circumstantial power of the market would force them to do 
so.  
In enacting neoliberal ideas, governments limit their intervention within social services, 
only insofar as to promote the maximum stimulation of the economy. Early childhood 
education has been dramatically changed by neoliberal policy, with a predominant number of 
early childhood settings owned by private individuals or corporate entities. The neoliberal 
mode of governance has enhanced competition between early childhood settings, increasing 
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managerialism, centralised strategies and affecting educators’ practices. In the privatisation of 
early childhood, education can be (inappropriately) positioned as a product and teachers as a 
part of an educational machine (Moss, 2009; Peters, 2018). Within the neoliberal drive to 
reduce social spending, children are viewed as ‘potent-potential’ and early childhood 
education as an ‘investment’ which can reduce future welfare costs, and/or enhance the 
‘assets’ of the nation in order to compete in the global market. Such a view reduces the 
responsibility of the early childhood teacher, as education settings are ‘irresponsibilised’ in 
order to delimit the possible negative effect (Cradock, 2007). Again, this is not always the 
case in practice, as standards for many early childhood settings are minimalised in the push-
pull for maximum utility and minimal restrictions on the market. The theory that supported 
the view that the market would drive up quality has not been realised in reality.  
 
Neoliberalisms and Murdochian Attention 
According to Murdoch, in the desire for ‘freedom’ two essential elements were lost: the 
diverse concepts that would enable individuals to represent their reality, and the ability to see 
beyond the limited scope of this vision. Within neoliberal theory, freedom of the individual is 
measured by his or her access to, and autonomy within, the market; the ‘unfettered will’ of 
neoliberal theory is not the same as that of liberalism, where minimal intervention is the key 
to freedom. However, the liberal and neoliberal ideas have had very similar effects upon the 
image of the human, raising the need to reconnect with the philosophy of Iris Murdoch in 
order to address contemporary concerns.  
Responding to the domains of Anglo-Saxon and French philosophy (which she 
identifies as enlightenment, romanticism, liberalism) to piece together the human of her time, 
Murdoch (1998) takes the stance that the image of the moral agent is fundamentally 
impoverished within liberalism; in her view, Western philosophical traditions have created 
“far too shallow and flimsy an idea of human personality” (p. 287) leaving humanity poorer 
for it. According to Murdoch, liberalism and the rise of the welfare state has resulted in the 
loss of philosophical concepts necessary to the debates relevant within the liberal tradition, 
including the concepts of freedom and autonomy. The aims of liberalism are to “secure the 
political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom” (Shklar, 1989), 
which may promote certain aspects as central; morality (Shklar, 1989), utilitarianism (Mill, 
2011), freedom (Rawls, 1985) to name a few.  
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Murdoch writes that “Our central conception is still a debilitated form of Mill’s 
equation: happiness equals freedom equals personality” (p. 290). More extensively, she 
writes:  
We no longer use a spread-out substantial picture of the manifold of virtues of man and 
society. We no longer see man17 against a background of values, of realities, which 
transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will surrounded by an easily 
comprehended empirical world. What we have never had, of course, is a satisfactory 
Liberal theory of personality, a theory of man as free and separate and related to a rich 
and complicated world from which, as a moral being, he has much to learn. We have 
bought the Liberal theory as it stands, because we have wished to encourage people to 
think of themselves as free, at the cost of surrendering the background. (p. 290)  
Hume, Kant, Hobbes, and Mill are identified as chief players in this ‘flimsy image’, although 
Murdoch also draws from Hampshire18 heavily in her argumentation. It is from these 
philosophers and “with friendly help from mathematical logic and science, we derive the idea 
that reality is finally a quantity of material atoms and that significant discourse must relate 
itself directly or indirectly to a reality so conceived” (pp. 287–288). This idea has been 
introduced within Chapter Two, and will be extended further within Chapter Four, but it is of 
significant importance to identify the role of the scientific here also, particularly through the 
segmentation of the individual into discreet measurable units, and the necessity for ‘hard’ 
evidence to make claims towards an understanding of the human.  
The “ideal citizen of the liberal state” (Murdoch, 1998, pp. 365-6) is generated from the 
‘age of science’, promoting confident rationality but also a sense of alienation from the 
universe. This sense of alienation was discussed in the previous chapter, through the image of 
the ideally rational individual who is unable to shift this feeling due to the legacy of Kantian 
rationality, which endows the individual with the capacity for objective assessment. Yet, one 
of Murdoch’s central criticisms of liberal traditions is that an overreliance upon the scientific 
lens (not only to investigate the human, but also as the correct mode of picturing the human), 
unsatisfactorily represents the intricate reality of the human individual. This is a failure that is 
composed of two parts “not only the erosion of the available conceptual resources for 
thinking about the self, but of a more general loss of the kind of theorizing that made such 
thinking possible, namely ‘metaphysics’” (Antonaccio, 2012, p. 217).  
                                                 
17 See Note 2 
18 See note 11 
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The liberal concern to advance the freedom of the human concurrently delimits the 
realm of the metaphysical, and reduces the moral individual to ‘rational decision-maker’. She 
writes: 
…we derive from Kant, and also Hobbes and Bentham through John Stuart Mill, a 
picture of the individual as a free rational will. With the removal of Kant’s 
metaphysical background this individual is seen as alone… monarch of all he surveys 
and totally responsible for his actions. Nothing transcends him…his inner life is 
resolved into facts and choices and his beliefs… [And] can only be identified through 
its expression. (Murdoch, 1998, p. 288)  
An image of humanity as rational, detached, free, and externally observable is produced in 
the desire for autonomous freedom. 
Within neoliberalism, autonomous freedom is protected only insofar as is necessary to 
stimulate the economy; the ‘will to be competitive’ is constantly shaped and enticed in order 
to maximise the productivity of market. Neoliberal freedom is an intricate relationship 
between the individual and the state. The degree of governmental involvement is to be 
extended only to this point: to encourage individual rights, and the vitality of market 
competition (Peters, 2011, p. 44). Harvey (2005) asserts:  
The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of human dignity and 
individual freedom as fundamental, as ‘the central values of civilization’. In so doing 
they chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and seductive ideals. These values, 
they held, were threatened not only by fascism, dictatorships, and communism, but by 
all forms of state intervention that substituted collective judgements for those of 
individuals free to choose. (p. 5) 
This notion of freedom, which is indeed ‘compelling and seductive’, takes the stance that 
compromises to freedom threaten liaisons with totalitarianism, and are equitable to the 
authority of the state over the autonomy of the individual.  
Despite her concerns with the ways that liberalisms misrepresents the human, Murdoch 
was also concerned with the autonomy of the individual. It could appear that Murdoch 
wholeheartedly rejected the liberal image of the human, but her relationship with this 
individual is more complex than it appears. As illustrated by Antonaccio (2012), Murdoch 
respected the liberal tradition’s vehement defence of the ‘real impenetrable person’ 
(investigated further in Chapter Seven) and passionately defended this central liberal value 
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(pp. 212-3). Murdoch (1998) defines this value as “a respect for the individual 
person…however eccentric, private, messy, and generally tiresome he may be” (p. 275). 
Although she rejects the individualistic and egocentric natures that are essential to the 
‘Kantian man-god’, she does not hold that these aspects are essential to the image of the 
individual and defends the concept of the liberal individual as a “substantial, impenetrable, 
individual, indefinable and valuable” (p. 294). However, even in her defence of the 
individual, Murdoch did not defend a form of individualism that promotes self over others. 
As articulated in Chapter Two, the humble individual is the preferred ideal in the concept of 
attention. Humans are not ‘free’, or as Murdoch writes, humans are “not isolated free 
choosers, monarchs of all we survey, but benighted creatures sunk in a reality whose nature 
we are constantly and overwhelmingly tempted to deform by fantasy” (p. 293). Murdoch 
points out that we are ridden by anxiety, which encourages us to produce a fictitious, self-
satisfying, falsifying veil, occluding our vision of the world (p. 369). 
The central values protected in neoliberalisms, the earlier stated ‘compelling and 
seductive ideals’, need to be considered in light of Murdoch’s understanding of the 
distinction between fantasy and imagination in the concept of attention. She expands upon 
her depiction of humans as ‘anxiety-ridden’ and encouraged to fantastical images, writing:  
We are largely mechanical creatures, the slaves of relentlessly strong selfish forces the 
nature of which we scarcely comprehend. At best, as decent persons, we are usually 
very specialised. We behave well in areas where this can be done fairly easily and let 
other areas of possible virtue remain undeveloped…The self is a divided thing, and the 
whole of it cannot be redeemed any more than it can be known. (pp. 381–382) 
At this point, it would appear that Murdoch’s assessment is that the human is irredeemable 
and the selfish and deluded nature of the individual that fabricates a fantasy in order to 
understand reality, is unable to be transformed. Yet this is not the completion of Murdoch’s 
illustration. To make room for the possibility of growth and change, Murdoch draws from 
Plato’s analogy of the cave to expand upon her conceptualisation of the human.  
Murdoch (1998) argues that the prisoners in the cave are first drawn to the shadows 
created by the fire, yet the point of the analogy is for the prisoners to move beyond the fire 
and into the true light of the sun. Here, Murdoch defines the fire as the “self, the old 
unregenerate psyche, that great source of energy and warmth” (p. 382). If humans reduce 
themselves to this limited understanding and find no motivation to become aware of what is 
beyond this narcissistic source of fascination, they will mistake the fire for the sun and 
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misplace self-scrutiny for goodness (p. 383). Through the dominant projection of the liberal 
individual in moral philosophy, humans are not encouraged to move beyond the fire. 
Murdoch (1998) explains: “When Kant wanted to find something clean and pure outside the 
mess of the selfish empirical psyche…His enquiry led him back again into the self, now 
pictured as angelic” (p. 368); despite Kant’s small metaphysical allowance, the delusion of 
unmitigated reason returned Kant to the self. Kant’s misstep was shared and magnified 
through a generation of philosophers that followed him. The moral agent is produced as an 
isolated, alienated will, offering two possibilities: “On one hand, Luciferian philosophy19 of 
adventures of the will, and on the other natural science” (p. 338).  
Murdoch would argue that the compelling and seductive nature of the neoliberal images 
of the human is due to the way in which it creates this Luciferian compulsion – the desire to 
substitute a fantastical argument for the reality of the situation, one based in part upon the 
desires of the ‘fat relentless ego’. Like Murdoch’s arguments against the ‘liberal’ image, 
neoliberalisms do not encourage individuals to move beyond the ‘fire’ of the ego. Within 
neoliberal notions of freedom, there is ample space to preserve and indeed encourage 
selfishness and greed justified by the illusion of freedom presented through the arguments of 
‘free access’ to the market. In this line of thought, those who prosper can be devolved of 
responsibility for those who fail, for if all humans are equally autonomous and capable of 
making rational decisions then they are solely responsible for their productivity or demise. 
The legacy of ‘movement’ over ‘vision’ as the primary way of understanding the actions of 
the human can be seen in the desire to ensure that continuous productivity is paramount, 
defining the validity of an individual within the ‘market’ and society. 
Through a misconceived notion of freedom, the neoliberal individual is situated as free 
to exercise the unfettered will and the ego and protected from ethical entanglements, 
obligations to, or concerns for ‘unsuccessful’ individuals. Murdoch was wary of the ways in 
which the ego can move humans to transmute reality into fantasy, a characteristic she argued 
was present within the liberal individual (p. 292-3) and is certainly characteristic of neoliberal 
theories. She argues “reality is not a given whole. An understanding of this, a respect for the 
contingent, is essential to imagination as opposed to fantasy” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 294). The 
neoliberal imagination is the imagination of the ego – the desire to promote one’s individual 
interests in a competitive system, to advance oneself ahead of others, to see others as 
                                                 
19 ‘Luciferian’ is further explicated within Chapter 1 in the discussion of the influence of Plato, and in Chapter Two in the exploration 
of the concept of ‘demonic’ selfishness that creates fantasy in order to seek consolation.  
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economic subjects. Murdoch argues that the notion of freedom is not about freeing ourselves 
from connections to others, but being cognisant of the role these connections play within our 
lives, our decisions and our interpretation of freedom; we can still make our own choices to 
participate within the ‘market’, but to assume that individuals do not have to be responsible to 
each other is to engage in a particularly virulent form of narcissism, encouraged by neoliberal 
ideas.  
Akin to the reductions invoked by the liberal image of the human, the neoliberal image 
has reduced the individual to the ‘economic unit’ and lost touch with the background to the 
human. These problems are generated through economic theory, the neoliberal affinity for 
quantifiable empirical research data and the desire for measurement of individuals. Within 
these understandings of the human there is a limiting effect, as they fail to recognise and 
appreciate the diversities and variations of the real impenetrable person. Furthermore, the 
neoliberal imagination is not an accurate representation of the real impenetrable person, but a 
misrepresentation in the national (global) desire to advance the economic situation of the 
nation-state. In creating an unnecessary dialectic between individual and community, there 
are significant aspects of human experiences that are omitted from neoliberal ideas. Murdoch 
would argue, that the presentation of the neoliberal agenda as the only ‘truth’ to be adhered to 
is limiting our understanding of the depth of human personality and the ability to be able to 
appreciate it. 
Murdoch seeks an image of what she calls ‘human excellence’, defined by its 
relationship to goodness. It is the position of this study that this image holds potential to 
reconsider the centrality of neoliberalisms within contemporary education. Murdoch (1992) 
seeks excellence through her position that philosophy should be concerned with commending 
‘a worthy ideal’ (p. 364). Murdoch maintains that goodness should be sovereign over other 
moral concepts, including freedom. Despite its sovereignty, goodness is difficult to 
understand not only because it is endless, but also because we deform goodness with many 
“false doubles” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 375). However, goodness cannot collapse into self-
interest when combined with love and, although we may not be able to represent it 
accurately, we remain certain that ‘great’ does not equate to ‘perfect’; we sense the 
difference. Murdoch (1998) explains that we are capable of seeing and sensing the direction 
of goodness beyond ourselves, and can appreciate the ‘self’ as a place of illusion (p. 376). 
This is where the movement away from the ‘self’ in the form of ‘self’-ishness is “connected 
with the attempt to see the unself, to see and to respond to the real world in the light of a 
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virtuous consciousness” (p. 376). When viewed as a transcendent reality, goodness enhances 
our vision to remove the ‘veil’ and “join the world as it really is” (p. 377).  
In ‘joining the world as it really is’, Murdoch’s focus on keeping philosophy within the 
realm of real human experience comes to the fore. In order to join the world, one must work 
within the world; to progress towards a realistic and experiential understanding of moral 
concepts. Murdoch (1998) was adamant that this increased understanding could only be 
wrought through reflection upon experience, guided by attention. Through continual work, 
moral concepts will reveal their unity; courage is an act of wisdom and love, freedom 
involves humility. However, moving towards unity cannot involve losing focus of the 
particular, nor losing sight of an external goodness by only attending to the particulars.  
Goodness involves the ability to not only grasp the particulars of each situation but to 
appreciate the sense of intuited moral unity and perceive the world in a unified manner; to 
connect with detail and to respect “distant transcendent perfection” (p. 383). Murdoch argues 
that the moral individual is capable of this moral task, capable of more than conceited self-
reflection or unrealistic judgements. She argues that this is something that has been the cause 
of detailed investigation by philosophers, and “what the ordinary person does by instinct” (p. 
377).  
 Yet how do we define the ideal individual? Murdoch (1998) is cagey about defining 
this person; she posits that we cannot sum up human excellence as “the world is aimless, 
chancy and huge, and we are blinded by the self” (p. 382). More importantly, she posits 
another reason we cannot fully encapsulate human excellence based upon Plato’s analogy, 
namely it “is difficult to look at the sun…it is easier to look at the converging edges than to 
look at the centre itself” (p. 382). Our looking towards the converging edges is enhanced 
through attention. Through magnetic tension, goodness and love are interconnected. 
However, neither the good nor love can be fully identified as “we are dealing with very 
difficult metaphors” (p. 384). Murdoch asserts that love is a concept disregarded within the 
philosophy of her time, displaced by discussions on freedom and autonomy (pp. 299-300). 
Yet through the concept of attention, freedom, love and the good are necessary cohabiters.  
In the concept of attention, there is magnetic tension between goodness and love; when 
goodness is loved, we are enlivened, drawn towards perfection and flourish in the light of the 
sun. These movements are not simply a matter of choice, will and determination, but affected 
by desire and love and its relationship to goodness. In neoliberal and liberal traditions the 
relationship between goodness and freedom is in tension. Liberal freedom is connected to 
autonomy: the ‘unfettered will’ and the ability to determine one’s own actions based upon the 
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possibilities of choice. The notion of ‘goodness’ may limit the potential productivity of the 
market; a transcendent goodness shackles the will and binds it to an external and inalterable 
necessity. In order to de-shackle the human, the liberal notion of freedom reconceived the 
good as a relative set of options, and “an empty space into which human choice may move” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 380). Reducing the good to a space into which the will may move 
eliminates the influence transcendent goodness held over the individual. This indefinite 
nature of ‘liberal goodness’ is promoted by the desire for an unimpeded will and individual 
choice. Love does not feature within this image. Good inhabits a space considered “as empty 
and almost trivial, a mere word” (p. 381). Neoliberalisms are argues to be situated as an 
‘ethic’ in themselves (Peters & Tesar, 2018). Yet in Murdoch’s view, goodness is not a 
matter of choice and creates an entirely different relationship to the notion of freedom; one 
which is not representative of an ‘unfettered will’ but more closely resembles ‘obedience’. As 
argued in the previous chapter, in this understanding of the world the movement of the will 
does not constitute moral ‘choice’ (p. 331). Rather, humility is brought to the fore as this 
quality will support the moral individual to accept the ties that connects him or her to others. 
Murdoch argues, “love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself 
is real” (p. 215). In appreciating the reality of another human, the idea of an ‘unfettered will’ 
needs redress. In this way, the ideal individual can be characterised as one who acquiesces to 
this ‘obedience’, someone who Murdoch identifies as ‘the humble individual’.  
The unfettered will is dependent upon the ability to make choices, and humility is a key 
to understanding more about the position of ‘choices’. As stated earlier, freedom and 
autonomy are highly valued within liberal traditions. In situating the individual in the position 
where all one needs to do is to “objectively estimate the features of the goods, and…choose” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 305) the individual is placed in the ‘driving seat’ of all moral choices; the 
individual is in a position of autonomy to freely choose the path he/she will take. In the 
Murdochian position, the individual is not free in this sense. Murdoch is clear to state that 
freedom is not about “the sudden jumping of the isolated will in and out of an impersonal 
logical complex, it is a function of the progressive attempt to see a particular object clearly” 
(p. 317). When the moment of choice arrives, Murdoch describes a condition of ‘strange 
emptiness’, which is “hailed with delight by both wings of existentialism…the Kantian wing 
claims it as showing that we are free in relation to the reasons and the Surrealist wing claims 
it as showing that there are no reasons” (p. 328). But if we consider the concept of attention 
as a progressive journey towards a greater understanding of the good, then the moment of 
choosing is not strangely empty due to freedom of reason or lack of reason, but rather due to 
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the incremental work done prior to the moment. If we consider attention as a progressive 
endeavour, through which our moral vision is enhanced in ways that imperceptibly builds up 
structures of value around us, then we can develop an understanding of the ‘crucial’ choices 
in our life being guided by our experiences, interactions and relationships leading us to that 
‘choice’, invoking a new relationship with choice, choosing and ‘freedom’ (p. 329). Freedom 
is less about the large decisions to be made, and more about the small moments that led us to 
the moment of choice; less about grand motions of ‘choosing’ and more about the progress 
made to get there.  
This notion of freedom is not concerned with the freedom of the individual from an 
external background, but is reliant upon this background and the humility to accept the 
choices that will be made as a result of our connections to others in the world. Moreover, this 
notion of freedom is not concerned with the ‘unfettered will’ of liberalism, for “explicit 
choice seems now less important; less decisive (since much of the ‘decision’ lies elsewhere) 
and less obviously something to be ‘cultivated’” (p. 331). This notion of freedom is moving 
against the notion that freedom is a struggle for autonomy and towards the idea that freedom 
is our connections to others; away from the image of the human as an ‘impersonal rational 
thinker’ and towards the image of the human as a unified being who is afforded the capacity 
for moral vision, and who can exercise some control over the direction and focus of this 
vision through the practice of attention (p. 322).  
Antonaccio (2012) argues that Murdoch’s philosophy contains a level of complexity 
that can accommodate “multiple forms of human aspiration” (p. 213). Although Murdoch’s 
notion of freedom is incompatible with the narrow liberal notion of the ‘ideally rational 
individual’, this is not to imply that there is no freedom. Antonaccio (2012) expands further, 
writing:  
Murdoch’s commitment to a unitary conception of the good did not lead her to deny the 
“infinite variegations” among different people with different aspirations. Rather she 
regarded the perfection of goodness – the ability to see beyond the self – as the 
prerequisite to a liberal respect for persons. (pp. 214–215)  
The narrow image of freedom presented within the philosophy of Murdoch’s contemporaries 
reduces our understanding of the capacity of the moral individual. Yet this is not to assert that 
there is no merit in the liberal struggle to promote the freedom of the individual. Murdoch 
(1998) is clear to demonstrate respect for this tradition, but expresses reservations about the 
simplicity of this freedom; for Murdoch the technique of becoming free is more complicated 
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than that realised through liberalism, and to support a liberal notion of freedom that 
welcomes the moral life “we need to be enabled to think in terms of degrees of freedom, and 
to picture, in a non-metaphysical, non-totalitarian and non-religious sense, the transcendence 
of reality” (p. 293, emphasis added).  
In order to do so, Murdoch advocates for the realisation that there is intricate 
complexity to the moral life (which is in effect all aspects of life in Murdochian philosophy), 
and, in order to appreciate this complexity, we need to enhance the subtlety with which we 
comprehend moral concepts through the practice of attention. As stated earlier, Murdoch was 
concerned with philosophy as a truth seeking and truth revealing undertaking. The ways in 
which philosophical positions present reality, and how relatable they are to human life, are 
critical aspects of validity. Any philosophical positions that fail to accurately represent 
human experience fail to fit the necessary criteria of philosophy, which is to reveal a truth 
about human existence. Murdoch critiques the liberal notion of freedom as it is not 
representative of the reality of human life. People do not consider themselves free and 
unfettered from all other people. Their moral choices are not hinged upon autonomy and 
rationality, nor solely related to external action. Rather, reality and freedom are complexly 
connected between ourselves and others and reliant upon the moral imagination. The moral 
imagination is not only a function of will, but rather “the experience of accurate vison which, 
when this becomes appropriate, occasions action” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 354). 
When the practice of attention is refined over the course of time, and relationships are 
developed through love (allowing for the magnetic tension to goodness), freedom cannot be 
seen to be a product of the unfettered will or the rational autonomous individual; human 
freedom cannot be represented through this iteration of the liberal individual. To move away 
from this notion of freedom, towards the inevitability of actions created through the act of 
attention, is to move away from the individualistic ego, into an “obedience to reality as an 
exercise of love”. (Murdoch, 1998, p. 333). 
 
Reconsidering Neoliberalisms 
In the Introduction, the point was raised that in the desire to retain autonomy through reason, 
philosophers were driven to produce an image of the human built from shaky premises, 
which impart a precarious foundation for the image of the neoliberal human in contemporary 
times. Over the course of the chapter, Murdoch’s criticisms of the ‘free’ liberal individual 
argued that this instance of liberal freedom was insufficient to represent the reality of the 
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complete moral being. This is a contention that can be equally made against images of the 
neoliberal individual. As Murdoch (1998) articulates, we are not ‘isolated free choosers’ but 
individuals who are a part of a wider moral world which we seek to augment and deform to 
fit our fantastical and egotistical proclivities (p. 293). Although the liberal and neoliberal 
notions of freedom are not equal to totalitarianism, there is a narrowing effect that distorts the 
image of ‘freedom’ in order to preserve the illusion of rational autonomy. The ‘cultivation’ of 
these freedoms, in the refined limits of governance designed to elicit the competitive nature 
of individuals, is challenged by Murdochian theory. Murdoch is not concerned with the role 
of ‘explicit choice’ but the recognition that much of our decision-making happens prior to the 
event, raising the question: Why should neoliberal ‘freedom’ be ‘cultivated’?  
And what of the ‘inner life’ that Murdoch seeks to defend? The ‘ideal neoliberal 
individual’ is again found wanting, with no ‘inner life’ represented beyond movements within 
the market. Although the moral decisions of the liberal individual were only externally 
measured, the neoliberal individual is measured through his or her productivity; again the 
measurement can only be outwardly regarded and subjected to external evaluation. The 
relationship between this externalised judgement, and the internal movements within the act 
of education need further exposition. Teachers are positioned to produce children who will 
compete within the future market, but are equally a part of the present market of early 
childhood education. Teachers are ‘irresponsibilised’ in order to limit the chances of moving 
outside the neoliberal mould (Cradock, 2007), but pedagogy is grounded within intricate 
human relationships; these relationships bind us together in ways that do not deny freedom, 
but are a part of its texture and substance. Neoliberalism promotes individualism over 
community, but early childhood education is built from a community ethic.  
The enactment and influence of governance is a significant point of difference between 
neoliberal and liberal ideas; liberal traditions seek freedom from governance, neoliberal 
theories seek to find the point where governance can maximise productivity. Subsequently, 
responses to education are affected by this difference; within contemporary neoliberalisms, 
the edge of governance is sought in order to protect the interests of the state and develop a 
(future) human product whom is maximised for economic efficiency. But, as argued by 
Murdoch, when freedom is understood as the humility to accept that choice is dependent 
upon connections to others in the world, pre-determining appropriate actions or choices are 
“less obviously something to be ‘cultivated’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 331). Teachers within early 
childhood education are not involved with an amorphous object of ‘human capital’, but 
responding to an individual human being.  
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Through the promotion of neoliberal ideas, education could indeed become technical 
and standardised, but as argued by Murdoch this form of ‘knowledge’ of the human fails to 
represent reality. In adhering to this fantasy much is lost in the potentiality of the educational 
experience. Underpinned by neoliberal theory – to produce individuals who are ‘enterprising’ 
and ‘competitive’ – education could enculture children into a ‘neoliberal normality’; 
manufacturing children according to an economic doctrine. As argued before, this approach 
to pedagogy will misrepresent individuals and the relationships between individuals within 
education; a standardised approach loses the deep contextual understandings of the human 
individual that can be wrought through attentive relationships and the potential of 
understanding education illuminated in the light of the good. In displacing the teacher for the 
technician, we lose the opportunity to attend to the child, to engage our moral vision, and 
move pedagogy towards a deeper appreciation of the reality of the child.  
Through neoliberal governance, teaching can become an object of externalised 
measurement: quantifiable, standardisable, and replicable; pedagogy can transmute into 
technical practices that can be translated into any setting. Yet there is an ‘inner life’ of the act 
of education that must be defended, one that cannot be measured externally without extensive 
understanding of the particulars of each setting, and indeed each relationship held between a 
teacher and a child. It is not easily measureable or quantifiable but that does not preclude its 
existence nor its value: “‘not a report’ need not entail ‘not an activity’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 
318). Humans have the potential for a rich imaginative capacity that is not able to be easily 
represented for external analysis (a point that is explored in more depth in Chapter Seven).  
The liberal image of the individual resisted by Murdoch viewed ‘reality’ to be a phenomenon 
comprehensible only though external observation and judgement, akin to empirically-based 
scientific understandings of the world. However, a recognition of the opacity of persons 
(which will be discussed further within Chapter Seven) and a respect for the non-empirical 
aspects of individual lives appreciable through the ‘just and loving gaze’ give pause to those 




In conclusion, continuing the neoliberal agenda in education could engender a situation 
comparative to that which most concerned Murdoch: a loss of the conceptual understandings 
to nurture and defend alternate visions. Through acquiescence to neoliberal ideas and the 
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enculturation of children into a ‘neoliberal normality’, we develop another generation of 
individuals who view the world through the economic lens. Is this an adequate measure of the 
good of education? As argued before, goodness is not a ‘void’, it is not relative and selectable 
from equally suitable options. The good of education is not externally derived standardised 
practices which promote mechanistic procedures between teacher and child. This is a false 
goodness, derived from a false love generated by the ego – the love of the self and the desire 
for individual advancement in the (future) market. Goodness in education is the attentive 
human relationship between the teacher and the child, the application of a just and loving 
gaze towards an individual reality and the progress of the practicing teacher towards a clearer 
understanding of the educational relationship. The intricacies of the attentive relationship 






Fact/Value, the Moral Imagination, and Neuroscience  
 
Introduction 
There are central positions in Murdoch’s philosophy that are persistent throughout her 
philosophical writing (from the 1950s to the early 1990s). These positions are developed over 
time and, although they feature differently within her various pieces of writing (taking a 
central or side role), they recur within many of her arguments. One of these positions is built 
from Murdoch’s concern with the influence of scientific rationality within philosophy. 
Philosophical movements that emulate scientific rationality to develop moral arguments 
produce an unnecessary and misleading divide between fact and value. She asserts, if this 
form of argumentation continues then philosophy will suffer from a loss of concepts and no 
longer remain apposite to the lives of everyday individuals. Furthermore, the loss of this 
conceptual knowledge will affect our ability to effectively argue for an alternate image of the 
moral individual. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss Murdoch’s arguments against 
scientism in order to illuminate similar concerns with the recent nascent application of 
neuroscientific findings to the field of early childhood education.  
Neuroscience is a field of scientific inquiry about the functions of the brain and has 
become a prominent discourse within early childhood education (this will be discussed 
further later in this chapter). Although science has produced many findings to benefit society, 
some caution needs to be applied to the broad application of the neuroscientific lens to 
education, particularly when affecting the purpose, direction, and intention of education. The 
image of the ‘learner’ and the subsequent implications for the role of the ‘teacher’ are heavily 
affected by neuroscientific discourse. Building from Murdoch’s arguments, this chapter seeks 
to demonstrate the need to pause and reconsider neuroscience as the prominent explanation of 
the ‘human’ and open conversations about the evaluative, ethical and moral act of education.  
At the outset of this chapter the fact/value distinction will be outlined with an 
explanation of Murdoch’s arguments against such a distinction. Following this, the problems 
of applying scientific rationality to philosophy will be defined. Next a discussion of the 
present situation and growing concerns about the application of neuroscientific findings 
within the domain of education will be outlined. Finally, the philosophical arguments 
developed by Murdoch will be brought into conversation with current concerns with 
neuroscience to offer a distinct position supported by Murdoch’s philosophical vision.  
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The Fact/Value Distinction 
Murdoch (1992) expressed concerns about the emergence of a strict fact/value distinction in 
moral philosophy. She argues that the initial purpose of this distinction was to protect values 
from facts in order to ensure moral values were neither tainted by, nor derived solely from, 
empirical conclusions (p. 25). What she identifies as a ‘post-Kantian theory of morals’ runs 
as follows: “survey all the facts, then use your reason” (p. 26). Murdoch remains uneasy with 
this movement into a new distinction and rationale for the fact/value divide, highlighting 
moments when it is expressed in this way. She identifies the advent of analytical philosophy 
as playing a major role in the promotion of the fact/value divide. The analytical tradition has 
promoted the position that the moral agent is capable of ‘stepping back’ into a theoretical 
‘space’ where a survey of all the facts is possible. Yet, Murdoch (1998) questions the 
possibility of the ‘stepping back’ motion, arguing that the image of rational detachment is 
part of the liberal illusion of freedom (as discussed in Chapter Three). The act of surveying 
the facts and then applying ‘reason’ lacks cognisance of the assumptions made prior to and as 
part of the ‘stepping back’ motion and in the act of surveying the facts. She contends that 
philosophers who present this image profess to be neutral and analytical, yet these two states 
are not analogous; the analytical position suggests a spurious connection between these two 
states implying their interdependence. Any instance where this is not the case is worth 
commenting on (p. 300). Additionally, value judgements are obscured by this conflation, with 
the resultant image of the moral individual rendered through this co-joined gaze. Where 
analytical philosophy seeks to remove values to develop a ‘rational’ starting point for 
analysis, a more appropriate approach would be to expose the suppressed premise to identify 
a potential failure in moral thinking or a form of moral evasion (Diamond, 1996, p. 81). 
Murdoch rejects the proposed distinction between fact and value, and views this division to 
be funnelling moral philosophy into a particular direction, creating a false impression about 
human beings and conduct and misrepresenting where the problems of moral philosophy 
actually lie.  
Murdoch (1992) identifies the “increasing prestige of science” (p. 25) as the major 
development affecting the movement of philosophical reasoning towards the new fact/value 
distinction. She suggests that the affinity for scientific rationalism encourages the desire for 
analytical neutrality and argues against the dominance of scientism due to the limiting effects 
that will be imposed upon philosophy through this relation; through the image of the world 
created through scientific naturalism, moral lives are delimited (Hacker-Wright, 2010, p. 
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205). Maintaining the fact/value distinction will cultivate “a diminished, even perfunctory, 
account of morality…leading to a marginalisation of the ‘ethical’” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 25). 
Structuring the approach to moral philosophy in this way invokes what Murdoch describes as 
the two ‘god-heads’ within Kantian philosophy – “the world of fact which must be 
realistically, bravely, accepted, and the moral subject who is to accept it” (p. 30). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this simplification of the relationship between the 
individual and the world is promoted to maximise a liberal interpretation of individual 
freedom. Yet the relationship between freedom and reality is more complex, and the world of 
fact is not easily separated from the moral individual in the way suggested by philosophical 
(or scientific) visions of the world. Rather facts and values imply each other in more intricate 
and subtle ways. If, as Murdoch holds, the distinction between fact and value is not clearly 
delineated, then a different understanding of the relationship between science and philosophy 
is required.  
Subsequently, there are three main ideas that will be outlined to build the argument 
against the fact/value divide. Firstly, that this partition neglects to acknowledge the evaluative 
element in the inception and development of facts (that, when concerning humans, value-
laden decisions are necessary to devising a fact, and therefore fact is never devoid of value). 
Secondly, if moral thought infiltrates conclusions assumed to be ‘value-free’, then what is 
lost when this inherent influence is disregarded. Lastly, if moral thought is an integral part of 
consciousness, should the fact/value distinction be abandoned and moral consideration no 
longer considered a supplemental or additional consideration? These points will be expanded 
below.  
 
The role of evaluation within the discernment of ‘facts’. 
Murdoch resisted the notion that moral actions are solely determined by objective rationality. 
She considered the development of moral philosophy to be arrested by the image of the moral 
individual adhering to an objective assay of the ‘facts’, leading them to a logical ‘neutral’ 
decision. The presentation of the moral individual, as the ‘ideally rational individual’, is 
discussed more at length in the previous chapter, but the following quote from Murdoch 
(1998) also aids our comprehension of this illusory moral character. She writes:  
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A man’s20 morality is seen in his conduct and a moral statement is a prescription of rule 
uttered to guide a choice, and the descriptive meaning of the moral world which it 
contains is made specific by reference to a factual criteria of application. (p. 63) 
This rendering of morality consists of a central individual who is guided by prescriptive rules 
(moral statements) determined by an allusion to empirically-derived ‘facts’ to support moral 
choice. It is a position supported by the dictum: “you cannot attach morality to the substance 
of the world” (p. 65) and an image devoid of any “transcendent background” (p. 63), 
picturing the moral individual as detached and ‘free’. Such an image compels the conviction 
that all moral positions should be logically determined and externally defendable, rendering 
metaphysics defunct.  
Murdoch argues that the fact/value distinction was determined in order to maintain the 
possibility for individual autonomy when the authority of the Good threatened it; in 
delineating ‘fact’ from ‘value’, the spiritual (value) world becomes a world of faith, not of 
knowledge (fact). Murdoch identifies these positions as confusing an anti-metaphysical 
argument with a logical argument, despite being covertly underpinned by a moral assumption 
that runs as follows: the danger in deriving morality from the factual world stems from the 
potential for morality to become dogma and the abstention from critical analysis of moral 
values (Murdoch, 1998, p. 66). This is a moral assumption, under the guise of logic. Murdoch 
expands further, writing: 
I am suggesting that modern philosophers have tended to take their stripped, 
behaviouristic and non-conceptual picture of morality as the only possibly picture 
because they have joined the anti-metaphysical argument and the logical argument to a 
moral argument of a different type. (p. 66)  
The presentation of moral deliberation as logical, neutral, and comprised of action, is not the 
only mode of moral thought, but a specific model enthralled with scientific neutrality. It is 
not a universal moral image, but a model developed through a certain perspective (one that 
will be later argued as a misapprehension of reality).  
According to Murdoch, this image of the moral world was countered by other 
philosophers, but only for minor analytical differences and not for the deep assumptions 
underpinning this position. In this image, we are led to believe that life involves all 
individuals dwelling within a world of common facts, and morality consists of (different 
                                                 
20 See Note 1 
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ways of) choosing and acting in response to these facts. The deep assumption that Murdoch 
seeks to contend is the possibility of an objective ‘space’ for the moral individual to step back 
into; this assumption misconceives the act of thinking and making sense of (moral) concepts. 
In contrast, Murdoch defended the moral imagination as critical to the decisions of the moral 
agent.  
According to Murdoch (1998), understanding the world is in part derived from the 
active role that the imagination undertakes in order to perceive it. She asserts that the world is 
“not just a world of ‘facts’ but a world upon which our imagination has, at any given 
moment, already worked” (p. 199). Murdoch argues that “reality is not a given whole” (p. 
294), consequently our imagination fills in the ‘gaps’ in order to develop a fuller picture of 
the world. It conjures up things that may be “beyond what could be said to be strictly factual” 
(p. 198). This is not to ascribe a ‘sinister’ role to imagination, nor to view this aspect of our 
consciousness as totally involuntary, but to view it as a critical aspect of the human condition. 
Appreciating the quality of reality and our apprehension of it is necessary in order to grasp 
the imperative role of the imagination. A moral imagination is developed through devoting 
our attention to the real world, a detailed observance of others within it and careful 
consideration of the particulars of each situation. Without this attention to reality, the moral 
imagination will be usurped by the individualistic ego leading to a departure into the delusion 
that it creates. So although Murdoch argues that imagination comprises of a movement 
‘beyond the facts’, this movement is careful to maintain the ‘just and loving gaze’, which is 
necessary to resist the “fat relentless ego” (p. 342), the enemy of the moral life.  
Exercising of the moral imagination involves an inevitable evaluative element as we 
contemplate our ideas and experiences. The role of the imagination is connected to the will as 
we are engaging in an active imagination; if imagination is more than ‘drifting ideas’ then the 
role of will in imagination is evident insomuch as “imagining is doing, it is a sort of personal 
exploring” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 199). The imagination then becomes both an ability and a 
means by which to extend our understanding of reality, not through a fictitious ‘objective 
neutrality’, but through attention to others. Attention involves an imaginative extension of our 
knowledge of people – beyond our experiences with them; in conjunction with the direction 
of the will to resist the ego. This is where it is most evident that there is an evaluative 
undertaking in our comprehension of the world. Reality, which is reliant upon our 
comprehension of experiences and the imagination in order to comprehend it, is part of a 
wider sensory experience. She contends that the movement to a fact-based moral philosophy 
was altogether too simplistically derived from the analytical act of simply by placing good 
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into inverted commas, showing that “philosophers were too impressed by words” (p. 72). 
Through the analytical lens, goodness is interpreted as mutable and shifting as value 
judgements are dependent upon the movement of the will and the choices of the individual in 
relation to the facts presented (p. 301). Goodness is not considered a part of the world, but 
rather as a label to which things can be affixed and, as the moral individual is governed by his 
or her movement within it rather than a vision of it, freedom is assured through the ability to 
move in and out of this logical matrix (Murdoch, 1998, p. 301).  
Yet thinking about morality is not as simplistic as that. Thinking about moral concepts 
– both the common understandings and our inner definitions – “is experienced in an imaging, 
semi-sensible mode” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 40). Moral concepts are not only thought of in 
words, but are pictured, remembered in relation to events and a part of a sensory experience. 
Thinking about concepts is not designating, but rather “understanding, grasping, 
‘possessing’” (p. 41). Although analytical understandings are not unhelpful, they cannot be 
the sole basis for developing a moral philosophical position. Words are taken internally and 
developed in ways where they are no longer strictly designated as words. More explicitly, 
they become “not the words, but the words occurring in a certain way with… a certain force 
and colour” (p. 34). Our understanding of the world is affected by our attempts to 
comprehend it and our grasp of concepts. These concepts are related to actions, but not 
entirely contained by them; they do not and cannot resemble the same sort of objective 
understanding that characterises scientific conclusions. Murdoch (1998) agrees there is the 
capacity for ‘rational detachment’ in some of our decisions, but not when efforts of moral 
imagination are required (p. 201) and this imagination is extensively used in human 
relationships and interactions.  
Here is where the critical nature of imagination is essential to the argument against the 
division of fact and value and can be best summed up by the following statement: all forms of 
thought are ubiquitously moral because of the “slow delicate processes of imagination and 
will which have put those values there” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 200). Furthermore, although the 
world is coloured by our values, our awareness of this tinted view is obscured due to the slow 
incremental movements that have built our beliefs. Fact and value are inseparable because the 
constructive activity of the imagination builds our vision of value and cannot be extracted, 
split, or stepped back from in order to rationally survey the ‘pure facts’ of the world. These 
arguments against an objective analytical view of the world show the necessity to reconsider 
any conclusions that involve a separation of fact from value, particularly those involving 
directives for human (inter)action. These directives need to be reconsidered in light of how 
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they are affected by the illusory fact/value divide, and the ways in which they move the moral 
imagination away from an accurate apprehension of reality. A ‘survey of the facts’ involves 
an evaluative element based upon, what Murdoch describes as “total differences of Gestalt. 
We differ not only because we select different objects out of the same world but because we 
see different worlds” (p. 82). Murdoch uses the term Gestalt to identify what she is trying to 
discern as a vision or outlook, a way of seeing and understanding the world derived from our 
imagination, which adds colour and force to our reading of it. These differences nullify the 
fallacy of a shared and accessible objective reality.  
As discussed so far, Murdoch’s arguments against the fact/value distinction run as 
follows: that it is being inappropriately conceived and that it is endorsed for the wrong 
reasons. Firstly, it is inappropriately conceived because this develops a vision of the human 
that is inconsistent with how facts and morals function. Murdoch argues that when 
philosophers attempt to objectively contain a moral concept, as like a ring around a set of 
facts, the area that they are attempting to contain is not solely affected by the ‘factual’ 
limitations of the moral concept, but their interpretive understanding of the concepts. To 
philosophers who situate morality as a ‘choice’ by individuals who step-back and survey the 
‘facts’, Murdoch asserts the following: Morality cannot be based upon ‘choice’, without 
consideration of moral concepts and their meaning and, as moral concepts are taken internally 
in order to be fully understood, ‘choice’ is not based upon factual representations of these 
concepts, but rather their interpretation.  
As morality is dependent upon an understanding of moral concepts guided by inner 
thought, it is difficult to defend ethical principles (do x when you are in x situation) due to the 
potential differences in moral values. Morality is not akin to scientific inquiry, as the survey 
of the ‘facts’ is not solely based on differences of selection, but differences of moral vision. 
Morality then becomes differences of “understanding…which may show openly or privately 
as differences of story or metaphor or as differences of moral vocabulary” (Murdoch, 1998, 
p. 82). In this understanding of morality, choice becomes less about attempting to convince 
others of your moral argument based solely upon an exposition of ‘facts’ or what to do in 
particular situations, and more about the communication of a moral vision, which may or may 
not be comprehended by the listener due to the incremental processes influencing the teller’s 
understanding of this vision. It also implies a new relationship with goodness.  
This leads into the second point, that the fact/value distinction was endorsed for the 
wrong reasons. This distinction was employed to secure the freedom of the moral individual 
against the authority of good. Murdoch (1998) asserts that the central desire for this form of 
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freedom is “to remove ourselves into a region where we can assess situations under no 
pressure from the will” (p. 199); freedom consists of our ability to engage our rationality, to 
‘step-back’ from the situation, assay the facts, and make our decision. In this image of 
freedom, any “failure to be free is the failure to operate the machinery of will-desire-belief-
reason in such a way as to enjoy the detachment of rational thought. It is that failure and not 
any more complicated moral failure” (p. 197). Yet Murdoch seeks to reconsider the 
dominance of this vision and suggest that there is not the possibility of ‘stepping-back’ in the 
way that the image of the ‘ideally rational individual’ would assume. This image of the 
human prioritises action over vision to promote the movement of the will as paramount, but 
humans are not “isolated free choosers, monarchs of all we survey, but benighted creatures 
sunk in a reality whose nature we are constantly and overwhelmingly tempted to transform by 
fantasy” (p. 293). Murdoch is arguing against the image of freedom as an objective rational 
decision leading to moral action, an image in which the imagination limits the individual’s 
ability to perceive reality. In this image, imagination filters and augments our objective 
observation of the world, altering our perception and limiting our ability to remain neutral to 
access facts and reality. Furthermore, Murdoch contests the argument that the imagination 
will have negative effects upon rationality with concurrent effects on freedom. The 
arguments that situate the imagination as a hindrance,  limit our ability to access objective 
reality21. As already argued, Murdoch’s interpretation of the imagination is that it is 
beneficial to accessing reality and necessary to the moral imagination as a medium to see the 
world as it really is.  
Murdoch’s line of argument is later critiqued by Hare (1963), but Diamond (1996) 
defends Murdoch’s position by revealing that Hare’s critique was misconceived, missing (or 
avoiding) the point that Murdoch was seeking to make. Hare’s argument was concerned with 
the discernment of moral principles in order to preserve freedom as tied to action, but in 
retaining the notion of principles, he misrepresented Murdoch’s rebuttal. He misinterpreted 
the main point of her argument, which is, that moral differences are not about certain kinds of 
principled views, but about total differences in vision. Hare argues indirectly against 
Murdoch, arguing for different aspects of moral principles. Diamond (1996) suggests he 
misconstrued this deliberately, for if he engaged with Murdoch’s arguments directly, it would 
erode his assertion that our moral being is characterised by freedom of action (as in Hare’s 
                                                 
21 These assertions are directed primarily at the image of the ‘ideally rational individual’ which is attributed to Hampshire, but as noted 
earlier, is the legacy of Kant, Hobbes, and Hume (Murdoch, 1998, p. 198).  
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sense) and reinvigorate Murdoch’s differing view of freedom (Diamond, 1996, p. 90). Hare’s 
argument maintains a suppressed premise through the fact/value distinction (p. 101), making 
the next step – that strength in freedom is wrought through the strength of the will to find a 
position of neutrality – unstable.  
 
What can be lost through the fact/value distinction?  
The fact/value distinction limits the development of the moral individual in many differing 
ways, but there are two aspects that will be focussed upon in this section. First, the way in 
which the moral individual is encouraged to see his or her moral self, with subsequent 
ramifications for understanding moral progress. Second, the segregation and dismissal of the 
inner life of the moral individual (and the role of the moral imagination), which stifles the 
development of the moral imagination.  
Murdoch (1998) was concerned with the characterisation of the moral individual 
through the fact/value distinction because the image of the human produced is both “alien and 
implausible” (p. 306). This estrangement has empirical grounds (that people are not like that), 
philosophical grounds (the arguments are unconvincing), and moral grounds (“I do not think 
that people ought to picture themselves in this way” p. 306). The first point of this section – 
that people will lose the ability to see themselves differently – is linked with the moral 
objections to the fact/value distinction. As articulated earlier, Murdoch asserted that our 
apprehension of reality is not only based upon facts, but also the workings of our moral 
imagination. As Murdoch states, the world is “not just a world of ‘facts’ but a world upon 
which our imagination has, at any given moment, already worked” (p. 199). This imaginative 
undertaking develops our conceptual understanding of life, which enables us to make sense of 
the world and our place within it. We are image-making beings, and the images we develop 
give us sense and purpose. Furthermore, these images act as a form of guidance, Murdoch 
states “Man is a creature who makes pictures of himself and then comes to resemble the 
picture” (p. 75), illustrating the idea that not only do we create these images in reflection of 
the world, but these images also serve to shape us. This point is crucial when considering the 
impacts of the imagination upon the ‘factual’ scientific realm of investigation (and will be 
expanded further below).  
Moral concepts are also an element of the ‘inner life’ Murdoch sought to defend. Moral 
concepts are part of an ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ relationship as they are developed and redefined 
over time and experience, shaping the human. When discussing moral concepts, Murdoch 
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(1998) asserts “of course, he derives the concept initially from his surroundings; but he takes 
it away into his privacy….and what use is made of them [concepts] is partly a function of the 
user’s history” (p. 319). The individual develops moral concepts from public definitions into 
highly personal understanding, built from personal experiences. Experience influences the 
ways in which we come to comprehend the concepts we encounter; by exercising the moral 
imagination (through the task of attention) we have the opportunity to fill in the gaps to move 
towards a realistic understanding of these concepts, developing a deeper understanding of the 
good. Conversely, through the fantastical creation of the ego, we have the opportunity to 
build a conceptual understanding that is not representative of reality, but defends our selfish 
nature (for example, when one is not looking through a just and loving gaze, greed can be 
thought of as necessary self-preservation or deserving reward for hard work). But in either 
case, through the ego or the moral imagination, fact and value are inextricable. There is no 
objective understanding of the world of human relationships as moral concepts are not merely 
built from ‘facts’ but dependant on internal vision(s). Moral concepts are how we see the 
world and ourselves within it; external fact and internal value are intertwined so intimately 
that it is almost impossible to discern where one starts and the other ends.  
As moral concepts are taken internally and developed within the privacy of the 
individual, then any moral ‘objectivity’ or ‘neutrality’ comes into question, and the image of 
the individual divorcing his or her value from the world of fact becomes less plausible. Moral 
value pervades existence and, through our evaluative nature, humans apply personal 
definitions of moral conceptual values to multiple spheres of existence. To assume the ability 
to ‘step back’ from moral value, particularly when investigating the human, is to miss this 
initial step. Furthermore, the proposed image of the individual ‘stepping back’ into a neutral 
position must be understood within the world of human relationships, in communion with 
other human individuals. There may be grounds for certain factual statements and empirical 
observations of the human world, but this strategy is not comprehensive. Objective scientific 
‘fact-based’ strategies must undergo “important modifications when it is to be understood, 
not in relation to ‘the world described by science’, but in relation to the progressing life of a 
person” (p. 320).  
As concepts are developed in the privacy of the individual, when humans engage in 
relationships they enter a space where they encounter others who equally hold internalised 
conceptual understandings. The actions of each individual are based upon equally private 
images; each is opaque to the other. But as these interactions lead to further interactions and 
develop conceptual understandings through these experiences, they are also shared in a 
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delicate way and each becomes affected by the other’s progress. Our attention to others, 
combined with the particulars of each relationship and experience, are part of inner and outer 
processes – our moral imagination and our relationships with others. Our appreciation of 
moral concepts needs to be sensitive to this particularity and respect the space of each 
relationship as unique and individual, while simultaneously building to the greater 
understanding of moral concepts. Murdoch was careful to articulate that our development of 
moral concepts should be motivated by the idea of perfection, moving conceptual 
understandings along to a point that will infer a greater unity to them; but generated from the 
particular, not at its expense. Equally, as argued prior, Murdoch highlighted the necessity of 
retaining the relatability of moral philosophy to everyday life. This was one of the main 
concerns with the image of the rational human investigator, that it was alien and implausible 
due to the inability to divorce moral concepts from evaluative actions. These aspects of 
human engagement are beyond ‘objectivity’ due to the opaque nature of the inner life. The 
assumption of objectivity loses touch with the everyday human who (consciously or 
unconsciously) utilises moral concepts in everyday decisions. When the search for unifying 
theories is undertaken without regarding the ubiquity of morality and the necessity to pay 
attention to the particulars, then the opportunities for a deeper unification of moral concepts 
are missed.  
The individual’s development of moral concepts is connected to his or her private 
cogitations and attention to others, not a part of a ‘stepping back’ motion into an objective 
space. If inner cogitation is how we develop our concepts and decisions for actions, then the 
objective space to ‘step back’ into must be questioned and moral principles (do x in y 
situation) become less certain. The illusion of objectivity can encourage individuals to 
attempt to resemble it, becoming deprived of the opportunity for a deeper understanding of 
moral progress. In the ‘stepping back’ motion, ‘moral progress’ is not the slow incremental 
progress that Murdoch (1998) supports, but the aforementioned grandiose leaping of the will 
(p. 317), leading to the mechanised actions of moral principles. Less is also made of an 
individual’s personal history (and their connections to others through this history), and more 
is made of the isolated individual and their ‘neutral’ choices in relation to facts. The 
opportunities for connections with and responsivity to the individuals in front of us are 
lessened when we are encouraged to focus upon individualistic choices in a contained world 
of facts (and see others as undertaking this task also).  
Finally for this point, Murdoch’s (1998) image of the moral progress as 
‘characteristically endless’ is lost due to the conviction that humans may shape their direction 
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within an ‘objective’ world. If we ascribe to this image of the moral individual – whose moral 
world is bound by objective facts accessed through the ‘stepping back’ motion and where 
moral principles denote a mechanistic approach to moral behaviours (when in x do y) – then 
we lose the potent potentiality of the ideal limit that moves and develops as we do. We lose 
the possibilities of enabling an intense and unending understanding of moral concepts, 
beyond the genesis of the concept formed through “the rulings of an impersonal public 
language” (p. 322).  
The second part of this section is concerned with arguments regarding the empirical 
grounds and moral grounds for the compartmentalisation of the inner life of the moral 
individual (and its subsequent loss of its development). Murdoch, (1998) asserts that the 
‘inner life’, which is unable to be represented externally, has been subsequently identified to 
be of no use, but “‘not a report’ need not entail ‘not an activity’” (p. 318). She argues that 
arguments that present the inner life as ‘absent’ are derived from the certainty that moral 
decisions must be devised from the external, rather than the internal, built in turn from “an 
uncriticised conception of science” (p. 318). Knowledge and appearances are situated in 
opposition to each other. The ‘modern philosopher’ is attempting to justify the ‘hard 
objective world’ and the role of ‘fact’ within the world of philosophy in much the same way 
as it is presented within the domain of science (p. 319). The decision that fact needed to be 
extricated from value, not as the initial protection of value from the rigidity of fact, but from 
the position that knowledge and appearance are separate realms, moved certainty from the 
internal to the external – from the individual’s comprehension to an ascription to public rules 
(p. 318). Yet, “moral concepts do not move about within a hard world set up by science and 
logic. They set up, for different purposes, a different world” (p. 321). The ‘hard’ world can be 
imagined as the factual and externally verifiable world, as a world of clean lines, but 
Murdoch conceptualises the world as messy and chaotic (Murdoch, 1992). If we are to accept 
the image of this ‘hard world’ and the moral individual functioning within the boundaries of 
this world, the potential of the moral imagination and the progressive development of moral 
concepts are lost. If “where virtue is concerned, we apprehend more than we clearly 
understand, and grow by looking” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 324), then limiting our vision of the 
world to this objective vision would reduce such comprehension and growth.  
In ‘objective’ vision, the difficulties of depicting the inner life render it defunct. The 
inner life is not able to be represented through explanation (I cannot explain how my inner 
mind works fully), it is not needed in the fact/value distinction (as ‘facts’ do not require the 
imagination to make sense of them) consequently the inner life doesn’t exist. However, akin 
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to the fusion of the anti-metaphysical and pro-logic arguments, contentions against the utility 
and existence of the inner life have been fused, and need to be extricated in order to salvage 
vital characteristics of the moral individual. The moral progression of an individual 
undertakes a different tone when perceived in light of morality, a mechanistic and infallible 
tone. Yet when the vision of morality involves the moral imagination and the progressive 
development of concepts there is an inherent (and Murdoch insists necessary) fallibility (p. 
317). The endless task of attempting to perceive reality introduces the idea of perfection and 
the presence of this idea demands a different understanding of the work of the moral 
individual. If the inner life is positioned as being of no use simply because it is not detectable, 
the ability of the individual to conceptualise moral progress is diminished and the idea of 
perfection is lost. The notion of fallibility is necessary in order to maintain continual moral 
progress and reject the (blind) certainty of moral principles. Fallibility is also necessary to 
maintain humility in the moral life and resist the ‘Luciferian compulsion’ represented through 
the (potentially) egotistical self-assuredness of a moral principle; a position and assertion of 
‘I’m right’ rather than ‘Let’s see’. This fallibility is necessary to the concept of attention, 
which seeks an understanding outside of the self, rather than inward for the answers to moral 
dilemmas.  
 
The inextricability of evaluation: Moving away from the fact/value distinction 
For Murdoch is it crucial that the dividing line between fact and value is shown to be in error. 
The claim to objectivity is a misapprehension and mischaracterisation of the moral 
individual. All mental concepts enter the sphere of evaluation and morality, consequently the 
dividing line creates a fantastical illusion of the moral life. The purposes of this dividing line 
have been articulated above: initially to protect value from the influence of fact, and later to 
ensure the moral agent a ‘freedom’ of motion to resist the determinism of ‘goodness’. 
However, (as also illustrated above) when this image of the moral individual becomes the 
primary image, and the moral life is governed by this interpretation of freedom, then other 
ways of seeing the moral individual – ways which may enable a movement beyond the ‘veil’ 
of our selves – are lost. According to Murdoch (1998), Hampshire’s interpretation of freedom 
consists in “how you choose, not what you choose, doing what you intend, not doing what is 
right” (p. 197). These underlying moral visions become a moral principle in itself while also 
affecting the interpretation and selection of the ‘facts’ on the road to devising other moral 
principles. The evaluative element is inextricable from ‘objective’ actions, indeed this 
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element precedes these actions at a point which is assumed to be the neutral starting position 
(for example – how does one determine the difference between what is ‘right’ and personal 
intentions without evaluation?). Diamond (1996) reiterates Murdoch’s point by stating “Our 
thought about anything is the thought of a morally live consciousness, a consciousness with 
its own moral character” (p. 102, original emphasis). Consequently, the ‘neutral starting 
position’ is not neutral but coloured by the moral vision of the observer. The assumption of 
objectivity disfigures our image of human potentiality and reduces our appreciation and 
comprehension of the imagination in moral choice and our aptitude for its development. In 
obscuring the imagination, decisions for actions can bolster the development of fantasy and 
maintain the veil of the egotistical self.  
Furthermore, the notion of freedom is in question when the ‘stepping back’ motion is 
surmised to be possible. As articulated within the previous chapter, the conceptualisation of 
freedom underpinning the arguments for objectivity are connected to the desire to retain the 
unfettered will, but this image of human freedom fails to accurately represent reality. 
Murdoch (1998) argues that when we engage in the act of attention, we arrive at the point 
where we “will have no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at” (p. 331). 
The ‘unfettered’ form is not the motion of a free individual, but a deluded individual who has 
failed to grasp the moral ties binding us to each other and is engaged in a fantasy of his or her 
own making. Or, as articulated by Hacker-Wright (2010), “the freedom that features so 
prominently in Kant-style morality is a symptom of it’s failing to take seriously the moral 
task of knowing the world” (p. 207, original emphasis). Kantian morality informs the notion 
of freedom that underpins the objectivity of scientific rationality, but the assumption that 
humans can remain ‘objective’ is shown to be inherently flawed when brought into dialogue 
with Murdoch’s arguments, rendering this representation of ‘reality’ to be inaccurate.  
 
The nature of reality 
In this philosophical vision, Murdoch is developing a different image of the nature of reality. 
In asserting that almost all scientific inquiries contain presuppositions – that there are 
assumptions or suppressed premises acting as the ‘stepping stones’ to scientific conclusions – 
she brings into question the premise of ‘objectivity’ in human beings, particularly when the 
focus of the inquiry is humans and human relationships. Murdoch’s position is that we cannot 
utilise the objective view when viewing humans and human relationships, instead we can 
only hope to work towards a way of viewing the world that distances ourselves from 
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individualistic views and the pull of the ego, in order to fully (and realistically) appreciate of 
the object of observation. This is not the removal of values, but the deepening and 
broadening of values. In order to appreciate reality more fully, we need to exercise a method 
of observing others that attempts to see them how they deserve to be seen, according to our 
just and loving gaze. In other words, to describe them according to what they ‘merit’ 
(Hacker-Wright, 2010). This approach could be accessed through a closer union between 
psychology and the humanities (Waugh, 2012, p. 39), demonstrating Murdoch’s appreciation 
of Freudian theory as an accurate starting point to build from (Hacker-Wright, 2010).  
The Freudian starting point identifies how the individual comes into the world with an 
innate desire to satisfy his or her own wants based upon an internal perspective. Murdoch 
(1998) identifies this starting point to advance her argument that from here we can move 
towards the process of attention, pushing us to look outward (p. 375). Innate desires (self-pity 
etc.) intensify the veil that obscures us from the reality of the world (p. 369). Yet, if we move 
away from selfishness, we move ourselves in the direction of virtue and in doing so lift the 
obfuscating veil and gain a clearer view of reality. This is not a condition of merely ‘looking’, 
but is a task and any vision of the world that does not apprehend this as a task obscures the 
inherent relationship between virtue and reality. Murdoch argues that we are obscure to 
ourselves due to the delicate processes of the moral imagination and will that build values up 
around us (p. 200). Consequently, we need an understanding of the world comprising of these 
obscure moral aspects, the practice of attention and the role of moral vision. Developing a 
‘value-free’ vision of the world adds to the veil and loses the opportunity for an accurate 
vision of reality. The development of a just and loving gaze moves us to appreciate the world 
in tandem with a more morally appropriate position. This dual movement reveals the 
substance of reality and its connection to virtue.  
Murdoch’s philosophy outlines a form of moral realism, described as reflexive moral 
realism. Murdoch promotes a unification of moral concepts through the sovereignty of the 
good, yet equally Murdoch’s moral theory is viewed to be response-dependant; moral 
concepts are only able to be viewed from a “peculiarly human standpoint” (Jordan, 2014, p. 
378). Murdoch’s reflexive approach to morality promotes the specificity of the individual, 
and the necessity to draw from moral vision and exercise the moral imagination in order to 
search for objective moral truths. Consequently, the search for moral truths involves a 
reflexive process in which consciousness is the medium for a reflective consideration of 
goodness, but avoids being merely subjective by understanding that consciousness is only the 
starting point (Altorf, 2004; Antonaccio, 2000). Murdoch, (1998) writes, “reflection rightly 
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tends to unify the moral world, and…increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing 
unity” (pp. 346-347). Reflection depends upon the moral imagination, and therefore this 
element of the moral individual must be rescued in order to fully appreciate reality. This form 
of realism, reliant upon the moral imagination, enhances our understanding of reality when 
we apply a just and loving gaze in order to view it. In return we attain a morally better vision 
of the world (Hacker-Wright, 2010). The image of the world presented through scientism 
must be rejected due to the ways in which it “belies the very conditions of generating 
knowledge, including scientific knowledge…[and]…fails to provide concepts adequate to 
describe our moral lives…turn[ing] us to defective moral ideals” (Hacker-Wright, 2010, p. 
205). As this is the case, Murdoch argues towards the position, not to change the sciences, but 
to ensure that the sciences do not hold dominion over the realm of philosophical enquiry. 
Murdoch presents us with a vision of the world, including the domain of science, which is not 
about merely looking, but about morally struggling to perceive the world. The reward of this 
struggle is the capacity to conceive the world ‘as it really is’ (Murdoch, 1998, p. 377). She 
presents us with a vision of the world that recognises that moral struggle shapes our 
character, and guides us to respond to others with “unavoidable actions” (Hacker-Wright, 
2010, p. 219).  
 
Some Problems of the Influence of Scientific Naturalism on Moral Philosophy 
Science is not philosophy, yet scientism has influenced philosophical ideas. The advent and 
influence of science upon society and moral philosophy, coupled with what Murdoch, (1998) 
identifies as a “simple minded faith” in its tenets, has engendered a “dangerous lack of 
curiosity about the real world” (p 293). The necessity to explain the moral direction for 
humanity through scientific method and to obscure the inner life because it cannot be 
accurately represented, demonstrates this dangerous lack of curiosity. As articulated above, 
“‘not a report’ need not entail ‘not an activity’” (p. 318). If moral actions are beyond 
measureable actions and choices, then there is a necessity to look beyond the assumed 
objectivity of science. An appreciation of the opacity of human individuals and an attentive 
way of looking at the world needs to be developed in order to fully appreciate reality.  
Subsequent movements that determine moral principles and encourage individuals to 
act in a systematic fashion also need to be questioned for their presentation of a mechanistic 
image. Murdoch (1992) asserts:  
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Philosophers who feel able to dispel all ambiguity also have to explain that a 
philosophical schema is not like the literal account of the functioning of an engine, but 
is a special method of explanation, not easy to understand, but having its own 
traditional standards of truthfulness. (p. 236) 
Philosophical schema that do not point out these caveats – subtleties and inherent biases – 
cannot represent nor appreciate reality. Reality is constituted through the complexities and 
the particulars of real human relationships.  
The moral lives of individuals, and morality in toto cannot be explained scientifically or 
empirically. Murdoch (1992) writes: 
moral value cannot be derived from fact…our activity of moral discrimination cannot 
be explained as merely one natural instinct among others…The possession of a moral 
sense is uniquely human; morality is, in the human world, something unique, 
special…an intimation of ‘something higher’”. (p. 26)  
Here Murdoch draws from a metaphysical position to defend morality as something beyond 
the realm of objective facts, something innately human. In order to appreciate the uniquely 
human nature of morality, the integral nature of the complexities of life and the opacities of 
human individuals need to be embraced. Scientific empiricism cannot contain morality 
because it cannot contain an accurate rendering of the particulars of humans or human 
relationships within a general theory.  
Initially, the argument regarding the separation of ‘knowledge’ from ‘appearances’ was 
derived to illustrate how certainty can only be objective if it is shifted from the internal to the 
external; internal ‘certainty’ was deemed uncertain until it is assessed against external views. 
This view designates internal activity to be analysed and defined from the ‘outside in’ to be 
verified through a logical, empirical (scientific) view, but this is to deny the knowledge that 
our inner life and our experiential understanding has developed through processes, which 
Murdoch, (1998) describes as “something…we find exceedingly familiar” (p. 317). 
Understandings of the world wrought through attention requires no observers and even if they 
did exist “the question of their competence would still arise” (p. 317). Others may not 
understand moral positions, the internal work may not produce rational public reasons, but 
they are “none the worse for that” (p. 326). Where the objective view would describe this 
internal process as ‘hazy’ due to its inability to be captured and presented externally, 
Murdoch asserts that this activity “is hard to characterise, not because it is hazy, but precisely 
because it is moral” (p. 317, original emphasis). Our moral activity is not hazy because it is 
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difficult to rationalise, it is hazy because it is beyond the vision of the world maintained by 
scientific rationality.  
Moral activity is the intimation of ‘something higher’, the goodness that we are 
magnetically pulled to in our lives. This the point at which knowledge and appearances 
indeed do connect and internal certainty does not need to be assessed against an external 
consensus. Murdoch, (1998) states:  
it is perfectly obvious that goodness is connected with knowledge: not with impersonal 
quasi-scientific knowledge of the ordinary world…but with a refined and honest 
perception of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment of what confronts 
one, which is the result not simply of opening one’s eyes but of a certainly perfectly 
familiar kind of moral discipline (p. 330).  
The ‘objective’ approach is characterised as a simple undertaking of ‘opening one’s eyes’, 
but it does not enable the viewer to exercise the moral imagination in order to make sense of 
the details (Murdoch, 1992, p. 349), nor, subsequently, to access reality. The objective view 
does not enable the viewer to appreciate the particulars, for science seeks out generalising 
theories to explain the world. Yet, if we can move away from generalities “toward the 
accidental and particular we introduce muddle but also variety and space” (p. 349). These 
varieties and spaces need to be preserved in order to access true reality, for if it is not just 
philosophical schema, but humans who are (mis)represented akin to the ‘functioning of an 
engine’ (as with the mechanistic dictums of moral principles), then questions beyond the 
standard questions of freedom and autonomy need to be raised. We need to ask specific 
questions about why this imagery is ascendant when it is not an appropriate representation of 
human engagement the moral world.  
 
The Neuroscientific Turn in Early Childhood Education 
Neuroscience is a branch of scientific research that is becoming integral in many arguments 
for increasing financial investment or governance of early childhood education. Advocates of 
applying neuroscientific findings to early childhood educational practice argue that 
neuroscience affords an insight into the functioning of the individual that can influence the 
processes of education, arguing, “the translation of neuroscience into principles that can 
inform sound policymaking offers considerable promise” (Shonkoff & Levitt, 2010, p. 698). 
Neuroscience is being viewed as the way in which to look into the mind of the child, situating 
early childhood education as a primary location for interventional practices to maximise the 
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potential of the brain. Within the document Understanding the Brain: The Birth of a 
Learning Science (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007) the 
following statement is made: 
neuroscience observations and their explanations of educational phenomenon is like 
looking at education through mysticism…like looking at education from the eyes of a 
seer or sage, who is aware of each and every happening inside the organs, tissues, and 
cells or even further down the line, when an action is taken or an idea is thought. The 
question is – like wise men, can the research findings in neuroscience influence the 
learning in desired manner? If yes then how and where to begin? As far as “where” is 
concerned, nothing is more apt than early childhood education and care (ECEC) 
platform. (p. 177) 
Neuroscientific findings are utilised to prove that the early years are the crucial time to 
support the growth of the child and to underpin economic arguments about early childhood 
education as the best investment into children’s learning and development. The report 1000 
Days to Get it Right for Every Child: The Effectiveness of Public Investment in New Zealand 
Children (Grimmond, 2011) makes the claim “The early years are critical due to intense 
neurological development during those years. It is to these years, therefore, that government 
policy and public investment needs to be targeted for the best returns” (p. v). Other reports have 
also correlated the findings of neuroscience with the necessity to invest in early childhood 
education (Allen, 2011; Council of Australian Governments, 2009; English, 2015; Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017). The neuroscientific turn is not just 
affecting educational policy, but is being used to inform pedagogical practice. The recent 
revision of Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017) included neuroscience as 
an underpinning theoretical foundation to the document. This section describes the young 
child’s brain as “far more impressionable” (p. 62), a condition described as “plasticity” (p. 
62). These images are then connected to the necessity to situate children in a space that will 
enhance the child’s brain to learn, for this plasticity renders children vulnerable, again 
necessitating intervention.  
The neuroscientific turn in early childhood education has become a highly significant 
point in developing (and succeeding) in arguments for the intervention into the lives of young 
children. Featherstone, Morris, and White (2013) identify the use of neuroscience within 
arguments for interventionist strategies in early childhood to be “influential if not 
hegemonic” (p. 1736). However, neuroscience doesn’t just describe an objective world, it 
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describes a particular vision of the world and, in doing so, shapes it. In creating a picture of 
the human conceived, measured and identified through neuroscience as a modality of ‘truth’, 
it follows that such a picture becomes the human through a recursive motion of knowledge; 
the position is adopted, then confirmation of the ‘actuality’ of this position is reinforced by 
filtering ‘fact’ through the evaluative neuroscientific gaze, limiting opportunities to develop 
alternate positions. As Murdoch (1998) writes, “Man is a creature who makes pictures of 
himself and then comes to resemble the picture” (p. 75); there are socio-political implications 
for describing humans through neuroscientific discourse. Vandenbroeck (2017) draws 
attention to preconceptions within neuroscientific research, writing “what is considered true 
is not a-historical, and what is considered as valuable and valid Science is always related to 
the socio-political context” (p. 34). In light of these considerations, an important question to 
ask is, ‘If the images being created hold socio-political implications for humans then what 
does this mean for the humans involved within the educational relationship, particularly 
within targeted realm of early childhood education?’  
Due to the influence of neuroscientific findings upon early childhood education, 
questions are being raised about the power effects of neuroscience, specifically regarding the 
ways in which neuroscientific information is being used in educational policy and practice. 
Millei and Joronen (2016) highlight the ubiquitous nature of neuroscientific findings within 
governmental policies relating to young children. They identify the use of neuroscientific 
arguments to develop strategies for early intervention, designed not only to intervene in order 
to prevent harmful practices, but to ensure the development of an entrepreneurial (future) 
workforce. In these cases, neuroscience is not being utilised for its ‘objective’ findings but to 
indorse a particular vision of the young child: that of the child as (future) human capital. 
Millei and Joronen (2016) describe the neuroscientific turn in early childhood as “an example 
par excellence of what Michel Foucault calls biopolitical government: a politicization of 
certain condition(s) of life that is premised on enhancement and positive improvement in 
human capacities” (p. 390).  
Gillies, Edwards, and Horsley's (2017) research into the uses (and misuses) of 
neuroscientific findings raises questions about how findings are being applied to educational 
policies. They argue that the application of neuroscientific findings in educational policies 
needs to be questioned, for although these findings should be positioned as ‘provisional’ in 
educational policy they are infrequently situated as such. They draw attention to the frequent 
utilisation of the discourse of ‘proof’ when drawing from neuroscience, even when the 
findings are less than conclusive. The identification of neuroscience findings within these 
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policies as ‘high quality’, and the frequent relocation of findings from one milieu to another, 
are (colloquially) identified as instances of “scientific bullshit” (Gillies et al., 2017, p. 14). 
White and Wastell (2017) echo this call, identifying that “‘evidence’ in the policy world 
knowledge is actively made” (p. 67), citing several cases where neuroscientific evidence is 
used inappropriately, shortened, augmented or otherwise distorted in ways to make the 
findings more simplistic and ‘hard-hitting’. They assert “Neuroscientific understandings are 
also working their way into professional practice in early years provision” (p. 37), and in a 
previous paper, that “the co-option of neuroscience has medicalised policy discourse, 
silencing vital moral debate and pushing practice in the direction of standardised, targeted 
interventions” (Wastell & White, 2012, p. 397, emphasis added) 
Moving away somewhat from the ‘misuse’ argument, Broer and Pickersgill (2015) 
identify the ways in which neuroscientific findings are used to promote a particular 
‘sociotechnical imaginary’, authenticating the dominant ruling class image of society while 
dually reinforcing the forms of governance employed by the ruling class to address these 
‘problems’. The problem of the potential of the human brain becomes an individual issue, 
devolving governmental responsibility for addressing wider societal issues of inequity. 
Within this hegemonic vision, addressing the failure to actualise the potential of the human 
brain becomes an issue of addressing the “soma, however, they do so in order to expand the 
outcome of the intervention to include society writ large” (p. 60). While the problem is laid at 
the feet of the individual, the benefits should become the property of the state. In this 
instance, neuroscience becomes another technology of government in the power/knowledge 
relationship between the government and the individual. A recurrent theme within all of these 
discussions is the way that neuroscience is used or misused to promote the ideologies of 
certain dominant bodies – be they governmental, non-governmental organisations, or 
otherwise.  
Furthermore, neuroscientific information is lauded for the way in which it mechanises 
the individual, as it creates a more concrete and simplistic image of the child and 
development in comparison to the image of the (opaque) mind (Bruer, 2011). Bruer, critiques 
the mechanisation of the individual, revisiting his ‘myth of the first 1000 days’ document to 
expand further upon his initial arguments. He discusses the ways in which the ‘mechanistic 
image’ of the brain through neuroscience – where the brain is likened to a computer system 
and behavioural traits are ‘hard-wired’ into said system – becomes more convincing to the 
wider public. The image of the brain as a system, and therefore more akin to a mechanistic 
form of function, is more appealing than the messier arguments of behaviour or attitudinal 
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evidence; Brain chemistry – particularly the ‘cortisol effect’ – and the ‘materialist’ elements 
are more tangible and therefore more ‘real’, than abstract mental images (p. 3). With a 
mechanistic brain, there are more grounds to develop mechanistic processes towards 
educating the brain, divorcing the brain from the rest of the child. In effect, pedagogy runs 
the risk of being “reduced to the development of effective methods to achieve predefined 
goals…pedagogy is then reduced to the search for ‘doing things right’ while leaving out the 
question of what is the right thing to do” (Vandenbroeck, 2017, pp. 34–35). This concern 
aligns with Murdoch’s (1998) concerns with the ‘moral correctness’ of the ‘ideally rational 
individual’, which consists of “how you choose, not what you choose, doing what you intend, 
not doing what is right” (p. 197). When the actions eclipse the decisions that lead towards 
action, as Murdoch argues, we lose touch with the moral background for our actions. This 
goal can be found within the applications of neuroscience to pedagogy; assuming that 
neuroscience will discern an “increased understanding of individual differences in learning 
and the best ways to suit input to learner” (Goswami, 2004) and invoking the ‘technician’ 
approach to education through the determinations of science.  
There are significant limitations to the image of the human when we seek to describe 
individuals through the neuroscientific lens, as though the brain was the totality of the human 
being. This concern is brought into strong focus when Harris (2010, 2011) argues for a vision 
of morality and moral conduct fully contained by science through the development of 
neuroscience. Harris (2010, 2011) contends that moral decisions are contained within the 
‘moral landscape’ of the brain, and can be confined to the interaction of neurons through 
synaptic connections. He asserts that when the brain can be adequately mapped out, or 
‘landscaped’, then all decisions – including moral decisions – will be determinable. This 
vision of morality and neuroscience is echoed by others who seek to contain the world of 
morality within the world of science (Hauser, 2006; Tancredi, 2005). I contend that this is a 
vision of the world significantly worse than that of ‘objective reality’, and if adopted will 
have ramifications for conceptualising the world of human relationships. Early childhood 
education, which has been so quickly affected by the neuroscientific turn, will not remain 
unaffected by these claims. There will be implications for the early childhood world, 







When Pedagogy is Based on (Neuro)Science: Some Fundamental Problems 
The following discussion against the dominance of neuroscience will not follow along similar 
lines to the arguments developed in the papers cited within the previous section. These 
arguments have presented a robust analytical counterpoint to the dominance of neuroscience 
along their projected lines of intention. Instead, this section will echo and support the 
concerns that Murdoch expressed: there are deep assumptions left as yet unquestioned 
regarding the application of neuroscientific findings within the domain of education. The loss 
of the ‘background’ of concepts was connected to the intrusion of scientific rationality by 
Murdoch. Furthermore, in modelling itself upon the scientific method, philosophy would 
suffer from both a loss of concepts and a general relatability to the lives of everyday 
individuals. This section will argue that these concerns are equally applicable to the notion of 
neuroscience and its effect upon the domain of education and the relationships between the 
teachers and children who constitute it.  
Education suffers a loss of concepts when education is reduced to standardised 
approaches of pedagogy and children are viewed through a narrow neoliberal lens (as argued 
in the previous chapter). When pedagogy is set with the task to seek and find the ‘correct’ 
approaches to teacher/child interactions, the question of what constitutes morally right 
approaches can be lost (Vandenbroeck, 2017). In the neuroscientific turn, something deeper 
about education is being endangered, something that echoes Murdoch’s concern about 
relatability. Images projected though neuroscience cannot accurately represent pedagogy, not 
because it is hazy but precisely because it is moral. The promotion of a ‘neutral’ image belies 
the role of the moral imagination and the potency of developing educational values towards 
an unending horizon. Furthermore, the delusion of objectivity undermines the value of 
attachment and the primacy of the teacher who develops an intimate knowledge of children 
through their attentiveness. The teacher, through attention and the exercise of the moral 
imagination, brings an altogether different notion of the reality of the educational 
relationship; one which does not resemble the objectivity of science, but is a deepening and 
broadening of appropriate educational values. The objective image presents an illusory 
representation of the reality of educational relationships. When images of the human 
generated through the scientific method are promoted as a ‘truth’, an understanding of 
education as a complex endeavour is diminished. Education is a meeting of individuals, 
comprehension of this undertaking is complex to unravel. The necessary task of every teacher 
is to resist simplicity in order to move beyond a mechanistic approach, towards a more 
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responsive and intricate mode of human interaction. In developing possibilities for pedagogy 
within education, attention offers the potential to move beyond the desire to ‘explain’ the 
child as though the functioning of an engine and respect the opacity of children as a necessary 
and rightful aspect of their individuality as moral beings.  
 
Resisting the Neuroscientific Illusion: The Moral Act of Education 
In promoting the eminence of choice and autonomy, the world of ‘facts’ is been situated as 
the ultimate interpretation of reality. In seeking to remove value from the situation and ‘step 
back’ to assess the situation, individuals are positioned as self-determining beings; governing 
goodness is a function of their agency. Yet the point Murdoch (1992) seeks to make is that 
that “‘facts’ are set up as such by human (that is moral) agents” (p. 26) and are therefore 
never objective. Equally, our movements towards objectivity are futile due to the small slow 
processes that incrementally, and obscurely, build up structures of value around us. We may 
be encouraged to see scientific empiricism as objective, but science is performed by (moral) 
individuals who make (moral) evaluations on the road to creating ‘facts’ and, in doing so, 
create and promote a certain picture of the (moral) world. Assumptions and suppressed 
premises are missed when they are overlooked because of a presumed objectivity. The 
illusion of objectivity can encourage individuals to attempt to emulate it, becoming deprived 
of the opportunity for a deeper understanding of morality and moral progress. Furthermore, if 
objectivity is believed to be a condition of our being, then we run the risk of becoming 
beholden to a very narrow view of how to investigate existence, as Murdoch cautions, a 
“dangerous lack of curiosity about the real world” (p 293) may come to pass.  
However, presenting the human being through the neuroscientific lens invokes a vision 
of an objective human world, despite being entrenched in moral evaluation. Through this 
image we are encouraged to believe that the workings of the human brain can be contained 
within the world of common facts, and morality – in the form of human choices and 
behaviours – stems from facts and exposition of the brain. Here is where it is imperative that 
Diamond’s (1996) echo of Murdoch’s point is fully comprehended: “Our thought about 
anything is the thought of a morally live consciousness, a consciousness with its own moral 
character” (p. 102, original emphasis). Conscious and, as Murdoch argues, morally evaluative 
thought, precedes the edicts of neuroscience, for the necessity to evaluate precedes the 
genesis and discrimination of ‘facts’. As Murdoch (1998) argues, “we are obscure to 
ourselves because the world we see already contains our values and we may not be aware of 
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the slow delicate processes of imagination and will which have put those there” (p. 200). 
Presenting neuroscience as an objective representation of the ‘inner life’ of the human mind 
involves the misrepresentation of the brain as the mind (Standish & Williams, 2016) and 
another imperative misstep: the failure to forewarn others of the role that evaluation plays in 
the movement towards factual conclusions. This can be unwittingly undertaken, or actively 
exploited to press a particular moral stance and attempt to disguise it as a truth of being. It is 
necessary to reconsider conclusions that ‘objectively’ separate fact from value, particularly in 
the case of neuroscience, in order to reconsider their implications for a broader vision of 
education.  
The hard objective world cannot contain, nor accurately explicate conceptual 
understandings, “moral concepts do not move about within a hard world set up by science and 
logic. They set up, for different purposes, a different world” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 321). Moral 
concepts do not conform to the ‘hard objective world’. Moral individuals invoke this 
conformity and attempt to shape moral philosophy to fit. Scientistic philosophers seek to 
promote the possibility of a ‘hard objective’ world, but need to return to the suppressed 
premises which underpin their argumentation. To recognise that objectivity cannot explain 
the sum totality of existence. This is equally so for early childhood educators.  Teachers may 
create images of education by drawing from visions of children projected through curriculum, 
research findings and neuroscientific information, but who also develop conceptual 
understandings by pulling this information into their ‘inner selves’ to deepen comprehension. 
They may find that these external visions do not fully explicate their experiences or 
conceptual understandings of pedagogy and relationships with children and synthesise a new 
understanding from their inner cogitations. 
Neuroscience would seek to make the internal process external, and to move the ‘hazy’ 
inner life to external ‘knowledge’. Supporters argue that neuroscience derives “cognitive 
neuroscience methods…to deliver important information relevant to…the quality of 
teaching” (Goswami, 2004, p. 2). But, it is equally necessary to draw attention to how 
education, as a moral undertaking, cannot be contained nor constrained by an allusion to 
scientific fact. Education and science do not intersect in this way; education does not move 
about within the world of science, but is a part of a different world with different purposes. 
We need to defend pedagogy as a complex and intricate act, and the inner life of education as 
a critical part of teachers’ understanding of children. Not dismiss them because they are hazy, 
but preserve them because they are moral. We need to appreciate the role of the inner life of 
the teacher within education. We cannot depend upon the fallacy of the ‘objective’ 
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neuroscientific view to guide us towards appropriate pedagogy, instead we can move our 
attention to a different moral vision of the educational world.  
As articulated earlier, Murdoch resisted the vision of moral actions as objective 
principles in order to preserve the opacity of each moral agent, and the particulars of each 
situation. A mechanistic aspect to interactions and an infallible orientation is brought to the 
fore when moral individuals ascribe to unwavering moral principles. Moral principles can 
encourage systematic and uncompromising adherence, invoking an automatous image of the 
moral individual. This approach to morality was identified as problematic for its mechanistic 
presentation of the human. The same assertion needs to be directed at the application of the 
findings of neuroscience within the domain of education. Neuroscience seeks to provide 
principles for action in educational contexts; principles derived from neuroscience in order to 
shape policy (Shonkoff & Levitt, 2010, p. 698). This form of ‘objective’ vision for policy and 
principles of education leads to a mechanisation of the educative act. Principles can prescribe 
and proscribe what to do, channelling actions into a particular direction and determining a set 
of responses. Principles can serve to mechanise the actions of the moral individual, becoming 
unquestioned edicts for behaviour in all contexts. These principles, when applied to education 
can imbue a ‘technician approach’ to pedagogy, which is stimulated through an unassuming 
‘objective’ view. As argued previously where moral principles become moral directives, 
neuroscientific findings become directives for pedagogical practices but are ‘cleansed’ of the 
stigma of moral bias through the unquestioned assumption of the ‘objective’ view of 
scientific investigation. As argued in Chapter Three, the neoliberal vision of education could 
reduce the depth and breadth of concepts necessary to appreciating the human relationship at 
the centre of education; supported by the ‘objectivity’ of neuroscience as explication of the 
human mind, there could also be an invigoration of principles for action within education. 
The idea of fallibility is necessary in order to maintain continual moral progress and reject the 
(blind) certainty of moral principles, but this idea is dependent upon a complex vision of 
education, one beyond the comprehension of science or neoliberalisms. We need a different 
image of the moral undertaking of education incorporating the use of the attentive moral 
imagination.  
The fact/value distinction was originally determined in order to protect moral values 
from the domain of science. But there is a danger, in the legacy of this division, and 
contemporary commitment to the certainty of scientific knowledge, that neuroscience will 
become a ‘newspeak’(Orwell, 1983) of education, one which was adopted in the hopes of its 
clarifications, but occludes important aspects. The nature of reality, when viewed to be 
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informed by the moral imagination, is “soaked in the sensible22” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 40): our 
existence does not involve simply looking at the world, but accepting our affective responses 
as a part of our apprehension of the world which comprises of not only moral choice but also 
moral vision. The task of the moral individual is to appreciate reality through the persistent 
act of attention: through a just and loving gaze which moves moral individuals not just to see, 
but to apprehend reality through moving beyond the desires of the self. When the world is 
comprehended through the neuroscientific lens, the attentive individual needs to question 
such a vision for its failure to “provide concepts adequate to describe our moral 
lives…turn[ing] us to defective moral ideals” (Hacker-Wright, 2010, p. 205). When the 
objective view is imposed upon education, and the fact/value divide underpins policies and 
practices, then these too must be rejected as misapprehensions of the role of morality within 
education. The objective mode of ‘looking’ creates a fantasy of objectivism, failing to 
comprehend the inherent morality underpinning this position and subsequent judgements. 
Education is not concerned with just looking, or limited scientific strategies that proscribe 
principles for action. Pedagogy needs to be reconceived as a complex task, resistant to 
standardisation due to the demand to remain attentive to the particulars of each unique 
situation. Any vision of the world that does not apprehend the act of education as a moral 




We seek to clarify things further with sciences, at times it would appear that we do indeed 
seek to see the workings of the human as though the ‘functioning of an engine’. Murdoch 
(1998) argues that the desire to insist upon a scientistic view of morality is an attempt to 
secure ourselves against the ambiguity of the world (p. 90). Such a claim can be seen in the 
neoliberal movements for standardisation and teaching as a technical undertaking. But when 
teaching is understood as an equation, we lose the potent potentiality of the idea of 
perfection, a perfection that can be infinitely refined and worked towards; an ideal that grows 
and develops as we do in our teaching practice, enabling an deeper understanding of the 
unique nature of pedagogy beyond the notion of ‘standard practice’. The act of education is 
                                                 
22 Recall the earlier point that moral concepts are not only thought of in words, but are pictured, remembered in relation to events and 
a part of a sensory experience. The use of the word ‘sensible’ is in reference to this form of sensory experience, and not the definition 
which would mean ‘wise’, ‘prudential’ or ‘practical’ (although it could be argued that Murdoch would assent that the moral 
imagination should be considered in light of all of these descriptors).  
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not hazy because we have not devised the right scientific understanding yet. It is not hazy 
because we have not developed the technology yet to fully comprehend the human (despite 
the movements of neuroscience). The reconsideration that is needed is not to refine scientific 
procedures, but to reconsider the fact-value divide: to reassess the marginalisation of 
metaphysics. The act of education is hazy precisely because it is moral, and the idea of 
limitless perfection (as opposed to objective certainty) needs to drive our moral movements 
in this. As articulated prior, reality is inexhaustible and limitless, and our attempts to 
understand it are guided by our moral concepts.  
If the assumption that everything can be explicated through science is accepted, or the 
explanations of the human presented through neuroscience are adopted as a ‘truth’ of child 
development, there will be ramifications for the ‘truth’ of how children can and ‘should’ be 
taught. If we assume that everything can be explicated through science, or we adopt the view 
that neuroscience is a ‘truthful’ way to see the child, then possibilities for an experiential and 
lived philosophy are diminished. There can be room for appreciating neuroscientific findings 
while envisioning education as a moral undertaking, but if we lose touch of the opacity of 
individuals and ascribe to a falsifying whole, we negate the agency of children and the lived 
experience of education with unknowable possibilities. If these assumptions are accepted as 
the only truth, akin to the presentation of neoliberalisms as ‘there is no alternative’, there will 
be a loss of curiosity for exploring education as a complex and inexhaustible reality which 
evades quantification, but is nonetheless significant. In the ascription to scientistic images of 
the human, and the adoption of neuroscientific approaches to educational ‘truth’, openings for 
alternate perspectives beyond education, as a set of pre-determined experiences and 
outcomes, are lost.  
Supported by the Murdochian concept of attention, education can be reconceived as an 
undertaking magnetically drawing the attentive educator towards a deepening of moral 
concepts to enhance pedagogy. As Murdoch would argue, we do not need principled 
directives to understand the interrelations between human beings, we need a more detailed 
terminology, morally loaded words and a deepening and broadening of moral concepts, for 
that is how we can apprehend and appreciate education as an ethical undertaking. 
Neuroscience should not be the only, nor the predominant view to make ‘sense’ of education. 
A vision of education as moral engagement, and the exploration of the potential benefits of 




Love and Early Childhood Education  
 
Introduction 
Dahlberg and Moss (2004) call for an ethical approach to early childhood education, and 
highlight responsibility, respect for otherness and a rejection of rational thinking as leading 
themes within this approach. They call for the resistance of a cognition/emotion binary and a 
movement to a postmodern ethics in order to engage with “particularities and emotions rather 
than seeking the dispassionate application of general and abstract principles” (Dahlberg & 
Moss, 2004, p. 69). Relational, moral and ethical teaching can be enlivened by the philosophy 
of Iris Murdoch. Attention, as an approach to pedagogy, holds interesting possibilities for 
making sense of the moral and emotional connections between teacher and child in the early 
childhood educational context; attention is an undertaking of “moral agents; it is an exercise 
of love through which we come to know others” (Roberts & Saeverot, 2018, p. 36).  
Attention is a demanding but invigorating task. As argued in previous chapters, it 
resists mandates for standardised practices, rejects predetermined learning outcomes and is a 
way of appreciating reality to remove the veil that denies clarity of vision when tainted by the 
desires of the self. Within the previous chapter, an argument was developed against the 
limitations of neuroscience as an ‘explanation’ of the inner life of the human. Instead, 
Murdochian attention promotes the influence of sensory aspects upon human experience. 
This next chapter will explore the concept of love as a sensorial aspect.  
 Love is identified by Murdoch as a means through which the moral individual remains 
open to the reality of other beings; moral vision is critical to developing a greater 
understanding of the world ‘as it really is’. Within the early childhood context, love is 
necessary to an understanding of education as a relational undertaking. When early childhood 
settings are constructed as spaces and places to develop children’s interests, seeing the child 
in order to notice, recognise and respond (Carr et al., 2000) requires the teacher to develop 
the moral imagination and appreciate the opacity of the child. Love is defined by Murdoch, 
(1998) as “the imaginative recognition of, that is respect for, this otherness” (p. 216). For 
Murdoch, an accurate appreciation of the other involves the work of the moral imagination. 
Love is positioned by Murdoch as the bridge to the other and reality beyond the self. Love is 
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the crucial concept within the act of attention and central to our ability to relate to others in 
life and in teaching.  
Within this chapter, love is viewed as a means for developing an episteme of the other, 
an orientation to education as a moral and ethical undertaking. The first half of this chapter 
will focus upon an exposition of Murdochian love, particularly the connections to 
imagination, goodness, the direction of love and how love can be conceived as a metaxu 
between the self and the world. Love and the idea of perfection will also be explored to 
expand upon the necessity to maintain vigilant attentiveness and remain sensitive to the 
notion of progress. The second half will outline the relationship of emotions and love to 
neoliberal forms of professionalism and make sense of the ways in which Murdochian love 
can aid teachers’ understanding of the act of education. Murdochian love will be also be 
investigated as a means through which educators can resist limiting visions of education; 
images of education that represent teaching as simplistic and formulaic.  
Following the thread of Murdoch’s (1998) assertion that “not a report need not entail 
not an activity” (p. 318), this chapter will argue against neoliberal views of pedagogy; that 
love between teachers and children is inconsequential due to its immeasurability. Attention, 
when undertaken sincerely, has the capacity to reconfigure relationships between people, and 
to enable teachers to more accurately see the child and reality. Murdochian philosophy makes 
room for the positive potential of conceiving the student-teacher relationship within the realm 
of the affective, placing love at the heart of the educative process. 
 
Love in the Concept of Attention 
I think love is my main subject…this is partly a philosophical development. I once was 
a kind of existentialist and now I am a kind of Platonist. What I am concerned about 
really is love, but this sounds very grandiose. (Rose & Murdoch, 2003, p. 25) 
This quote from Murdoch is taken from an interview originally published in 1968. It 
demonstrates the centrality of love as a concept within her writing. Although this interview 
was conducted while Murdoch was overseeing rehearsals of a play adapted from her book 
The Italian Girl, philosophical considerations take a central role in reflecting upon choices 
made in her writing. Murdoch’s statement identifies her movement – from existentialist to 
Platonist – as informing her decision to focus upon love.  
In line with the main focus of Murdoch’s statement above, it is necessary to any 
consideration of Murdochian philosophy, particularly that of attention, to articulate the 
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importance of love. Love is a central idea in the concept of attention, interlinked with other 
concepts in Murdoch’s philosophy, such as the moral imagination and ‘unselfing’. In order to 
fully appreciate and be open to the possibilities of Murdoch’s (1998) concepts, it is important 
to make sense of how love is a part of a wider landscape of moral concepts and highlight her 
position that time and experience will deepen comprehension of these concepts, connecting 
them in ways that intuit a more clear and comprehensive moral vision (p. 322). Love is a 
moral concept which can grow and develop through experiencing it in the world. Love is not 
contained by public definitions, but rendered and refined through personal contemplation 
leading to a more gradual personal understanding, which is negotiated with public definitions 
(Antonaccio, 2000, p. 93). Although love is being ‘made singular’ in this section, love cannot 
be isolated from other concepts, a necessary entanglement that will become clear as the 
chapter progresses.  
 
Imagination, goodness, and love 
Murdoch (1992) states, “we are fantasising imaginative animals” (p. 323). To understand 
how imagination is guided by love and intersects with goodness, it is first important to 
understand how Murdoch positions imagination in relation to love. According to Murdoch, 
imagination is integral to our existence. Imagination is essential to our relation to others and 
the ability to “make real to oneself, the existence and being of other people” (p. 322). 
Insomuch as it is a way into understanding other people as real beings, imaginative acts are 
also conducted entirely within ourselves, it is “an (inner) activity of the senses, a picturing 
and a grasping” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 325). As articulated in the previous chapter, the 
development of concepts within our minds is experienced in an “imaging, semi-sensible 
mode” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 40) and our thoughts about concepts are not designations of what 
they are, but rather “grasping, ‘possessing’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 41). Murdoch (1992) 
expands further by identifying the need for a “reflective ‘placing’ of consciousness” (p. 325) 
when considering the role of imagination in morality. With deliberate reflection we become 
more attuned to the network of values and concepts around an “intuited centre of ‘good’” 
(Murdoch, 1992, p. 325), clarifying our ability to perceive reality and developing our 
concepts to apprehend it. The ongoing act of attention is deliberate reflection, which 
incrementally enhances moral perception and the ability to see the world as it really is.  
The imagination is engaged constantly in human life, yet is so entirely pervasive that “it 
is in danger of seeming empty” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 322). Murdoch argues for an extended 
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understanding of imagination, proposing a separation between ‘good’ imagination and ‘bad’ 
imagination. Consequently, Murdoch delineates imagination from fantasy in moral terms to 
segment the more general use of the term ‘imagination’ into bad fantasy and good 
imagination (Murdoch, 1992, p. 322). The difference in moral direction is central to the 
understanding of both imagination and fantasy. Fantasy consists of the larger portion of one’s 
thoughts, guided by self-preservation or self-aggrandisement (e.g. vanity, vengeance, 
grandeur and power), but imagination is a “moral discipline of the mind…(and)…suggests 
the searching, joining, light-seeking, semi-figurative nature of the mind’s work, which 
prepares and forms the consciousness for action” (Murdoch, 1992, pp. 322-3). Fantasy limits 
our appreciation of the world and “can imprison the mind” (p. 322), whereas imagination 
“appears as a restoration of freedom, cognition, the effortful ability to see what lies before 
one more clearly, more justly” (p. 322). As Altorf (2008) articulates, “through fantasy, people 
only look after themselves, while imagination looks at the world…fantasy is mechanical, 
whereas imagination is connected to…exploration” (p. 69).  
The moral imagination supports the attentive individual to explore a deeper 
understanding of reality, one that is not built from an egotistical standpoint but is open to the 
perspectives of others. It is difficult to keep our attention upon the real situation and “prevent 
it from returning surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-pity, resentment, fantasy, 
and despair” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 375). However, as imagination is constantly employed and 
often fantasy is mistaken for imagination, how can we seek to distinguish between the two 
more accurately? This is where it is critical to unravel the intersection between imagination, 
love, and the call to the good as these connections will support the endeavour to direct the 
imagination and resist fantasy.  
Firstly, Murdoch (1992) asserts that our experience of love stirs up our imagination and 
“reach[es] down into, the deep breeding places of imagery” (p. 346). Love is a catalyst for the 
imagination and opens us up to our best imaginative possibilities. Secondly, our ability to 
direct attention is through our capacity to love (p. 354). We direct our attention outwards 
when we love something beyond ourselves. However, as articulated above, imagination is 
something that is conducted entirely within ourselves. We love outwardly, but what is 
imagined through love is entirely inner. How do we resist the desire to distort what we 
imagine? How do we reflect in a way that remains true to the reality of the other person? 
Love’s connection to the good guides the direction of the imagination. Through love’s 
magnetic pull to the good, love is directed towards goodness, and when this happens “even 
impurely or by accident” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 384) love is purified. Murdoch recognises that it 
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is difficult for people to appreciate the opportunities extended to us through love because 
instances of love are frequently self-absorbed and ‘possessive’, it is difficult to see love’s 
connection to goodness when love is something rarely seen in its highest form. However, 
when love is viewed in this form we can instantly distinguish it from lesser forms and see 
how it demonstrates goodness. Therefore, love is an essential part of understanding how we 
are magnetically pulled to goodness.  
Murdoch (1998) challenges the notion that selfish examples are indeed love. In as much 
as imagination is confused with fantasy, love is at times confused with ‘false love’, which 
moves to ‘false good’ (p. 384). This ‘love’ is characterised by the same identifiers as that of 
fantasy: self-serving, egotistical desires. In these examples there is a tension between the ego 
and humility, between self-interest and ‘obedience’ affecting our understanding of freedom 
(as explained in Chapter Two). Love is “capable of infinite degradation and is the source of 
our greatest errors” (p. 384), but Murdoch questions the accuracy of describing these 
examples as ‘love’, for in Murdoch’s conceptualisation of love, there is a connection to 
goodness. Although ‘love’ may lead individuals to make errors, “when it is even partially 
refined it is the energy and passion of the soul in its search for the Good” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 
384). This is where love, freedom, and goodness intersect. As articulated above, where 
fantasy is mechanical, imagination is connected to exploration. Imagination directed by love 
is the ability to explore not only our connection with others, but our relationship to the good. 
Love is where our respect for otherness invokes the possibilities for humility, and 
acquiescence. When love and imagination are combined they are magnetically drawn to the 
good, and aid our developing understanding of goodness. Love is the “tension between the 
imperfect soul and the magnetic perfection which is conceived as lying beyond it” (Murdoch, 
1998, p. 384). Through the development of the moral imagination, honed in the practice of 
loving others, we enhance our understanding of the good.  
In everyday life, love is difficult to comprehend due to its complexity and a lack of 
appropriate examples within the world. Love is frequently mistaken for other emotions that 
are generated from fantasy; as argued before, these are created through innate human 
selfishness (Murdoch, 1998, p. 384). Yet love is also an ordinary and everyday human 
activity serving as a counterbalance to selfishness. Love is enacted within real human 
relationships which, when directed truly, are also an illumination of the world in the light of 
goodness. As a part of everyday human life love opens humanity to the possibility of making 
progress in the moral pilgrimage. Love accesses the best in us, for love is “an ultimate 
consolation and an ultimate saviour” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 346). Love enhances our developing 
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understanding of the good, for when we seek it we become appreciative of the desires of the 
other person whom we love, refining our imagery and concepts accordingly. As we progress, 
we can draw from our developing network of values around our ‘intuited centre of good’ and 
use this understanding in our imaginative reflection to check the direction of our love in order 
to resist that egotistical pull.  
 
Love is directed outward in order to apprehend reality 
Murdoch (1998) develops her vision of love, goodness and light from Plato’s analogy of the 
cave. She likens the fire to the light of the self, a light that would appear dazzling and may 
distract one from moving beyond the cave into the light of the sun and goodness (pp. 382–
383). She states, “the self is such a dazzling object that if one looks there one may see 
nothing else” (p. 324). If we are halted in our search by this lesser light, we may never realise 
there is more beyond its alluring brightness; the prisoners in the cave may mistake the fire for 
the sun, as we may mistake “self-scrutiny for goodness” (p. 383). The threat of narcissism 
looms large when love is predominately directed internally, this form of neurosis is a 
significant barrier to our ability to develop loving knowledge of the other (p. 216). Therefore 
the guiding direction for attention is “Outward, away from self which reduces all to a false 
unity, towards the great surprising variety of the world” (p. 354). Reality is “the proper object 
of love” (p. 355) and fantasy is “the proliferation of blinding self-centred aims and images” 
(p. 354). It is through our ability to love, which is to see the other in front of us, that we can 
remove ourselves from the fantastical world of the ego into the reality of a shared existence 
and, ipso facto, we can only truly love when we move towards an open and unselfish 
attentiveness (p. 372). 
However, by merely ‘looking’ outward one will not apprehend reality, nor the more 
comprehensive moral vision that can be achieved through an appreciation of ‘otherness’. 
Reality cannot be accessed by simplistic ‘objective’ looking, and even the assumption of a 
positon of objectivity is flawed (as argued in the previous chapter); moral visions colour our 
understanding of the world. When the world is understood through excessive love of the self 
instead of love for others, our appreciation of reality is clouded, drawing us closer to the fire. 
But, the light of the fire only lights up ourselves, and vaguely sketches out others. It is the 
light of the sun that reveals the world as it truly is. When we are limited to the light of the 
fire, we hold an obscured view and, due to this clouded view, can only access a limited 
understanding of reality. Guided by love, our moral vision is refined and we are drawn to the 
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light of the sun; we are open to accessing an understanding of reality hitherto ‘unknowable’. 
Love is enacted through the practice of attention and “attention is rewarded by a knowledge 
of reality” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 373). Love is an integral concept necessary to attention and a 
means to access reality insomuch as love is the way to attain a true perception of reality 
revealed by the good. Moral progress towards the good is beyond introspective looking, 
beyond the self and even beyond the immediate, as goodness is a distant metaphysical 
actuality. By realigning our vision towards “a distant transcendent perfection” (p. 383) that is 
thoroughly grounded within the everyday world, we develop our understanding of the good 
and how it guides our actions in our everyday lives.  
The philosophical entanglements between ego, otherness, reality, and love demonstrate 
a point at which Murdoch is indebted to the concepts of Simone Weil (2002). In earlier 
discussion (Chapter One) about the influence of Weil upon Murdoch’s philosophy, Weil’s 
view that attention is a necessary prerequisite for love was identified. The Weilian claim that 
attention presupposes love illustrates its integral nature. Without love, it cannot be attention 
and in instances of pure attention, there is always love. This point is of particular significance 
where Weil writes “Among human beings, only the existence of those we love is fully 
recognized” (p. 64). Weil’s ideas influence Murdoch’s position that love renders others more 
clearly. Through love the other is more fully drawn, without love the other is rendered less 
‘real’, or as understood through the analogy of light, the light of goodness which is revealed 
through love clarifies our vision of others. Without the light of the sun, we can only rely on a 
lesser light occluding our vision. We navigate towards goodness by love and the other is 
illuminated; love is the act of ‘bringing into focus’, adding pigmentation, shade and vibrancy 
to the image we hold of the other. This is not just to sketch an image of reality, but to render 
it through the medium of consciousness and attain clarity of the world ‘as it really is’. 
Murdoch (1998) exemplifies this in her scenario of M and D, stating “When M is just and 
loving she sees D as she really is” (p. 329, emphasis added) and also in her statement that the 
act of love “indicate[s] the connection of the good and the real” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 437). We 
not only see others more fully through the vision of love, but also become more attuned to 
reality located outside of ourselves, outside of the grasp of the ego.  
 
Metaxological love 
Love is a bridge, a metaxu between the self and the world, which enables individuals to be 
‘stretched’. An exposition of metaxological thinking within the philosophy of Weil and 
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Murdoch highlights the ways that love stretches us away from our ego, towards the other 
(Larson, 2014). With Weil (2002), the goal is to remove ourselves entirely. Weil (2002) 
writes:  
I must withdraw so that God may make contact with the beings whom chance places in 
my path and whom he loves. It is tactless for me to be there. It is as though I were 
placed between two lovers or two friends…If only I knew how to disappear there 
would be a perfect union of love between God and the earth I tread” (p. 41).  
Decreation, a central concept of Weil’s philosophy, comprises a deliverance from ‘self’, and 
involves ‘piercing the screen’ between us and God. This screen is set up as a necessity, for 
without this screen, we would be absorbed entirely by the light of God, ceasing to be. The 
screen enables the space to develop individuality, personality and a sense of ‘self’ separate 
from God. But according to Weil, the ambition of all people should be to pierce this screen in 
order to lose the ‘self’ and become one with God, or as in the above quote, to serve as the 
vessel for God’s loving presence for others. For Weil, love is a bridge between ourselves and 
God and, once we have undergone the process of decreation, love flows through us from God 
to others.  
Murdoch amends Weil’s removal of the self in her philosophy (as previously 
articulated). Instead, Murdoch seeks the removal of the ego and a movement towards an 
appreciation of the other through careful attention enacted through a just and loving gaze. 
The removal of the ego is through our loving attentiveness to others, which renders them 
more accurately and enables us to access reality. However, we do not withdraw entirely. The 
development of an appreciation of the reality of others does not require the destruction of 
one’s own unique individuality, rather it “presupposes the notion of individual consciousness 
as the necessary and inescapable medium of moral vision” (Antonaccio, 2012, p. 96, original 
emphasis). The moral task of every individual is not to remove themselves entirely, but to 
remove the egotistical elements that get in the way of seeing reality. This is the enigma of our 
moral lives: in order to fully apprehend the reality of our existence, we must push away our 
‘self’ but can only do so through an appreciation of the world undertaken by our ‘self’. 
Murdoch (1998) recognises the complexity of this directive, asserting, “The direction of 
attention is, contrary to nature” (p. 354). As a part of developing values, one must also 
develop the distinction between the ‘self’ as the product of the ego, and the ‘self’ created 
through careful loving attention to others in the world. This is a crux of Murdoch’s 
philosophy and a point she laments frequently within her writing; we are selfish, egotistic 
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individuals, but love can be the bridge between us and others inspiring the transition of our 
own personal world view from fantasy to reality.  
This moral task is undertaken from a uniquely individual perspective that is dependent 
upon knowledge and experiences comprehended through the unique consciousness. The form 
of ‘unselfing’ promoted by Murdoch is reliant upon the unique individual position in order to 
fully attend to others through a just and loving gaze; an accurate rendering of D is reliant 
upon the whole unique personality of M struggling to perceive D more justly. This wholly 
individual understanding creates a situation in which external analysis of her moral position 
may indeed be impossible, for a just and loving gaze is not a only ‘looking’ at something, it is 
not an undertaking which is seeking neutrality or objectivity, but is a form of deliberation 
undertaken from the singular position which M has built from the experiences in her life, her 
relationships with others and the inner development of her moral concepts. An external 
analysis of M’s moral reconsideration of D would not reveal the unique position which she 
draws from to come to her conclusions, and can only be summed up in the statement “‘I can’t 
explain. You’d have to know her’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 326). Murdoch asserts “I can only 
choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision 
is a result of moral imagination and moral effort” (p. 329). This extends Murdoch’s assertion 
that to understand M’s decision would not only requiring knowing D, but also M (more on 
this is discussed within Chapter Seven).  
A loving perception of other individuals is not through the extinction of the self, but 
through the acceptance of our position as moral individuals entrenched within unique 
experiences of the world. Love is a part of a patient regard for others, which is not the 
extinguishing of the self, “but as something very much more like ‘obedience’” (Murdoch, 
1998, p. 331) and obedience to reality is an exercise of love (p. 333). Unselfing is not the 
extinction of the individual, but rather the purification of moral vision through the 
undertaking of love, which is refined via the good. It is the movement our moral vision 
beyond the limitations of the ego, into a space of illumination (the light of the sun); the 
entrance into a realm where reality can be appreciated without the obfuscating illusion of the 
self (Antonaccio, 2000, p. 182). Through a form of moral discipline that is utterly familiar 
and yet infinitely perfectible, we can resist the pull of the ‘the fat relentless ego’ which 
eradicates our ability to apprehend reality (Murdoch, 1998, p. 342). Love maintains good 
moral vision, just as morally good vision invigorates love. Love is the proper determinant for 
our decision making and will bring us the ‘right’ answers only when we undertake the task of 
attention: “an exercise of justice and realism and really looking” (p. 375). As an integral part 
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of the task of attention, love is the force that acts as the bridge between the removal of selfish 
desires and the retention of the uniqueness of the individual. Love is “both innate and 
external” (Larson, 2014, p. 156) and can serve as the metaxu between the self and 
selflessness, self and others, the self and the good. This goodness “cannot be grasped apart 
from the evaluative and desire-laden gaze of a perceiving consciousness” (Antonaccio, 2000, 
p. 140). Yet love enables us to move beyond the desire-laden gaze that is a part of our prise23 
of the world, and purify our intentions through the good.  
 
The endless task of love 
The idea of perfection is necessary to developing a moral vision of the good. Love and justice 
are the primary concepts guiding our perception of others in the attentive gaze, and the 
utilisation of these concepts involves “the idea of progress, that is the idea of perfection” 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 318). A loving gaze is not an undertaking that can be considered ‘finished’. 
The idea of perfection is necessary to ensure that the act of attention is never completed. 
Attentive individuals cannot say, ‘well, I have looked and this is my final reckoning’, attention 
is an endless process because the objects of our attention change and, in devoting our attention 
towards them, so do we. Love and the pursuit of the good transforms us (Murdoch, 1992, p. 
222) and transforms our vision of others around us. Consequently, we must maintain our 
attention in order to appreciate these developments, refine our vision, and remain sensitive to 
our growing understanding of moral concepts. The endless task of attention is “guided by the 
existence of an ideal end point of love or knowledge which always recedes” (Antonaccio, 2000, 
p. 97, original emphasis). Perfection is conceptual, for it is never fully attainable; insomuch as 
humans are finite and perfection is infinite, perfection will always remain distant (Widdows, 
2005, p. 75). As attention, reveals the connection between the good and the real, ongoing 
attentiveness also reveals a “heightened sense of value and a vision of perfection” (Murdoch, 
1992, p. 437). Attention realigns our perceptions of ‘finished’ and ‘enough’ through the 
revelation of the idea of perfection, which in turn alters our motivations in life because it 
“inspires love in the part of us that is most worthy” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 350). We seek 
something beyond our own selves when we are motivated by the desire to perfect our loving 
and just vision of others. Love, when undertaken as a part of the endless task of attention, 
guides the individual by steering his or her moral vision outward, revealing the world 
illuminated by goodness to which love is magnetically drawn (p. 384).  
                                                 
23 Recall that our understanding of the world is through a “grasping, possessing” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 41) 
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Furthermore, when we undertake the task of attention we need to be aware of Murdoch’s 
exposition of our developing moral character and our efforts to enhance perception, 
specifically, “where virtue is concerned we often apprehend more than we clearly understand 
and grow by looking” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 324). To appreciate the virtues surrounding our 
intuited, but infinitely perfectible, centre of good, we must remain open to reality as something 
we can partially discern, but always more than we can fully grasp. As articulated earlier, love 
is a catalyst for the imagination and when the imagination is stimulated by love, so is the 
attraction between the “imperfect soul and the magnetic perfection which is conceived of as 
lying behind it” (p. 384). Through practicing an endless loving gaze, we are offered the 
possibility to both grow our comprehension of virtues and learn more about our capacity to 
apprehend inexhaustible virtue.  
In order to move forward in our moral progress why is it necessary to reach for 
perfection? Murdoch admits that it may appear more sensible to reach for improvement rather 
than perfection, but love shows us the critical differences between these two goals. Perfection 
moves us, and alters us in ways that improvement would not, for “it inspires love in the part of 
us that is most worthy. One cannot feel unmixed love for a mediocre moral standard” (p. 350). 
As argued earlier, when we view love in its highest form we have the capacity to distinguish it 
from lesser forms. The idea of perfection opens us up to the desire to keep searching for perfect 
love. If we reached for progress, then we would miss the possibilities of moral vision beyond 
the ‘mediocre’; we may only reach ‘average’ and lose touch with the good. Furthermore, one 
must reach for perfection in order to avoid the trap of ‘false love’ moving us to a ‘false good’ 
(p. 384). The idea of perfection is necessary to maintain endless forward momentum in the 
right direction. This does not need to be conceived as a dauntless task, but can be welcomed as 
an opportunity to be incrementally transformed in the light of the good. At this point the 
discussion will turn towards early childhood education as a ‘professional’ practice, and the 
grounds for a Murdochian response. 
 
Love in Early Childhood Education 
In order preserve the uniqueness of the child and argue for an ethical and relational model of 
early childhood education, Dahlberg and Moss (2004) draw attention to postmodern ethics, 
the ethics of care, and the ethics of encounter as essential themes in the ethics of education. 
They highlight the ideas of ‘attentiveness’ and ‘listening’ through the philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas and Loris Malaguzzi to navigate the ethical dimensions of education. 
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‘Attentiveness’ is defined as a form of distancing that “enables the Other to be in its 
difference, in contrast to the nearness which implies the possibility of grasping something 
and, hence, a potential for better control” (Dahlberg &Moss, 2004, p. 84). This study has 
considered the notion of ‘attention’ at length and this is a good point to comprehend what 
Dalhberg and Moss seek in ‘attentiveness’ and ‘listening’ and what Murdochian attention can 
offer.  
The tensions between knowledge, control and respecting ‘otherness’ are of central 
concern to Dahlberg and Moss (2004) and are a central reason for drawing from Levinas in 
order to resist motivations to shape education into a procedural, technical, or instrumental 
rationality; education for Dahlberg and Moss is understood as an ethical and political 
practice, with early childhood centres functioning as sites for enhancing ethical fluency with 
strong and equal partnerships between all members. In doing so, Dalhberg and Moss identify 
the ‘ethics of care’ as a creative practice which can transverse linear notions of education, and 
highlight philosophers such as Foucault, Arendt, Heidegger, Lyotard, and Ricoeur as 
influential in notions of care. Additionally, they identify Weil and Levinas.  
Murdoch and Levinas (1979, 1986, 1988) both seek to resist totalising processes in 
order to preserve the uniqueness of the individual. For Murdoch, others are wholly opaque, 
and for Levinas, the other is ‘invisible’, but not insomuch as the other is absent, but rather 
there is an impossibility of reducing the other to a concept (Beals, 2007). For those within 
education who wish to resist codification and over simplification of the complexities of 
children’s learning, Levinas’ philosophical oeuvre, particularly his ideas of the ‘other’ and 
‘unknowability’, support such an endeavour (Cheeseman et al., 2015). Levinas refers to the 
non-cognitive understanding of the other and instead conceptualises our relationship to the 
other as a ‘striving’ or ‘aspiring’ rather than knowing or believing (Morgan, 2011), a sense of 
which is similar to Murdoch’s appreciation that the other is wholly unknowable, and attention 
is guided by the idea of perfection. Specifically within the early childhood sphere, Ritchie 
(2007) describes the possibilities for Levinas’ ‘thinking otherwise’ in relation to supporting 
bicultural hybridities and resisting the colonising forces that reduce Tino Rangatiratanga 
(Māori sovereignty). This will be discussed further in Chapter Six.  
Akin to Murdoch, within Levinas’ philosophy, the ‘economy of satisfaction’ is 
rightfully interrupted by the presence of the other, so that interpersonal communion can be 
understood from the perspective of the other (Plant, 2003). Plant (2003) identifies Levinas as 
a philosopher who is not as distant from the concerns of everyday life and the potent power 
of love, as would be suggested by Alford (2002) who compares Murdoch and Levinas’ 
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philosophy. However, in Levinas, love is cautioned against due to the ways in which it may 
do violence to others beyond the ‘pairing’ of love and it is suggested that the paternal 
relationship is the ideal model to understand an unambiguous relationship with alterity 
(Kourie, 2013, p. 2). The role of eros within Levinas is identified as ‘critical’ to Levinas’ 
philosophical understanding of love (Kourie, 2013), but is also critiqued for the ways in 
which the masculine and the feminine are compartmentalised through a patriarchal gaze 
which delimits the feminine (Irigaray & Whitford, 1991). Limitations are also expressed 
about the convenient image of the ‘neighbour’ within Levinas’ analogy of ‘interruption’ as it 
familiarises the face of the other, reducing the potential of the interruption if a stranger was 
there in his or her stead (Žižek, 2005). This is not to assume that the ‘other’ of Levinas is 
only restricted to the points of connection to the self, as Levinas was clear to identify the 
stranger should be an object of love as much as the ‘neighbour’ (Strhan, 2012). 
But a critical separation between Murdoch and Levinas must be recognised: Murdoch 
remains adamant that the sublime can be located within the ordinary and everyday human 
interactions without recourse to distancing our philosophical cogitation from the immediate 
reality (Alford, 2002). For Murdoch, the sublime is within the ‘mess’ of everyday human 
lives and must be defended for within the ‘mess’ is the substance of existence; we can start 
from no other point (Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, “Contingency must be defended for it is 
the essence of personality” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 285). Every wholly opaque other (including 
oneself) is built from contingency and the particular, the starting point of which we are all 
immersed within. Love is a devotion to reality that does not seek to reshape the other, but 
reshapes ourselves within the ‘mess’; attention “wakes us up right in the midst of the 
mess…[and] its attendant, love, gives us a chance at vision” (Roberts, 2010, p. 124). Like the 
neighbour coming to the door within the analogy of Levinas, moments of attention are the 
way to wake us up, but not in order to move past the ‘mess’ but to stay within it and develop 
a clearer vision of it through a deeper exploration supported by the lens of love. Murdoch 
offers a way of conceptualising loving responses to others right in the midst of the 
pedagogical experience; attention is practical understanding of the role of love within our 
everyday relationships, demanding us to remain attentive to the reality that is in front of us 
and not focus upon the ‘interruption’ itself.  
Ultimately, Dalhberg and Moss (2004) endorse a pedagogy of listening, explicated by 
the writings of Loris Malaguzzi and enacted within the early childhood education in the 
province of Reggio Emilia, Italy. Malaguzzi’s ‘listening’ and Levinas’ preservation of the 
other draw many parallels with Murdoch’s attention. Each of these foci are reaching towards 
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concepts addressed in the concept of attention; a deeper understanding of Murdoch’s concept 
of love can add to the philosophical consideration of early childhood education as an ethical 
encounter. Malaguzzi and Murdoch both sought a way to understand others without 
containing them. ‘Listening’ and ‘attention’ both support a necessary awareness of the 
contextual particulars and an outward focus concerned with a deeper appreciation of reality 
of the child. The pedagogy of listening and the philosophy of Iris Murdoch can produce a 
synergy that can enhance pedagogy and a broader understanding of the act of education. The 
concept of love developed by Murdochian philosophy enhances ‘listening’ by philosophically 
supporting the ‘ordinary and everyday’ pedagogical practices as an inextricable part of 
education.  
Looking more closely at the Aotearoa New Zealand context, Te Whāriki (New Zealand 
Ministry of Education, 2017) promotes a vision of pedagogy that recognises the complexity 
of emotions when working with young children. Teachers’ emotional expressions towards 
children are important in the act of education (Hargreaves, 2000). Working and living with 
young children as an early childhood teacher is an emotionally charged undertaking. Young 
children’s expressions of emotion can be intense and, subsequently, teachers’ responses to it 
cannot be devoid of feeling. Arguably, impassive responses are not encouraged of early 
childhood teachers; it is recognised within the early childhood community that teaching must 
be emotionally responsive. Indeed the good teacher “must know not only how to look and 
listen but also how to speak and to respond” (Roberts & Saeverot, 2018, p. 41). The abilities 
to listen and look are encouraged through the Learning Stories framework of assessment 
(Carr et al., 2000), in which attention to children is a necessary first step in the assessment 
process: ‘Noticing’ is the first step of the framework, followed by ‘recognise’ and ‘respond’. 
Teachers are expected to “listen to [children] attentively to understand their perspectives” 
(New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017, p. 45). In order to understand their perspectives, 
and to build the bridge between self and other, between teacher and child, Murdochian love 
holds potential for early childhood educators to comprehend the critical role of the emotions 
in order to realign pedagogical responses towards an appreciation of the child within the early 
educational context.  
Consistent with the focus of the curriculum, children’s emotional development is 
central to pedagogical practice. But, importantly, teachers’ emotions are also acknowledged 
as a significant element within educational relationships, where it states “The wellbeing of 
each child is interdependent with the wellbeing of their kaiako” (New Zealand Ministry of 
Education, p. 20). I take the stance that ‘well-being’ is inclusive of emotional well-being, a 
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stance supported by Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017). In associating 
teachers’ emotions with those of children, a symbiosis of emotional stability is highlighted; 
children and teachers are interconnected through an intricate web of affections, sensitivities, 
and empathies. Within Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017) an 
appreciation of the connection between individuals is considered necessary in order to ensure 
children develop a sense of well-being. The teacher is described as integral to this growth, 
and the child is ‘anchored’ by the emotional support of the teacher (New Zealand Ministry of 
Education, 2017, p. 14). Emotions can be viewed as a point of connection between the self 
and other, between the teacher and child, enhanced by loving attention. The movements 
towards ‘knowing’ children as a scientific, or scientistic undertaking (as discussed within 
Chapter Four), need to be reconsidered against the ambiguity of other ways of ‘knowing’ 
beyond the epistemological, including the ontological and axiological.  
However, such an interpretation is in tension with neoliberal designations of feelings 
and emotions. Tesar (2012, 2014) draws attention to the ways in which neoliberal 
technologies seek to govern children through the expression or suppression of emotions; 
designating ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways of performing feelings. As articulated within Chapter 
Three, tensions emerge between the distinction of neoliberalism as a set of policies and as a 
lived rationality. This point is equally relevant to the governance of behaviours within the 
early childhood context. Professional boundaries around intimacy are established to 
demarcate the ‘professional teacher’. In England, Powell and Goouch (2012) identify 
situations in which physical expressions of intimacy (kissing babies) are explicitly forbidden 
due to ‘professional’ requirements stemming from blanket policies adopted by management. 
The teachers expressed their hesitation about such comprehensive approaches, but also 
admitted that an expectation of ‘professionalism’ would alter their pedagogical practices 
despite these hesitations.  
Within New Zealand, neoliberal technologies of governance extend to teachers’ 
expression of emotions through externalised criteria designating appropriate forms of 
professionalism. Despite the expectation that emotions are interdependent (New Zealand 
Ministry of Education, 2017), there is a tension that needs to be explored between The Code 
of Professional Responsibility (Education Council New Zealand Matatū Aotearoa, 2017) and 
Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017). Within code 1.2: ‘Engaging in 
professional, respectful and collaborative relationships with colleagues’, the code attempts to 
demarcate professional boundaries through articulating examples of behaviour that breach the 
boundaries of ethical and professional relationships, including instances of “intimate contact 
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with a learner” (p. 12). Although this could be considered to be limited to the context of 
sexual intimacy, such a reading is blurred by being described as “sexual or intimate contact 
with a learner” (Education Council New Zealand Matatū Aotearoa, 2017, p. 30, emphasis 
added). What does this mean for the early childhood teacher who is directed by Te Whāriki 
(New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017) to “communicate positive feelings… warm and 
intimate interactions” (p. 30, emphasis added)? If emotional interdependence is understood to 
be a part of the early childhood curriculum and necessary to pedagogical approaches within 
early childhood, then how does this fit within the ‘professional’ life of the teacher? It is 
questionable to assume that intimacy assumes sexual expression. Likewise, it is questionable 
to remove ‘intimacy’ due to these entanglements with sexuality. Similar to the tension 
illustrated by Murdoch – that the inner life should not be discarded due to the difficulties of 
representation – something would be lost if intimacy was discarded from pedagogy 
altogether. A ‘professional’ determination should consider what intimacy may mean for the 
teachers and children who are participating in educational contexts up to fifty hours a week. 
The concept of love within Murdochian attention can offer another way of viewing intimacy 
in pedagogical relationships. As articulated earlier in the chapter, love opens us up to our best 
imaginative possibilities, and supports us to focus our attention so that our selfish desires may 
be overcome in the apprehension of the other. Through its connection to goodness, love 
cannot be understood as possessive or inappropriate forms of physical action, and these lesser 
forms of ‘love’ can be identified through the light of goodness. Reality, is the proper object of 
love, and attention to reality is the demand of the early childhood educator who seeks to 
pedagogically respond to the real child(ren) in front of them.  
The understanding that pedagogy is an act of love can be enhanced through the moral 
vision of Murdoch’s concept of attention. The demarcation between ‘professional’ and love 
has elicited the conditions for love to become a ‘ground up’ notion of professionalism, but 
due to the marginalised nature of this discourse, there are fewer opportunities to engage in 
wider critical discussion on the concept of love to deepen and broaden philosophical 
argumentation. Consequently, opportunities to extend understanding and appreciation of the 
professional and loving teacher are lessened. However, movements towards a deeper 
appreciation of the role of love in early childhood pedagogy are advancing. In theorising love 
and caring, Page (2011) draws from Noddings (2013) and Goldstein (1998) to articulate the 
importance of considering care as a form of action, or as written by Goldstein (and 
highlighted by Page) caring is “not something you are, but rather something you engage in, 
something you do” (p. 246). More recently, in an edition of the International Journal of Early 
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Years Education, devoted to the consideration of the concept of love in pedagogy, Page 
(2018) sought to conceptualise the notion of ‘Professional Love’, by setting out principles for 
practice, including the “intellectual capacity to become self-aware” and the ability to “de-
centre” (pp. 135-6). Noddings’ (2013) ethic of care is built from Murdochian attention, but 
love is critically investigated by Murdoch enabling a deeper understanding of its role in 
attention (the genesis of Noddings’ concept of engrossment). An understanding of ‘self-
awareness’ and ‘de-centring’ are enhanced by Murdochian attention, and offer new ways of 
reconsidering the role of love in pedagogy to ensure room is made to explore possibilities 
beyond a principle-based approach to ethics. In education, morality is more than principle-
based ethics; an appreciation of value attributes can add a critical dimension to ethics in 
education (Chapman, Forster, & Buchanan, 2013). As argued by Murdoch, when morality is 
determined to be ruled by actions, something is lost; the loss of the background underpinning 
moral actions and delimiting the role of the inner life in moral decisions. Furthermore, a 
critical distinction is articulated when love in education is labelled as “Professional Love” 
(Page, 2018). It is important to consider what may be gained from this distinction, and what 
could be lost.  
Limitations placed by externally constructed codes of conduct are akin to moral 
principles; dictums to be upheld (potentially at all costs). Such an approach invokes the 
problems of Kantian rationality, which Murdoch finds problematic when considering the 
reality of human relationships (as discussed in Chapter Three in the image of the ‘ideally 
rational individual’ who is considered capable of divorcing ‘fact’ from value in order to 
determine moral actions with others, or assess others’ moral actions). Arguing along similar 
lines, Taggart (2011) asserts the ‘hegemonic status of Kant’ underpins the correlations 
between neoliberal projections of ‘professionalism’ and performances of ethical behaviours 
within the domain of education. Objective reason is viewed as the sole requirement to 
determine ‘right’ from ‘wrong’ behaviours, in a manner akin to that expressed by Murdoch 
(1992) to be post-Kantian: “survey all the facts, then use your reason” (p. 26). Taggart (2011) 
writes:  
Being ethical, in this sense, is about observing principles and justifying actions in the 
light of them. Such an approach is routinely used to underpin the assessment of teachers 
so as to allow standardised value judgements to be made concerning their performance. 
(p. 86)  
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Such an understanding is not without its ramifications for teachers’ understandings of moral 
sensibilities. Chapman, Forster and Buchanan (2013) found tensions between rational 
communication and emotional expression in pre-service (Secondary sector in Australia) 
teachers discussions of ethical dimensions, with “the pre-service teachers opting to be seen as 
rational and preferring to tie their emotions to the rational discourse of fairness for the 
students, rather than care for them” (p. 137). Chapman, Forster and Buchanan (2013) equally 
argue that ‘professional’ entanglements can shape teachers’ developing professional identities 
insomuch that emotional reactions are situated as “not professionally ethical” (p. 141).  
The distinction of ‘professional love’ from love needs to be carefully considered in 
light of the considerations of principle-based ethics and the neoliberal desire to codify. This is 
the predominant approach to the governance of ethical encounters in early childhood, yet it is 
recognised as insufficiently narrow, raising questions about the validity of this approach. 
Page (2018) and others (Aslanian, 2015; Claxton & Atkinson, 2000) resist such narrow 
codifications and indicate the value of the intuitive within education. This is a space where 
Murdoch’s understanding of the idea of perfection can support the claim that love in 
education is the love of attention and is necessarily unquantifiable. There is a distinct 
inability to fully define nor apprehend love in its totality, for it is ever refined and clarified 
through its practice and understood through a sensory appreciation of its magnetic pull to the 
good. A Murdochian understanding of love can broaden the notion of love in education 
through the concept of attention as an ‘inhabited’ philosophy, supporting the notion of a 
philosophical understanding of love within teaching built from pedagogy (more on the notion 
of attention as an ‘inhabited’ philosophy will be discussed in Chapter Seven).  
Love as a central concept of early childhood education which is developed through the 
practice of attention has much to offer early childhood education. Dalli (2010a) articulates 
that the ‘expectations’ of professionalism generated by scholarly discussions lose touch with 
the realities of teachers. She states:  
I have argued that the traditional alignment of early childhood work with the role of 
mothering, and the attendant discourses of love and care, have acted to disempower 
early childhood practitioners from claiming professional status…At the same time, 
discourses of love and care persist in early childhood teachers’ talk about their work… 
these discourses should not be ignored in scholarly discussions on the nature of early 
childhood professionalism…rather, it is timely to re-vision notions of love and care so 
that they may be transformed into pedagogical and political tools. (p. 174) 
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Moving through dominant discourses are the counter-discourses of the teachers or the 
‘ground-up’ constructions of professionalism that reconceive the educational act as one of 
‘emotive labour’, including the concept of love (Dalli, 2010a). Emotionality is recognised as 
a space that is constantly negotiated, and carefully managed; emotions can be positioned as a 
part of the professional role built from personal and intimate relationships (Dalli, 2010b, 
2010a). Reconfiguring professionalism to recognise the work of teachers as both an act of 
love and intimacy requires an appreciation that professional teachers are aware that “keeping 
an appropriate professional distance requires emotional work of the highest calibre” (Elfer, 
Goldschmied, and Selleck, 2003, cited in Osgood, 2010) and a respect for teachers’ abilities 
to negotiate these delicate emotional boundaries.  
Problems of ‘performativity’ and the incongruence between neoliberalisms as a set of 
policies and as a lived experience, can be partially mitigated by counter-discourse movements 
of teachers working within the early childhood settings (Dalli, 2010a; Osgood, 2010). 
Instances of ‘top-down’, hegemonic expressions of professionalism are reinterpreted and 
critiqued by educators working within early childhood settings, who are capable of 
expressing a reimagined definition (and determination) of ‘professionalism’ from within. 
Teachers within Osgood’s (2010) study sought to resist externalised ‘competencies’ as the 
sole criteria for determining the ‘professional’ teacher. The definition of the professional 
teacher is critiqued as a gendered reading, and the teachers’ counter-discourse an act of 
disruption to the correlation of the ‘hyper-femininity’ of emotional expression to 
‘unprofessionalism’ (Osgood, 2010). But these opportunities must be read in light of other 
‘realities’ of neoliberalisms raised by Powell and Goouch (2012): teachers may experience a 
desire to resist ‘professional requirements’ but are dissuaded by the potential ramifications of 
doing so. 
Neoliberal ideas promote the notion of the professional teacher as apolitical and 
innocuous, yet to do so within the context of early childhood education is to eradicate the 
long history of feminism, social justice, and child advocacy movements that have fostered the 
growth of early childhood education and underpinned ideological and philosophical tenets 
within pedagogy. The call to the moral and the ethical has been a part of early childhood 
education since its inception (May, 2009). To consider the early childhood professional as 
one who needs to go ‘beyond caring’ is to ascribe to “the persistence of an outdated equation 
between caring and female irrationality or anti-intellectualism” (Taggart, 2011, p. 85). 
Osgood (2010) identifies the tenuous position ‘professionalism’ places teachers: within a 
space which encourages them to enact a fantasy and suppress the authenticity of pedagogical 
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practice, particularly when it was counter to ‘professional’ requirements. Osgood (2010) 
writes: 
The early childhood workforce is readily constructed through neo-liberal discourses as 
comprising docile bodies that yield to the discourse…as ‘technicians’ willing to comply 
and unquestioningly deliver prescribed practice and meet externally set occupational 
standards. (p. 127)  
A reconceptualization of the role of Murdochian love within pedagogy offers substantive 
arguments against the image of the technical teacher, raising questions about the fantastical 
nature of this  image, generated through the egotistical desire to control the limits and 
boundaries of ‘learning’. Although the desire for control is generated through the ego, love 
magnetically draws us to the good, purifying our movements with others. When education is 
directed through love, the fallacies of neoliberal forms of ‘professionalism’ are clearly 
identified. Murdoch argues although goodness has many ‘false doubles’ when coupled 
together, love and goodness cannot be led astray. We can immediately distinguish lesser 
forms of ‘professionalism’ from those that support pedagogy as a form of attempting to see 
another individual through a just and loving gaze.  
When love is the underlying motivation for intimacy with children and discerned from 
‘false love’, then intimacy cannot be mistakenly characterised as something untoward. Love, 
illuminated by goodness, is a movement that cannot be concerned with egotistical desires, 
rather attention seeks to place the object of love in the position of ultimate concern; the centre 
of one’s focus. Within the keynote address at the 2005 Te Tari Puna Ora/New Zealand 
Childcare Association national conference, Dalli (2006) focusses upon the complexities of 
the ‘professional’ teacher and the concept of love. Despite the strength of love as a 
motivation for appropriate pedagogy, the incompatibility of love as a legitimate form of 
‘knowledge’ invokes an association between the discourse of love and reduced professional 
status. This problem can be likened to Murdoch’s earlier concern with the dissection of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘appearances’ in the assessment of morality through the objective lens (as 
argued in Chapter Four). This demarcation was invoked in order to relocate ‘knowledge’ to 
the observable evaluation of actions rather than a part of the ‘hazy’ inner life. However, Dalli 
also comments that this correlation invokes an unnecessary hierarchy, situating “the brain 
above the heart” (p. 7) and delimiting the potential power of love as a discourse of strength in 
pedagogy. What is needed, Dalli argues, is the development of an understanding which would 
not only position care and love as ‘feeling’ words, but also enhance a deeper theoretical 
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framework: part of “a newly theorised discourse of professional practice” (p. 11) beyond a 
‘personality trait’ (p. 11) and part of a relationship concerned with the “unending obligation 
to meet the other” (p. 11).  
In order to undertake this work, I contend that Murdoch’s arguments against the 
dismissal of the inner life as hazy, irrational, and unable to be externally validated, are of 
significant value to developing a newly theorised discourse of professional practice based 
upon the centrality of love within pedagogy. As Murdoch argues, love developed by the 
moral imagination is hard to characterise “not because it is ‘hazy’ but precisely because it is 
moral” (p. 317, original emphasis). Such an understanding of the relationships between 
pedagogy, evaluation and performativity can enhance a lively debate on the validity of the 
concept of love. If teachers enter the educative space with loving attentiveness, their moral 
imagination is brought to the fore, and mechanical processes built from fantasy can be 
diminished. Murdochian love encourages teachers to consciously reflect upon their 
judgements and think deeply about how they are developing inner thoughts of others, guided 
by the need to remain responsive to the “reflective placing of consciousness” (Murdoch, 
1992, p. 325).  
This loving reflection will support current forms of narrative assessment and offer a 
new way to consider the moral vision within assessment as a matter of gestalt. Pedagogy is 
based upon moral vision and the motivation to understand children through the moral 
imagination; the task set before teachers is to view others through the lens of love. Love is 
bound to imagination and through the light of goodness the world is clearly illuminated. 
Teachers are expected to ‘see’ the child and when assessment is undertaken through attentive 
love, teachers can be opened up to the possibilities of the child by gaining a clearer 
understanding of reality beyond themselves; beyond the limitations of performative forms of 
assessment towards a greater appreciation of the possibilities of pedagogy based upon 
attention. Differences may be understood as differences in moral vision. Rather than seeking 
more effective ‘tools’ to articulate and describe the reality of the child, first we would be 
encouraged to reconsider the moral vision that pictures them (Murdoch, 1998, p. 82).  
Love is a moral concern, it is an individual task not undertaken through the extinction 
of the self, but through the acceptance of our position as moral individuals entrenched within 
our unique experiences of the world. Teaching is also a moral act in which knowledge of the 
individual affects the negotiation of ‘education’ between teacher and child. Love allows the 
teacher to ‘see’ the child and enhance a conceptual understanding of the educational 
relationship. The act of education can be enlivened through an appreciation of pedagogy as 
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It is doubtful that neoliberal ideas will support the notion of care coexisting with 
professionalism (Ailwood, 2007). In effect, teachers and bureaucrats will be speaking at cross 
purposes when seeking to find common ground. Although the same could be said of love, the 
potent power of ‘ground up’ conceptualisations of pedagogy and professionalism can be 
philosophically grounded by the substantive nature of the Murdochian concept of love, 
supporting pedagogy as an attentive act which is ‘inhabited’ (a point to be extended within 
Chapter Seven). Love opens a space for teachers to validate their intimate understanding of 
children by acknowledging the necessary incremental moments that build an understanding 
of children and improves comprehension of the pedagogical process. These small 
developments are essential within early childhood pedagogy, and critical to an appreciation 
of education as a relational undertaking that resists technical processes. Technical directives 
for practice undermine teachers’ loving understanding of children, and the craft of the 
attentive teacher to weave a curricular approach that meets the child’s individuality and draw 
from love’s knowledge to encourage the child on an educational journey. When understood 
through Murdochian attention, love can be viewed as a means to reorient systematic and 
formulaic understandings of education and renegotiate the professional and loving teacher in 
early childhood education.   
132 
 
Chapter Six  
Attention and Aroha 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the critical role of love within the concept of attention was explored 
in order to develop a philosophical grounding for the necessity of love in pedagogy. Love 
was defined as ‘respect for otherness’ (Murdoch, 1998, p. 216) and conceived as a metaxu 
between self and the world. In this chapter, the centrality of love within the concept of 
attention will be brought in conversation with the Māori concept of aroha. Respect and 
consideration will be given to allow for an interweaving with mātauranga Māori, such as 
tapu, mana, manaakitanga, and āta, to develop a fuller picture of aroha. The purpose of this 
chapter is to highlight the shared vision of attention and aroha. Attention has much in 
common with aroha and when brought together, the synergy of these concepts can strengthen 
an understanding of education as something more than what is offered through neoliberal 
interpretations.  
In order to contextualise the direction for this investigation, at the outset of this chapter 
I will situate myself as a researcher, describing some of my history and role at the time of 
conducting this study. Following this will be a section outlining some of the dilemmas I 
experience in relation to bicultural development as a teacher born outside of New Zealand 
and some supportive ideas from research for how to navigate them. Next, the concept of 
aroha will be sketched with a view to exploring the harmony between aroha and attention and 
how they can be aligned to enhance each separate concept, and build cohesive synergy 
between them.  
 
Contextualising Personal/Professional Approaches to Bicultural Development 
As a non-Māori teacher and researcher, the purpose of this section is to offer some contextual 
information as a means of grounding my personal-professional position in relationship to 
these concepts. In order to achieve this, I will share a little about my history and present, my 
own cultural positioning and my relationship and engagement with mātauranga Māori. 
Necessary to this discussion will be an articulation of the professional expectations of early 
childhood teachers in relation to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, Tino Rangatiratanga and bicultural 
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development and how these affect my approaches to being a teacher, researcher and person 
living in Aotearoa New Zealand.   
Presently, I am an early childhood teacher who works in an education and care setting 
in Aotearoa New Zealand. I am employed as a ‘Lead Teacher’ within the room where I teach 
with one other teacher. Together we teach up to 12 children each day, but due to the part time 
enrolments of some of those children, there are approximately 18 children who are enrolled 
in this group. This group is one of four across the learning centre, divided primarily by age 
into 0-18months, 18-30 months, 30months to 3½ years, and 3½ years to school leaving age 
(anywhere between 5 and 6). The overall teaching team totals 15, representing a very diverse 
range of cultural backgrounds with over half of the teachers originating from countries other 
than New Zealand, including myself.  
I was born in the United States of America. My family (Father, Mother, elder sister) 
moved out to Aotearoa New Zealand because my father was enlisted in the United States 
Navy, and the Navy stationed him in different places internationally. He was stationed in 
Christchurch to work in the ‘Deep Freeze’ Antarctica Programme, and we immigrated to 
Aotearoa New Zealand when I was six years old. My father was raised in Louisiana, in a very 
large family. My mother was an only child, adopted into a childless Mexican-American 
household (she is also of Mexican-American heritage). Raised with Mexican-American and 
Cajun cultural traditions and a strong focus upon valuing and participating within the cultural 
traditions of the places we were stationed (California, Hawaii, and New Zealand over the 
course of my life), the experiences of my childhood have developed in me both the desire to 
know more about differing cultural understandings of life, and the desire to make sense of 
how these impact upon my ontological, epistemological, and axiological orientations.  
When we came to Christchurch, we were perceived by many as a novelty. There were 
no other Americans at the school I attended, and certainly no Mexican-Americans. There has 
been a disconnect with the United States as a space of ‘home’, as despite strong patriotic 
threads from my father and a staunch pride as a Chicana instilled in me by my mother; we 
have never returned to the United States since our departure. My cultural orientation is 
strongly ‘Kiwi’, but this does not encapsulate my experiences and ways of knowing and 
being, for the strong ties to my Mexican-American heritage and the ongoing experience of 
being recognised as a foreigner by people within New Zealand (due to my accent) still affect 
my everyday experiences.  
From this position I begin my encounter with ‘biculturalism’. I have experienced the 
notion of ‘biculturalism’ through exposure to the Māori and Pākehā cultures in New Zealand, 
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viewed initially through the influences of my family and later through teacher education 
programmes. Some foundational understandings were generated from the stories my mother 
would share of colonising effects which impacted my mother directly and indirectly through 
her community. She would share with me her experiences as a person of Mexican heritage in 
America and connect these to the necessity for us (my elder sister and myself) to respect 
appreciate and uphold other cultural heritages, especially when we are the ‘guests’ in another 
country. The correlations in colonising effects between Mexican and Māori peoples were not 
lost on my mother; she would tell me of her experiences of coming from a Spanish-speaking 
household and attending an English-speaking school. My father would share his views of 
tolerance and acceptance, having seen racism first hand through the effects of the subjugation 
of African-American people living in Louisiana. Every time we moved my Mother and 
Father would encourage me to try to see the world through the eyes of the local and 
indigenous people living there and embrace cultural diversity as a strength. They also were 
adamant that I remain true to my own self, my upbringing and mi familia. Consequently, 
although I am a teacher in New Zealand, I am not fully ‘kiwi’ and bicultural practice is 
understood through this interpretation of myself within New Zealand culture. 
Over the course of my teaching career I have been working towards enhancing my 
appreciation of mātauranga Māori woven through the fabric of Te Whāriki (New Zealand 
Ministry of Education, 1996, 2017). At the outset, Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of 
Education, 1996) was hailed as a landmark document for supporting the equal footing and co-
habitation of colonial and indigenous approaches to children and childhoods and particularly 
as a document that unified a pluralistic and at times competitive sector. As a ‘bicultural’ 
curriculum, Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 1996) is described as a 
‘meadow of opportunity’ for presenting post-colonial possibilities that can “disengage us 
from the constraints of bicultural dichotomies, moving into terrain that validates and 
legitimises multiple subjectivities which enrich the possibilities for Māori to live as Māori” 
(Ritchie, 2008, p. 202). The present edition of Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of 
Education, 2017) was enhanced to strengthen the bicultural framing, and extend guidance 
relating to kaupapa Māori as an integral element of teaching in the Aotearoa New Zealand 
context (Kaye, 2017). Whakatauki are utilised for their metaphorical quality to support 
educators’ ability to see education differently and to consider the implications of this vision 
for pedagogical practice. In this revised edition, there has been a move to represent Māori 
concepts in ways that are not transliterations of English concepts, but separate and unique. 
Wellbeing is defined as “children have a sense of wellbeing and resilience” (New Zealand 
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Ministry of Education, 2017, p. 26), whereas Mana Atua is set apart with the following 
definition: “children understand their own mana atuatanga – uniqueness and spiritual 
connectedness” (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017, p. 26). The distinctions between 
these values and subtle points of separation and convergence infer the nuance that teachers 
need to apply in order to orient their teaching approaches towards bicultural development. It 
is also critical to resist the ways in which neoliberalisms pervade bicultural themes 
surreptitiously; the ‘bicultural child’ is not exempt from the neoliberal lens and is constructed 
to normalise neoliberal discourses. In a view of childhoods as ‘assemblages’, Duhn (2012) 
highlights this slippery aspect of neoliberalisms, which may appear impermeable, but can be 
brought into focus by identifying the tensions, contradictions and ambiguities in the ‘ideal 
bicultural child’ of the first edition of Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 
1996). Arguably, the same concern can be extended to the neoliberal construction of the 
‘bicultural teacher’ (or kaiako) within the most recent edition of Te Whāriki (New Zealand 
Ministry of Education, 2017).  
The movements I undertake in my bicultural development are further influenced by the 
expectations for all teachers as partners to Te Tiriti o Waitangi. As party to this document, 
teachers must remain cognisant of and active in, the necessity to uphold Tino Rangatiratanga 
(Māori sovereignty). Additionally, these professional expectations are extended through my 
status as a registered teacher, which is guided by Our code, Our standards; Ngā tikanga 
matatika, ngā paerewa (New Zealand Teaching Council Matatū Aotearoa, 2017). These 
expectations are evident where this document guides teachers to work in the best interests of 
students by “affirming Māori learners as tangata whenua and supporting their educational 
aspirations” (p. 10) and “demonstrating a commitment to a Tiriti o Waitangi based Aotearoa 
New Zealand” (p. 12). The enactment of this expectation is through a shared responsibility to 
enhance the educational success of Māori learners and understand the “histories, heritages, 
languages, and cultures of the partners to Te Tiriti o Waitangi” (New Zealand Teaching 
Council Matatū Aotearoa, 2017, p. 18).  
Although an understanding these professional responsibilities guides my engagement 
with Māori concepts, deeper understanding of the concepts and how they are translated into 
practice is not part of these documents, and must be sought elsewhere. I have been informed 
by publications, but I have also gained knowledge from relationships over the course of my 
teaching and research career. Here my understanding is indebted to the generosity extended 
by whānau of the Māori children I have taught. They have taken the time to further elucidate 
these concepts and enhanced my understanding immensely. Furthermore, in conversation 
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with Māori researchers, I have been alerted to critical points of alignment between Murdoch’s 
concept of attention, and kaupapa Māori. This has furthered my conceptual development. My 
approaches to pedagogical practice, underpinned by a desire to enhance my comprehension 
of mātauranga Māori is beyond notions of performativity of professional requirements. 
Sensitive to the Murdochian arguments for the notion of philosophy as inhabited (which will 
be expanded further in the next chapter) I do not see my approach to bicultural practice as 
governed solely by principles (do this, not that), but more as the progressive motions and 
incremental developments in moral vision. A ‘lived philosophy’ moves me to an enactment 
of pedagogy that must be understood through contemplation, but also through experience; the 
lived philosophy is one that must be embodied, inhabited and lived.  
Furthermore, this lived process demands the understanding that morality affects all 
human decisions and interactions. The ethical entanglements that accompany interpersonal 
relationships are brought to the fore, particularly when the contents for discussion are cultural 
values. In this way, I seek to acknowledge and uphold bicultural development as something 
beyond the epistemological and ontological, and attempt to include the axiological, insomuch 
that values are essential to the conceptual understandings which I am moving to grasp. 
Murdoch conceives the development of conceptual understandings as such a ‘grasping’, 
although there needs to be a distinction between grasping to know, contain, and possess 
(potentially in order to appropriate, disseminate and control), and one which is underpinned 
by the concept of attention. Through a just and loving gaze, the focus is to displace the ego 
and to continually re-evaluate the individual reality which is the object of attention. As such, 
the notion of finality, one which would render a concept as ‘complete’ is inappropriate.  
Humility, is essential to this position and representative of Murdoch’s ideal individual, 
therefore it is critical for me as a researcher seeking to respond to the moral call of 
attentiveness to remain humble about how I interpret and present Māori knowledge when 
they are not a part of my own cultural heritage. This is important for,  
In Māori terms, knowledge is widely viewed as a taonga, to be guarded and protected 
and to be passed only to those who can be entrusted with preserving and using it wisely, 
for group rather than individual benefit…from this perspective, the sharing of 
knowledge is viewed as an act of generosity. (Love, 2004, p. 1) 
I am not Māori, and the following account of Māori concepts is undertaken from readings, 
conversations and experiences with Māori concepts from my own unique cultural position. I 
approach this task with great respect and humility. Any claims to knowledge need to be 
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considered carefully, with āta (care and deliberation). I hold in esteem the individuals who 
have shared their conceptual understandings in order for me to be able to develop a deeper 
appreciation of mātauranga Māori. I also seek this conceptual development as a response to 
the call to improve bicultural development (Ritchie, 2003) and to honour my parents’ 
expectations for me to venerate indigenous cultures in order to behave a courteous guest who 
should understand the mores of the country I reside in. I hope that the analysis undertaken 
within this chapter will be seen as an effort to work towards a way of responding to the call 
for stronger pedagogical practices enhanced by aroha, for the benefit of all the children of 
Aotearoa New Zealand.  
 
On Knowing and Teaching as ‘Other’ 
As an early childhood teacher in Aotearoa New Zealand, developing an understanding of 
concepts which are a part of the traditions of tangata whenua (especially as a person from 
another land) requires sensitivity to the concept of ‘otherness’. Murdoch was clear to argue 
for an image of an ‘inner life’ and the ways in which this inner life is wholly opaque to 
external individuals, but nonetheless a critical part of the individual. Although we attempt to 
see another person more clearly, they will remain entirely opaque. Furthermore, the vision of 
the human as an individual who (when engaged in the moral task of attention) is a pilgrim on 
the moral journey through life, enhances the image of the unknowable other as separate and 
distinct but also undergoing a process shared by all humanity. The ‘other’ in the educational 
relationship may well be fully unknowable, but we are still connected through the 
commonality of an inner struggle and the external magnetic force of the good, which pulls all 
attentive individuals in the same direction. The task of attention focuses our awareness of 
others and the necessity to remain open to looking differently at the possibilities presented by 
the unknowable other. Biesta (2017) asserts that our subjective existence involves a dialogic 
approach to the other, one that is not exclusively concerned with internalised intentions and 
desires, but also “intimately bound up with the ways in which we engage with and respond to 
what and who is other, with what and who speaks to us, addresses us, calls us, and thus calls 
us forth” (p. 3). de Vocht (2015) highlights the necessity for understanding teacher-child 
dialogue through the Bahktinian lens of moral answerability. Yet, in the recognition of an 
‘other’ there is the potential to misalign good-intentions with homogenous practices. Through 
a Kristevan ‘foreigner’ lens, Arndt (2018) challenges us to consider the foreigner within and 
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remain open through the unknowable within ourselves, and draw on this experience to 
appreciate a commonality with others.  
The following discussion hinges upon the concept of the obscure and unknowable other 
and our responses towards that otherness. In looking critically at bicultural understandings 
and attempting to embrace another way of knowing, being and valuing in the world, the 
question of ‘who is the other’ can be raised and Murdochian strategies can be developed in 
order to improve one’s moral vision in relation to the other. Here, a question is raised about 
the notions of subjectivity, agency and what could potentially be identified as the ‘visionary’ 
– a critical element within Murdochian (1998) images of the human (p. 332). Whilst there is 
no necessity to remain bound to one image of the human or another, if the notion of moral 
vision and the developing capacity for acting differently is absent, then this image of the 
human has lost an element which is essentially Murdochian. Responsivity to the other is not 
only about personal actions, or how we are subject to another’s actions, but also a question of 
moral vision.  
The movement to enhance conceptual understandings of mātauranga Māori presents me 
with a central dilemma that needs to be identified, explicated and navigated. I am aware of 
how this dilemma could undermine my attempts for seeing different. The dilemma is 
identified in part by Ritchie (2003) who articulates some problems for educators who seek to 
ensure that their pedagogy is enhancing ‘bicultural practice’. She is particularly cautious 
about educators who are undertaking this and are non-Māori, raising the question:  
…to what extent can (and should) non-Māori emulate qualities of “Māoriness”? Can 
non-Māori early childhood educators learn to act as Māori do, in situations such as 
urban kohanga reo, where modern non-kinship based whanau have been created and 
operate from a kaupapa (philosophy) of aroha, manaakitanga and whakaiti? (Ritchie, 
2003, p. 6) 
These questions resonate with me as a non-Māori and as a non-New Zealand born individual 
with Mexican-American heritage. How do I make sense of kaupapa Māori, and what are the 
ways in it will impact upon pedagogical and philosophical understandings of education?  
Warren (2014) also highlights this dilemma for non-Māori educators who are expected 
(as an aspect of professional responsibility) to develop bicultural understandings. She 
undertakes a post-structuralist self-study of discourses and professional subjectivities in 
relation to navigating ‘biculturalism’ and resisting colonising discourses. She articulates that 
there are several discourses at work that affect the individual: professional discourses, Te 
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Tiriti social justice, and cultural identities. She argues that it is important to articulate each 
discourse in order to evaluate how they may impact personal/professional practices. 
Understanding how discursive practices operate can offer opportunities for transformation. 
Engaging in a Foucauldian ‘post-structuralist’ lens (with due awareness of Foucault’s 
resistance of this designation), Warren (2014) reinforces the stance that power/knowledge 
relationships are ever present within interrelations with others and discourses of 
biculturalism. To analyse myself through this lens is to situate myself according to multiple 
subjectivities. As a teacher of young children, my position is one of privilege and my 
orientation within the learning setting – how I position myself philosophically, and how this 
is expressed to children, whanau and teachers – must consistently navigate the omnipresent 
power dynamics between myself and others. This is necessary in order to resist the potential 
approaches of ‘sameness’ that I may unconsciously produce and make room to move into 
different, and potentially confrontational, spaces of transformation.  
To navigate this dilemma, Ritchie (2003) highlights the qualities of responsiveness, 
respectfulness and reciprocity (central elements of the Te Whāriki approach to education) as 
the means through which individuals can navigate problematic issues of professional 
subjectivity. Respect is: 
certainly a fundamental quality for Pākehā educators to demonstrate, and one which is 
related to that of whakaiti…adopting a whanaungatanga approach requires the 
reconceptualising of the construct of teacher as ‘expert’, since we cannot be experts in 
another person’s culture if we do not share that cultural background. Teachers from the 
dominant Pākehā culture will require both humility and openness, so that in remaining 
vigilant as to the limitations of the role of a Pākehā facilitator of bicultural development 
they may avoid pitfalls that can easily befall those who come from an uncritiqued 
paradigm of ‘expert’ or ‘person responsible’. (Ritchie, 2003)  
The bicultural character of Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017) 
encourages non-Māori teachers to work with Māori concepts. This is problematic when non-
Māori educators assume a position of knowledge in relation to these concepts, or conversely 
avoid engagement with them; a recognition of the hyphen between Māori-Pākehā, as a more-
than-grammatical gap (Stewart, 2018). Stewart (2018) asserts that critical kaupapa Māori 
theory holds a long-standing tradition of acknowledgement of the challenges of the hyphen 
gap, and promotes a vision for kaupapa Māori which will meet “kanohi-ki-te-kanohi…the 
critical Pākehā response of seeking entanglement, bearing guilt and maintaining commitment 
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to productive disappointment of the recurrent urge to want to fully understand the Other” (p. 
8). Yet also within Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017) teachers are 
specifically positioned to recognise they are not exclusive holders of knowledge but 
respectful learners (altering the power/knowledge dynamic). This aligns with Murdochian 
ideas about the other as unknowable and opaque; the process that must undertaken in order to 
revise moral judgements relies upon the respectful attention of the educationist, validating the 
importance of the inner life of teaching. In the recognition of their limitations of knowledge, 
teachers can “move beyond conventional models of delivering ‘culturally appropriate 
practice’ as defined by teachers/experts” (Ritchie, 2003, p. 9). Humility and openness are 
identified as key concepts within this process (Ritchie, 2003); they are ways in which the 
teacher can orient themselves to move towards transformation.  
Humility and openness are central to Murdochian ideas. According to Murdoch, the 
humble individual holds the possibility of being good; this person is able to displace personal 
needs, desires, wants, in deference to the other through the task of attention. Attention is 
defined as ‘a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality’ and is a way in which 
individuals can see others justly, lovingly, and clearly. It is an endless task, for as other 
people grow and change over time, so does our moral vision through the practice of attention. 
Murdoch developed the concept of attention as a practice through which individuals can 
move beyond the pull of the (selfish) ego, and attempt to see the reality of another person. 
“Fantasy (self)” Murdoch (1998) argues, “can prevent us from seeing a blade of grass just as 
it can prevent us from seeing another person” (p. 357). Furthermore, “our minds are 
continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil 
which partially conceals the world” (p. 369). This ego gets in the way of our innate abilities 
to seek and discern the good. However, if we can remain ‘humble and open’, as suggested by 
Ritchie (2003), then we can have the opportunity to see the other and respond appropriately 
and ethically. If we can move towards a form of selflessness that suppresses the ego, but also 
holds on to our individuality, then we can develop our conceptual understanding of Māori 
concepts from our own unique personal viewpoint.  
Selflessness is the key to a just and loving gaze, and therefore the key to seeing the 
world as it is. Humility also enables individuals to embrace the idea of perfection and see 
their efforts as steps along the way, not the end point in the journey. Yet the humility that is 
necessary to engage in the act of attention is hard to attain as “humility is a rare virtue and an 
unfashionable one and one which is hard to discern” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 385). Unfashionable 
or not, (arguably still the case in present day neoliberal times), humility is critical to 
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remaining open to learning, to seeking alternate viewpoints and to accepting that the 
misunderstanding may lie with oneself. Furthermore, humility encourages teachers to remain 
open to the thought that the ‘other’ can retain their individuality. Claims to a position of 
‘knowledge’ or ‘understanding’ are realigned when we are open to the possibility of being the 
‘other’ in the educational relationship and to seeking to appreciate different ways of knowing, 
being and valuing rather than enforcing one’s own. The moral task of attention can assist my 
understanding by supporting the ‘development’ aspect of bicultural development, seeing 
incremental growths in understanding as a progressive move that are underpinned by the idea 
of perfection, humility, and a movement away from the ego towards an appreciation of the 
other. It is through this orientation that I engage in the following investigation into the 
synergistic possibilities of aroha and attention. 
 
Aroha: Foundational and Interdependent  
Aroha is a foundational concept within kaupapa Māori, argued to be foremost in the three 
kete of knowledge (Patterson, 2014). Additionally, aroha is interdependent with other 
concepts that add meaning to the way aroha is to be understood as a concept and a practice. 
As both a noun and a verb, aroha is multifaceted (Tate, 2010). Consequently, there is no 
single English word that can encapsulate all the facets of aroha. Comprised of: aro – to direct, 
focus, presence24; oha – generosity; and ha – the divine breath or life force, (E Tū Whānau, 
2016). Aroha can translate directly as the focus and presence one generously extends to 
attend to the divine force within others. Yet the constituent parts which combine to create the 
word are not sufficient to explicate the concept in its entirety, there is an experiential and 
enacted aspect to aroha where understanding is deepened over time and practice (Patterson, 
2000, p. 112). Aroha is described as an “all-encompassing quality of goodness, expressed by 
love for the people, land, birds, and animals, fish, and all living things” (Barlow, 1991, p. 8). 
Further to the expression of love, the concept of aroha can contain the emotions of grief and 
pity (Metge, 2015; Patterson, 2000), and also the concepts of affection, compassion, sacrifice, 
and generosity (Tate, 2010, p. 137).  
To gain an understanding of aroha, this concept must be considered in relationship with 
tapu and mana. Tapu can be defined as a state of being which is derived from the supernatural 
realm (Metge, 2015, p. 284). Henare (2001) articulates tapu as a cosmic power imbued into 
all beings at the time of creation. Its connection to mana is understood as being (tapu) with 
                                                 
24 Aro is also defined as “mind, seat of one’s feelings, desire…to know or understand” (Best, 1954, p. 39).  
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potentiality for power (mana). Shirres (cited in Rameka, 2012) states “It is from the spiritual 
powers that we receive our worth as human beings, our intrinsic tapu, and it is from them we 
receive our power; our mana, to carry out our role as human beings” (p. 135). The mana is 
the potency that grows from the spark of tapu within; where tapu is the potential for power, 
mana is the enacted power (Rameka, 2012, p. 136). Another aspect of tapu, which emanates 
from this other-earthly spark, can be understood from the set of relationships which stem 
from the energy of tapu and the subsequent restrictions, privileges, and constraint due to the 
effects of contact (Durie, 1998). This aspect of tapu establishes and determines conduct with 
spaces, places and beings (Metge, 2015, p. 284) and should not be considered static, but 
rather a part of the dynamic flow of tapu which can be channelled, enhanced, or advanced 
(Durie, 2001, p. 80). Understood as ‘te tapu i/being-in-itself’ and ‘te tapu o/being-in 
relationships’, tapu is a multidimensional force present within individuals and within 
relationships (Tate, 2010, p. 44). Tapu needs to be treated with awe and respect for its 
origination from atua and divine beings and its relationship with mana. 
Although not the same, mana and tapu are interdependent as mana is derived from acts 
that sustain or enhance tapu (Tate, 2010, p. 84). The delicate relationship between tapu and 
mana is characterised within a ‘spiral of life ethics’ which seeks to ensure the balance is 
maintained through generative relationships between hearts, minds, being, and matter 
(Henare, 2001). Tapu rises in relation to mana, which is key to attaining the fullness of tapu 
(Mead, 2016, p. 50). Tate (2010) contends that the purpose of life (te wā) in Māori theology, 
is to possess the fullness of tapu (p. 252). The origins of this power is inherent within each 
individual through the prestige and power of the ancestors through the lines of whakapapa 
(Mead, 2016). Makereti (1998) explains that the tohi ceremony celebrating the birth of the 
child endowed the child with tapu and mana from the gods and beings of above and below 
(those who have moved onto another plane of existence). Indeed, time is part of the spiral of 
ethics but only insomuch as it is considered as reflective rather than projective, as for Māori 
the past and present are brought to the fore as cohabiters, whereas the future is unknowable 
and therefore envisaged of as ‘behind’ oneself (Rameka, 2016, p. 387). Whakapapa is a part 
of this time/space cosmology where the past is always embodied in the present through the 
connections of the individual to the spiritual plane (Rameka, 2016, p. 389). The development 
of tapu, which leads to a fuller life is a form of becoming-in-relationship with the spiritual, 
driven by the desire to remain under the influence and power of the gods (Barlow, 1991). 
This aspect of tapu – as a progression – is enhanced by due attention and diligence to the 
conditions whereby which one increases this tapu (Barlow, 1991).  
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Although tapu and mana are inseparable (Mead, 2016; Rameka, 2012) these concepts 
can only be understood with due consideration for the roles that aroha, pono and tika, 
(loosely translated as perception and right conduct respectively) play in their achievement 
(Tate, 2010, p. 246). Aroha, pono and tika govern three core relationships of existence – 
between atua, tangata and whenua (godly beings, people, and land/creatures) (Tate, 2010). 
Patterson (2010) also alludes to this interdependency, describing the world as tapu insomuch 
as objects of the world carry the mana of atua denoting within them an intrinsic value from 
this tapu, and designating care to be taken when engaged in relationships. Aroha is a divine 
power that emanates directly from atua and guides individuals’ conduct to respectfully 
respond to the divine spark within (Tate, 2010, pp. 49-50). Aroha is the highest response to te 
tapu i – the divine spark within – when enacted through relationships. Through relationships, 
aroha flows outward in ways that are productive, creative, empowering, and enhancing (Tate, 
2010). As a force that flows multi-directionally, there are outward/downward motions of the 
one giving and upward/inward motions of the one receiving, both aspects of which are 
contained within te tapu o  - being in relationships (Tate, 2010). These are also described as 
‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ flows, which allude to the metaphysical nature of aroha as an 
externally derived force.  
Mana is also defined as a metaphysical concept. Mana is an energy and a potent state of 
being, one which holds transformative potential when harnessed through everyday human 
activities of generosity (Pere, 1994; Webber, 2019). Aroha plays a prominent role within this 
flow of mana through the affirmation that can be felt when this mana is upheld by others, and 
inversely the whakamā (shame, shyness) and diminishment of mana when inappropriate 
behaviours are corrected. It was very important for the mana of the children and the wider 
whānau that children are encouraged to be strong in spirit and to assert themselves (Hemara, 
2000, p. 13), for if children are encouraged to feel safe in a stable and loving environment 
then they are assured to carry on and enhance the mana of their community (Hemara, 2000, p. 
47). Makereti (1998) also explains the interplay between aroha and mana, for in her time a 
child was “never ordered, but was always asked in a kindly way to help” (Makereti, 1998, p. 
26). Aroha is seen as a way through which children can be guided without physical 
reprimand, particularly as this results in their loss of mana, as articulated by Hohepa (1998) 
through a Kōhanga Reo song: 
Ko te mea nui ko te aroha 
Kaua e patu taku mokopuna 
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Me awhiawhi ko i taku mokopuna korikori e 
The greatest thing is love 
Don’t hit my grandchild 
You must embrace and care for my mischievous grandchild. (p. 63).  
Aroha given and received is required to be shared with the giver and extended to others. Pere 
(1994) explains that aroha, mana and utu (reciprocity) are integrally interlinked (Pere, 1994). 
Mana is a form of authority which demands a response (Leuluai, 2018). Utu is the response 
which seeks balance; anything given or taken – good or bad – will be reciprocated due to the 
necessity to maintain the balance. Individuals are often expected to offer or return generosity 
to others in order to maintain this reciprocity and, conversely, steps may be taken (overt or 
subtle) to redress mana imbalances due to inappropriate actions (Pere, 1994, p. 37-8). The 
focal point of utu is not to do worse to others than was done to oneself, but to ensure that the 
balance is maintained towards equivalence, and always with a view to the notion of ea - the 
successful closing of events due to the restoration of relationships and a successful 
achievement of revenge or attainment of peace (Mead, 2016).  
The mana of each individual in a community is bound together and mana is bound to 
community. Patterson (2014) writes, “The mana of an individual is their standing in 
community. Without community, there can be no mana – it cannot just arise; mana has to be 
mana ‘over’ or ‘among’” (pp. 78-79). Consequently, the concepts of mana, aroha and 
whanaungatanga (kinship, which may extend to those who are not blood related) are 
connected. Aroha is a foundational concept within whanaungatanga (Mead, 2016), an integral 
dimension of kinship ensuring the functionality within and between communities. Metge 
(2015) explains “respect and affection for older relatives was a strong sanction against 
seriously bad behaviour…whakamā was an effective sanction in its own right because it 
diminished a child’s self-image and mana” (p. 86). The feelings of whakamā were intensified 
due to aroha; admonishment delivered by one you loved brought heightened feelings of 
shame individually and collectively (to the family as a whole). Affirmation is similar 
insomuch as the aroha felt for the person giving the affirmation enhanced its prestige for the 
individual and the collective. 
Stemming from the root word ‘mana’, manaakitanga is frequently defined as generosity 
or hospitality (Metge, 2015). Webber (2019) extends this definition in response to the 
concepts which constitute manaakitanga. Comprising of mana, akiaki, and tanga, 
manaakitanga is the practice of honouring and uplifting the mana of others. Webber (2019) 
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writes “This is what manaakitanga means - to akiaki (cherish/nurture) the mana of others.” (p. 
130). This definition of manaakitanga motivates extensive consideration of what it means to 
be a generous host beyond mere formal hospitality; manaakitanga requires one not just to 
cater to others, but also to uplift their mana. Such an act of generosity not only positively 
affects the mana of the guests, but also the mana of the host. Inversely a miserly act produces 
negative effects and repercussions. This understanding of manaakitanga deepens the 
understanding of this concept to be not only inter-relational, but synergistic. Caring for others 
becomes connected to our own mana or conversely, a sense of whakamā due to the ways in 
which we avoid this duty. To act with generosity towards others and to attend to the divine 
power within them is an undertaking of aroha (Mead, 2016).  
Aroha generously focuses ones attention to attend to the divine spark within others – te 
tapu i – so that the mana of the person receiving aroha is upheld. Similarly manaakitanga is 
about careful attention to the needs of others. When mana is carefully enhanced through 
aroha, it is defined as soft mana as opposed to hard mana. Patterson (2000, 2014) delineates 
between these two aspects of mana: where hard mana is transferred (‘zero-sum’) when won 
through battle, soft mana can be remedial and additive when attained through compassion, 
kindness and love. Through the legend of Tāne-Mahuta who wrenched his parents Ranginui 
and Papa-tūānuku apart so that light may enter the world, Patterson (2014) articulates how 
Tāne-Mahuta gained mana by taking it from his parents through this act of strength, yet also 
enhanced their collective mana from acting with aroha after this severance by adorning his 
parents with clouds, comets and rainbows, and vegetation, trees and birds. The first is an 
acquisition of hard mana, the latter an enhancement of soft mana. Patterson (2014) argues 
that the ‘spectacular’ ways which are used to win hard mana (which is a transference of mana 
from one to another) are often easier to see than the softer, more subtle actions which build 
soft mana (which adds mana to all). Yet, the “fame of the provider of the food is more 
permanent than that of the warrior” (p. 76) meaning that the less extravagant daily acts of 
aroha are to be valued more than flashiness. Metge (2015) contemporises these aspects of 
mana by articulating how they are enacted in life: children may be reproached for 
wrongdoings through public chastisement and physical reprimands, with the resultant loss of 
mana, but mana would be restored through acts of aroha following the reprimand by the 
admonisher. In an interview with Māori elders, she quotes one as stating, “they would wipe 
away your tears with the same hand that chastised you and give you a hug. After a beating 
there was always aroha” (p. 88). Mana won through physical strength disturbs the balance, 
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invoking redress, but the enhancement of soft mana through aroha ensures the advantage of 
all and, and in the case of Metge’s (2015) example, the restoration of mana and relationships.  
Aroha is loving unconditionally and gratefully, and manaakitanga is about giving 
generously and graciously. In both of these concepts, consideration and carefulness are 
highlighted as a form of precision and conscientiousness (Tate, 2010). Both aroha and 
manaakitanga are about careful movements and actions, invoking a connection with āta. The 
concept of āta is woven through this conceptual node of aroha – through the notion of 
consideration and care that must be a part of engagement with others. Aroha is a process 
which is undertaken with a form of mindfulness for the object of aroha. As a take pū, or basic 
principle of Te Ao Māori, āta conveys the intention to move ‘with care’ or ‘with deliberation’ 
(Forsyth & Kung, 2007). Āta is described as a process with ‘renewing possibilities’ through a 
revisualisation of the position of oneself in relation to others and movements as a response to 
this reflection (Pohatu, 2005). Like aroha, āta is a theory-in-practice’; conceptual 
understanding of the meaning of āta can only be wrought through its enactment within life 
(Forsyth, 2006). Āta is described as essential to any conscientising process in which there are 
challenges to understanding the perspectives of another person. Within āta, there is an 
inherent necessity to move carefully and respectfully in order to preserve and enhance mana 
and avoid the repercussions of breaching tapu (Pohatu, 2005).  
As āta is described as a renewing force, aroha is also defined as a creative energy, 
working with the three essential elements – pū the positive force, kē the negative force and hā 
the life giving energy or force (Barlow, 1991). Barlow (1991) explains that the ways in which 
these concepts are bound together through aroha in this statement:  
Pū ana roto 
Kē ana waho 
Ka pū te rūhā 
Ka hao te rangatahi 
I runga i te mahi aroha 
The nucleus or positive force is at the centre 
The negative force is the outer shell 
The old elements are discarded 
And the new elements are created 
By the power of aroha (p. 8) 
147 
 
Aroha maintains the power of renewal, working through the positive force at the centre (te 
tapu i) to shed the negative forces which would contain and restrict individuals from 
becoming anew with aroha. Tate (2010) confirms aroha as a creative force, stating that while 
tapu manifests aroha, mana is the power to cultivate the creative and productive nature of 
aroha (p. 145). The interplay between mana and aroha – where mana induces the creativity of 
aroha – must be considered in relationship with the earlier assertions of the dependency of 
mana upon community. If mana is dependent upon community, then the creative potential of 
aroha is only possible within communion with others. In this way, aroha is reaffirmed as an 
enacted concept, one that must be understood in practice. Tate (2010) establishes aroha as a 
motive power, a celebratory and renewing power, and an expressive power (p. 139). Through 
the enactment of aroha with others, individuals are motivated to yearn for communion, their 
relationships are renewed and celebrated, and inner feelings are expressed in ways that alter 
individuals unequivocally for the better through enhancement, restoration and empowerment.  
Aroha also functions as a governing force for relationships and a principle for 
interactions (Tate, 2010). The three main relationships need to be considered within this 
communion: between atua, tangata and whenua. Attending to the tapu of all beings motivates 
the practice of aroha to be considered as a communion not only of mind and body, but also of 
spirit. The Māori concept of wairua (literally meaning two waters) is the culmination of the 
spiritual and the physical, and a recognition of the inseparability of the two within the Māori 
world cosmology (Rameka, 2016, p. 388). The expression of aroha is not restricted to the 
physical, as it contains a movement that “reaches inwards and outwards from the very core of 
one being to the very core of the other” (Tate, 2010, p. 139). Through aroha, our wairua is co-
joined with that of others and demands the necessity to respond respectfully. These physical 
and spiritual potentialities are joined at conception through the mauri – the life giving force 
bestowed by the gods and imbued in the body within the physical world (Barlow, 1991, p. 
83). The mauri is also a force within all objects, with the consequence that no object is ever 
truly inanimate; all objects contain this gods given vitality which is responsive and dynamic 
with other objects (Durie, 2001 p. x). But, unlike the divine spark of tapu, mauri is 
extinguished at the time of death. The mauri is critical to mana as mana flows through the 
mauri (Leuluai, 2018). Acts of aroha which enhance mana are connected to the mauri, 
affecting those we express aroha to and rippling outward through this dynamic tension. 
Through the mauri we are bound together physically and spiritually, and through aroha we 
have the ability to radiate the positive effects of aroha beyond those we immediately contact. 
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The interrelationship between mauri and aroha reveal the positive potential and creative 
power of aroha to renew and restore.  
In the case of children, mana is a strong part of the binding force linking the two 
parents, and their differing families and communities together. In this way, the child is an 
embodiment of the connections between these two communities and a reflection of the hopes 
and aspirations of the future of these two communities (Hemara, 2000). Through aroha, the 
mana of the child is to be protected as such. Children maintain and connect the lines of 
whakapapa, linking the ancestors to the present, and represent:  
…the personification of the worlds of yesterday he purapura i ruia mai i Rangiatea, e 
kore e ngaro. Precious seeds dispersed from Rangiatea (the famed homeland of the 
Māori gods) will never be lost. As precious seeds, the child was nurtured for survival 
and inculcated with an understanding of their own importance (Reedy, 2003, p. 55) 
The act of shared aroha for children is mana enhancing, encouraging the child to be strong in 
his or her sense of mana to build towards the ability to stand up and contest the loss of mana 
and seek utu to redress the balance (Rameka, 2012, p. 134). Such a view is endorsed within 
the Māori text section of the 1996 edition of Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of 
Education, 1996) where it states:  
Mā te whai mana o te mokopuna ka aea e ia te tū kaha i runga i tōna mana Māori 
motuhake me tōna tino Rangatiratanga 
Through the pursuit of mana the child will be able to stand strongly in her/his sense of 
Māori independence and self-determination. (Ritchie & Skerrett, 2014, p. 97) 
Mana is a part of a strong sense of self, a strong standing in the community and aroha is a 
part of this empowerment. Through aroha, individuals are “mutually enhanced, restored, and 
empowered” (Tate, 2010, p. 139).  
As articulated at the beginning of this section, the concept of aroha is deepened through 
experience and enactment of aroha (Patterson, 2000p. 112). The necessity to reciprocate 
aroha received is to be understood as something akin to an ‘obligation’. It is worth quoting 
Reedy (cited in Reedy, 2003) at length where she states: 
Aroha is an overworked and misunderstood concept…Misuse of this word is a result of 
our lack of responsibility to teach the rule of reciprocity on which aroha flourishes. 
Aroha is not something anyone can command from others because they imagine it’s 
their right. To accept and enjoy the loving, the sharing, the caring of aroha means you 
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give back a little more than you received. This keeps the networks alive and 
functioning. The acceptance of aroha in any shape or form places one unequivocally 
under obligation to that person, that family, that group. (p. 58) 
The choices one makes about what actions to take in life become a part of aroha. The 
necessity to respond to the aroha of others can direct individuals’ responses and actions 
shifting the direction of their life remarkably (Tate, 2010, p. 141). Yet aroha still hinges upon 
the freedom of the giver to resist the compulsion to express aroha and the freedom of the 
receiver to resist the call to accept it and reciprocate (Tate, 2010, p. 145). Here, pono and tika 
are behind the movements of aroha. Tate (2010) writes, “If our aroha is to be pono (to have 
any truth, honesty or integrity) there must be action behind our words” (p. 141) and if aroha 
is to be tika (correct action), then there are moral obligations to be upheld which relate to a 
deeper conceptual understanding. Developing with aroha and understanding the implications 
this has for subsequent actions within one’s life can greatly alter the direction of life, but 
aroha is the “act of love that adds quality and meaning to life” (Barlow, 1991, p. 8).  
 
Attention and Aroha 
At the outset it is important to articulate that there is a definitive epistemological difference 
between mātauranga Māori and traditional Eurocentric understandings of the world which is 
brought into focus by Mika's (2017) discussions of ‘worldedness’. Mika (2017) 
problematizes the notion of the self and other as things separate and absolute, arguing that an 
indigenous notion of ‘worldedness’ (in which all things are constituted with each other, and a 
single object collapses the ‘all’ into one) is incongruent with the image of the sovereign self. 
He argues that there are fundamental differences for the Māori student when the 
underpinning logic of the Platonic tradition of philosophy is foregrounded at the expense of a 
worlded metaphysic. Tate (2010) also states “Tangata is not merely an individual. Tangata is, 
by virtue of his or her relationships with Atua, with other tāngata and with whenua” (p. 47). 
As argued in other chapters, Murdoch also sought to resist the restrictive notions of self, 
individualism and the persistence of a non-metaphysical image of the world. Murdoch (1998) 
asserts, “The humble man25, because he sees himself as nothing, can see other things as they 
are” (p. 385). Perhaps there is a connection here between the humble man and the vision of 
kaupapa Māori insomuch as the aversion to the idea of a singular self allows for a more 
                                                 
25 See Note 2 
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accurate vision of everything else (with due hesitation about the idea that there is a separate 
and distinct ‘everything else’). Although grounded in differing understandings of the world, 
there are resonances between the two concepts that can enhance comprehension of each 
concept, introducing some cohesion through an exploration of their synergistic potential.  
As articulated earlier, aroha is comprised of: aro – to direct, focus, presence; oha – 
generosity; and ha – the divine breath or life force, (E Tū Whānau, 2016), literally meaning 
‘the focus and presence one generously extends to attend to the divine force within others’. 
Aroha is the highest response to te tapu i, the divine light in every being. Through this 
divinity, we are all interconnected. In paying respect to the tapu within another being, you 
honour the tapu within yourself and the relational tapu that binds everyone together. Through 
the response of aroha, we behave best with others and encourage the best in others as a 
necessary response. Attention is also defined as a generous form of focus which seeks to look 
for the best in others – to focus our attention upon them with a just and loving gaze. Attention 
is likened to prayer, which Murdoch (1998) describes as an “attention to God which is a form 
of love” (p. 344). Deriving the concept from Weil, Murdoch sought to investigate the 
question, ‘what is a non-religious form of attention like, and what could be the benefits of this 
attention?’ Rameka (2015) asserts that Western traditions frequently situate spirituality as a 
challenge to rational thought. Murdoch wrestled with this divide in her own philosophy and 
developed the concept of attention to maintain many foundational theological aspects by 
promoting the benefits of their preservation. Many of these aspects resonate with the concept 
of aroha (and supporting concepts) which are inseparable from a spiritual epistemology and 
ontology.  
Aro is also understood as “mind, seat of emotions, feelings, desire…to know or 
understand” (Best, 1954). In this definition of aro, towards the ha – the divine life breath or 
force – can be seen another way of understanding the synergy of attention and aroha. The 
practice of attention is based upon the moral imagination, the ways in which the moral 
imagination can enhance our moral actions in the world, and our understanding of moral 
concepts, as Murdoch states “where virtue is concerned we often apprehend more than we 
clearly understand and grow by looking” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 324). The interconnections 
between the conscious mind, the emotions, and the desire to know and understand are 
culminated within attention, which is also akin to the definition of aroha.  
Through the analogy of Plato’s cave, Murdoch defines her concept of goodness as 
something external. Goodness must be located outwards, for within ourselves there is only 
the small fire of the ego, which is hypnotic but can never be the true light of the sun. 
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Attention and love is directed away from the self in order to resist the narcissistic pull that 
would interfere in our progress towards a deeper understanding of goodness. We attend to the 
external in order to resist this call. Yet with aroha there is a differing relationship with the 
internal and the external. Tapu originates from atua (Tate, 2010), but is something external as 
well as internal. Tapu is within us, outside of us, and within relationships between atua, 
tangata and whenua. It is not wholly externalised nor internalised, it is omnipresent. The tapu 
within all beings is representative of a deeper holism, in which the individual is inextricable 
from the whole. However, some parallels can be drawn between externalised goodness and 
the description of tapu as ‘sacred’ and something set apart (Barlow, 1991). Here, tapu is still 
connected to us, as is goodness, through the relationships between atua, tangata and whenua, 
but there is still something beyond within the concept of tapu, which must not be considered 
completely within our grasp. Goodness is also beyond us, and akin to aroha being the highest 
response to te-tapu-i, love is the magnetic pull between us and goodness, drawing us ever 
closer through a lived practice.  
Aroha is an orientation to life which enhances quality and meaning (Barlow, 1991), yet 
it is not the only choice. There are alternate paths that move us away from aroha. Likewise, 
attention is a moral task set before us. With aroha, one may choose to resist this call and 
suffer the resultant detriments through loss of mana and the lack of fulfilment of tapu. 
Through inattention, the pilgrimage towards a fuller understanding of the good will be 
derailed. Integral to both of these processes is the assumed understanding that aroha and 
attention is indeed a practice: an inhabited philosophy that must be lived in order to develop 
conceptual understandings. Likewise, in both practices the love that is given to others is 
underpinned by humility and generosity. Although Murdoch would argue that love is not 
given in order to ensure its return, aroha is given with an expectation of reciprocity, with 
more given than received. It could be argued that Murdoch resisted the idea that love should 
be returned in order to withstand the pull of the ego to turn acts of love into something that 
would benefit oneself. The generous return of aroha can be considered in relation to the 
worlded view, with the understanding that the expectation of the return of aroha is not to the 
benefit of the individual but to the benefit of the connected whole (here the additive value of 
soft mana is invoked). Murdoch looks to reduce the individualistic push and the negative 
effects of the narcissistic ego, a process not at odds with aroha as an “all emcompassing 
quality of goodness, expressed by love” (Barlow, 1991, p. 8). Conversely, any thought of 
individualism or ego would be a movement away from kaupapa Māori in toto; a foreign 
ideology, an alien concept and one outside of philosophical consideration in the Māori world.  
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If aroha is a shedding of the ‘old’ for the new’ (Barlow, 1991), then the use of the 
moral imagination to re-envision what has been previously ‘seen’ could be drawn into 
conversation with this ‘shedding’ action. Murdoch describes the world as seen through a 
‘veil’, and the act of attention is the process in which love moves us to see reality more 
clearly; through the virtues, we seek to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and see the 
world as it really is (Murdoch, 1998, p. 376-7). Removing or piercing the veil through the 
‘just and loving gaze’ could be likened to the shedding motion insomuch as the shell of the 
ego, which is hardened around the individual, is pierced and falls away to reveal a new way 
of seeing. Attention and aroha are the key tasks in both of these processes. In this way, the 
progressive motions of the pilgrim are not so much about forward momentum but the 
shedding of old ideas like the skin on our bodies. Perhaps, (as with the notion of freedom in 
the concept of attention) like our own shedding of skin this process happens so incrementally 
that we do not notice. Indeed, we are hardening or shedding our skin continuously as we ‘rub 
up against’ other ‘objects’ and conceptual understandings of the world and choosing to 
develop the ego or attention and aroha. Through relationships with atua, tangata and whenua, 
we can choose to shed our ego, allowing new understandings and ideas to emerge, or develop 
callouses which close off the flow of energy and thickens the veil. This shell could inhibit 
future prospects of shedding; the more egotistical we are, the more likely our shell is calcified 
and unshifting. Attention and aroha enhance our sensitivity to the divine spark within others 
and our receptiveness to accept other ways of knowing and being.  
 
Conclusion 
Murdoch strongly argued against a philosophical view of humanity that wholly excluded the 
spiritual and privileged the empirical, quantifiable, and scientific as the sole ways of knowing 
and understanding the world. The connections of attention with aroha and kaupapa Māori 
enhance her definitions of the immeasurable. These epistemological understandings are 
critical within early childhood education in Aotearoa New Zealand in which Māori are 
tangata whenua, and educational approaches are developed from this grounding. The forms of 
measurement undertaken within the neoliberal approaches to early childhood education are 
viewed to be in opposition to a Māori epistemology, as articulated by Ritchie: 
“…the individualism of neoliberalism directly contravenes the collectivism of te ao 
Māori, as expressed through Māori values of whanaungatanga (relationships, 
connectedness), aroha (the reciprocal obligation to care, respect), utu (reciprocity), 
153 
 
manaakitanga (generosity), and kaitiakitanga (guardianship of the earth)” (Ritchie & 
Skerrett, 2014, p. 136).  
Murdoch argues that an image of the world as something able to be counted and controlled is 
an illusory product of the ego. The world cannot be calculated and measured for the messy 
and chaotic nature of existence resists such quantification; the interconnections between 
individuals or, as highlighted within this chapter, the holistic nature of existence, is beyond 
enumeration. Processes of education are equally unable to be ‘planned for’ in this controlled 
and orderly fashion as each connection between individuals is unique and a part of a greater 
whole. Each and every child is a part of this greater body of being, and the utmost response to 
it is one of attention and aroha26.   
 
  
                                                 
26 It is essential to assert the view that “there should be a recognition that non-Māori cannot speak for Māori” (Ritchie, 2003, p. 7). 
Due to the finality of the written word upon the page, the Māori knowledge I outline within this chapter does not have the 
opportunity of rebuttal. I maintain the desire to resist further colonising practices that could be invoked by claiming a position of 
‘knowledge’ in relation to these concepts. Therefore, here I express my humility and hopes that this undertaking is seen as an act of 




An ‘Inhabited’ Philosophy: Attention and Teaching  
 
Introduction 
The focus of this study is to resist the dominance of neoliberal strategies that foster limiting 
interpretations of education and to develop an argument for essential aspects of education 
that, if irretrievably lost through the prevalence of neoliberal ideas, would deform the act of 
education. Within Chapter Five, it was argued that the practice of Murdochian attention 
enables educators to enhance the moral imagination built through the ‘ordinary and everyday’ 
experiences of the attentive individual. In Chapter Six, aroha was introduced as a concept that 
holds synergistic possibilities with attention. Here, it will be argued that attention and aroha 
offer a way to reconsider thinking and being with others in education. Together, these 
concepts support a new consideration of the moral task of education and bring together the 
epistemological and the ontological aspects of human experience to reconceive pedagogy. 
Furthermore it will be argued that both attention and aroha are difficult to quantify, but these 
concepts are nonetheless worthy of extensive consideration and enactment; considering how 
teachers can be part of a ‘lived’ pedagogy is supported by attention as an ‘inhabited 
philosophy’ and aroha as a motive power to enhance the community. These concepts should 
be continually considered alongside the intentional, externally observable (and more 
‘measurable’) actions of the teacher.  
Over the course of this study the concept of attention has been drawn upon to question 
models of education that promote standardised practices and visions of children constituted 
from a limited conception of the human, formed from an overreliance on scientific methods 
and inappropriately applied to education. Attention is a means through which the lived 
experiences of those involved in the educational relationship can be enhanced, and the act of 
education deepened as a process which (re)defines our vision of the child and the world. 
Brought together with aroha, attention holds the potential to enrich the educational 
experiences of all people of Aotearoa New Zealand.  
In this chapter, the pivotal aspect of attention as a lived philosophy, one that maintains 
the necessity to value education as a practical and philosophical undertaking – progressive, 
developed and enhanced over time – will be brought to the fore. The first section will explore 
different aspects of attention, including the notion of askesis, the concept of reality in relation 
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to the moral imagination, and the Murdochian defence of the ‘real impenetrable person’. As 
these sections progress, the concept of aroha will be brought alongside attention to address 
and resist unnecessary processes of measurement and quantification made prominent within 
neoliberal ideas, and to emphasise the intuitive aspects of teaching that are part of the ‘lived 
experience’ of education.  
 
Askesis, the Lived Practices of Attention and Teaching 
The notion of askesis, derived from the Greek ἄσκησις meaning ‘exercise’ or ‘practice’ is 
differentiated by Antonaccio (2012) from the Christian notion of asceticism. She describes 
askesis as a philosophical form of thinking considered to benefit individuals by inculcating 
wisdom-enhancing habits of mind. Askesis is the enactment of a form of self-regulation 
through which we move progressively towards an ideal, maintaining the notion of philosophy 
as a ‘lived ethics’ or an “art of life” (Antonaccio, 2012, p. 128). Antonaccio (2012) argues 
that there is a contemporary philosophical turn towards askesis, driven by the concern to 
realign moral inquiry to the concerns of everyday moral lives and limit the domain of moral 
principles and rules that have marginalised the reality of the moral agent. Yet this turn is also 
constrained by the movement towards ‘antitheory’, a central element of which is the 
assumption that there is no external universal order beyond the agent. Antonaccio (2012) 
expresses apprehension that the essential quality of askesis – to attain the overarching rules 
beyond the particularity of the self – is lost in this modern translation, risking subjectivism 
(collapsing the good into the predilections of the self) and voluntarism (that the doctrine of 
the will is the fundamental element in the search for the good). She asserts the claim to 
reconceive askesis in light of Murdochian philosophy, as the notion of ‘practice’ and 
inhabited philosophy is central within Murdoch’s concept of attention; a ‘reflexive’ model of 
askesis which, based on Murdoch’s concept of attention, would strengthen complimentary 
aspects of antitheory whilst maintaining the benefits of a metaphysic of goodness. The 
Murdochian ‘reflexive’ model is favoured because it forefronts the notion of askesis within 
the notion of ‘personal resonance’. She writes:  
…instead of positing an ontological connection between ‘human reason’ and the 
rational order of the cosmos, the reflexive model posits a correlation between 
consciousness and the good which can be accessed only through consciousness itself. In 
other words, the good is not conceived as existing solely outside us in the order of the 
cosmos; rather, it is located in the very texture of consciousness. Moreover this 
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universal good resonates in the consciousness of individuals and thus is mediated 
through human particularity. (Antonaccio, 2012, p. 142)  
The model of reflexive askesis presented by Antonaccio (2012) resonates strongly with 
Murdoch’s claims that moral vision is necessary in order to motivate us to situate moral 
sources of energy outside of the self and appreciate external reality via the inner workings of 
the moral imagination. The moral imagination is the medium, the motivation is other beings 
(or art/literature/beauty) and the good is the transcendent perfection incrementally revealed 
through this reflexive practice. However, goodness is also resonate within us, for the process 
of askesis must draw upon the resources of our consciousness (imagination, vision, 
reflection) to perfect our orientation to the good. The inner is inextricable from the whole self 
(and also inextricable from the good) but attention to what is ‘outwards’ from ourselves is 
how we hone our sense of the good.  
In highlighting the tension between the inner and the good, Murdoch’s reflexive model 
recognises the threat of the ego to derail moral progress by resorting to narcissistic 
tendencies. Reflexivity with external objects, brought into focus by the task of attention, 
works to (re)align our moral compass. Browning (2018) highlights the reflexive nature of 
Murdoch’s philosophy, arguing that Murdoch resisted a priori forms of moral philosophical 
inquiry, preferring to sustain philosophy as a means of representing and navigating the real 
moral experiences of ‘everyday’ people. He writes that Murdoch supported and enhanced a 
form of metaphysics that “locates individuals on a general map of experience, which relates 
its messiness to a supervening goodness that can be accessed so as to guide a moral life” 
(Browning, 2018, pp. 174-5).  
In directing a just and loving gaze outwards from oneself, structures of value are built 
within us incrementally and almost imperceptibly (Murdoch, 1998, p. 329). Through this 
work of consciousness the individual is connected to the transcendent good not through a 
‘choice’ but rather an ‘obedience’. In order to strengthen the connection to the good without 
and within, one must undertake the task and practice of attention frequently and live out the 
‘just and loving gaze’ in everyday experience. The act of attention is specifically described as 
a process that is not limited to philosophers or spiritual leaders, it is something enacted by 
ordinary people in everyday lived experiences. The reflexive askesis, which is a part of the 
moral task of attention, ensures that we do not move too far beyond the reality of the world, 
but this is challenged by the pull of the ego. Attention is an ‘everyday’ moral task to 
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moderate the ego and enhance moral vision to more accurately perceive others in the world; 
to make progress in this moral task, one must practice.  
When viewed through the lens of askesis, there are many parallels between 
philosophical notions of the ‘lived ethics’ or ‘art of life’ and the role of the teacher within the 
educational relationship. Teaching is not a simplistic process but a negotiation between 
individuals to demand a deeper consideration of the ethical orientation of the teacher. 
Through the Murdochian concept of attention, the notion of askesis resituates the educational 
relationship and, more directly, the practice of teaching as something realigned to the 
concerns of everyday moral lives within the educational setting. These relationships are not 
easily measured in order to be reproduced, eliciting a limitation on the dominion of 
procedural standardisation. Furthermore, the turn to askesis as a means through which to limit 
the domain of moral principles can support the movement to promote educational practices 
that esteem the reality of the lived experience of education. Such a turn would equally resist 
the interpretation of teaching as a technical endeavour.  
As with the philosophical movement towards askesis, caution must be applied in order 
to avoid teaching falling into the traps of subjectivism and voluntarism. The reflexive nature 
of attention offers a way of ensuring that the good of teaching does not devolve into the 
predilections of the self, by the necessity to look, relook, and look again at the world beyond 
ourselves. Is what I am thinking about this child really true? Am I reconsidering this 
assumption in light of what the child is doing now? What do others think of the child? These 
are questions that can motivate this movement away from the self, and uphold the reality of 
the child. These questions are also built from the continual growth of moral vision, enhanced 
through the moral imagination. The work of the moral imagination is undertaken prior to, and 
in tandem with, action. Subsequently, moral concepts cannot be separated from the actions of 
the teacher.  
When askesis is understood through attention and alongside aroha, teaching cannot be 
considered a set of predetermined actions. The work of the moral imagination precedes such 
action, and continually informs action. Aroha guides us to live generously with others 
through validating our intense feeling for the other in the educational relationship. Aroha is 
the governing force for our relationships with others, between atua, tangata, and whenua. 
Aroha supports attention to reconsider the roles that spirituality, people and place hold within 
our lived experience of philosophy. The good of education is within the texture of our 
conscious enactment with education, and the feelings that we bring through aroha to 
education. Love, but also the nuances of love, grief, pity, compassion, sacrifice and 
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generosity (Tate, 2010, p. 137). When pedagogy is considered through attention and aroha, 
the teacher is open to a broader understanding of education as ‘obedience’ as well as 
generosity and sacrifice. Our developing understanding of goodness enhances our 
understanding of children, the domain of slight control we have in order to influence their 
learning and the responsibility that comes with it. The inner life of the teacher is a strength to 
preserve, not an action to control. The role of the teacher is to engage in the lived practice of 
philosophy through pedagogy.  
 
‘Reality’, the Moral Imagination, and the ‘Everyday Individual’ 
Murdoch proposes that our understanding of reality is enhanced through the practice of 
attention. It is not simply through being alive that one can access the reality of other beings 
within the world, but as a philosophical practice – as an ‘inhabited’ philosophy – attention 
enables us to incrementally reveal a deepening of moral concepts, enhancing our 
understanding of reality in the light of goodness. As has been articulated earlier, attention is a 
moral task that is concerned with removing the veil produced by the ego. The ego works to 
promote only selfish desires, obscuring reality in favour of a delusion fabricated to support 
the satisfaction of egocentric desires. Through paying attention to the ego, we are blinded 
from seeing the reality of the world and, more crucially, the world illuminated in the light of 
goodness. If we attend to the ego, we are obscured not only from deepening our 
understanding of reality, but limited from perceiving and developing an understanding of 
goodness.  
Murdoch identifies that reality is complex, and difficult to defend if any single notion is 
given to illuminate its entirety; reality is not a ‘given whole’ in the sense that misuses of 
empirical science would maintain. However there is an understanding of reality as perfectly 
familiar to ordinary people: that human beings are not simply a combination of rationality 
and will, but something more complex. There is a greater intricacy to the ‘moral self’ than the 
representation of the ‘thin as a needle’ agent that Murdoch seeks to refute. The combination 
of this complexity and unity makes it difficult to express ‘reasons’ for moral choices as they 
are built from moral concepts, visions, and some slight exercise of the will. Murdoch (1998) 
states, the moral individual is “a unified being who sees, and who desires in accordance with 
what he27 sees, and who has some continual slight control over the direction and focus of his 
vision” (p. 322). Despite the difficulties of expressing the inner workings of the medium of 
                                                 
27 See Note 2 
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consciousness, the moral vision is still significant. As Murdoch writes, “‘reality’ as that 
which is revealed to the patient eye of love is an idea entirely comprehensible to the ordinary 
person” (p. 332).  
As articulated earlier, morality is not the sole domain of philosophers, but something 
accessible to ‘everyday individuals’ and certainly within the domain of teachers. The 
example of M and D is identified as “something more ordinary and everyday” (p. 312). This 
is not to belittle this exemplar. Rather it is to illustrate Murdoch’s appreciation that everyday 
individuals, through their practice of attention and the moral imagination, can develop a clear 
vision of reality. The moral individuals who are negotiating the world are not bound to action 
through a shared rationality as the Kantian image would suggest, rather that they are drawn to 
the good through the practice of attention and the ‘patient eye of love’.  
Although reality is more than our attempts to border or describe it (Antonaccio, 2000), 
moral progress is open to every individual who attends to reality through love. Our 
understanding of how aroha enhances attention can support a deeper appreciation of reality. 
Our appreciation of reality is drawn from the common concepts that are individually rendered 
and honed through everyday experiences. Aroha is based upon an understanding of the 
connected whole, the woven universe (Marsden, 2003; Mika, 2017). Aroha is given and 
expected in return as a benefit to the collected whole. Tapu infuses every object, and the 
individual is not separate from this whole, but woven into it. An understanding of reality is 
based upon common concepts, consequently aroha can broaden the conceptual frameworks 
that traditionally support English version education documents. Although Te Whāriki (New 
Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017) supports mātauranga Māori, the synergy of aroha and 
attention can support a broader appreciation of how everyday experiences are a part of a 
philosophical understanding of reality. We view children through our understanding of how 
the world works, through our epistemological gaze. Honing our gaze by engaging with 
attention and aroha in our everyday experiences enhances our moral appreciation of 
pedagogy. This is a lived experience developed through everyday practice of the moral 
imagination. As earlier identified, Murdoch argues that everyday individuals may well have 
avoided the trappings of moral philosophical images of will, reason and exposition, stating 
“Perhaps the virtuous peasant has got out of the cave without even noticing the fire” (p. 383). 
Indeed, perhaps the beginning teacher may have a moral vision of pedagogy illuminated by 
the light of goodness. However, there is a necessity to remain sensitive to the ongoing 
pilgrimage. Reality is inexhaustible and, through multiple attentive relationships, the 
opportunities to enhance and develop a broader view of reality is afforded to the teacher and 
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the ‘virtuous peasant’ alike. There is a common appreciation of the everyday possibilities of 
attention insomuch as “M knows what she is doing when she tries to be just to D, and we 
know what she is doing too” (p. 332). Even though we are unable to understand the inner life 
of the teacher, through Murdoch’s philosophy we are not the ‘thin as a needle’ agent and can 
be appreciated as something more complex.  
 
The Notion of the ‘Real Impenetrable Person’ and the Incapacity of Language to 
Represent Moral Decisions 
As articulated at various points over this study, Murdoch (1998) was concerned with the 
retrieval of the ‘real impenetrable person’ (p. 294). This ‘impenetrability’ is described as a 
fundamental tenet of liberalism Murdoch seeks to defend, one that is done a disservice by the 
liberal notion of freedom (as argued within Chapter Three). Respect – for the contingencies 
of life and the particulars of human experiences – is necessary to this defence, but must be 
mediated by the concerns outlined above regarding the potential of the destructive voluntarist 
and subjectivist turns. We must respect the particular, but it must not occlude the universality 
of the good. Here is a point where aroha offers another way of considering universality, 
through the worlded connection we share with all life in the universe through te tapu i. 
However, the tensions that are revealed when reality is misconceived as a singular truth (as 
cautioned earlier in relation to empiricism) need to be explored. The ‘truth’ of reality is 
moderated by the respect for the contingent, underpinned by the significance of the ‘real 
impenetrable person’.  
In the reassessment of D, Murdoch (1998) characterises M’s revision as wholly unique 
to M, who asserts, “‘I can’t explain. You’d have to know her’” (p. 326). Two main 
supporting arguments will be developed to defend M’s statement. First, the notion of the ‘real 
impenetrable person’; second, the incapacity of language to fully explicate M’s assessment. 
The arguments for these two concerns hold the potential to defend education against limiting 
technical visions of the teachers and are discussed at length below.  
Firstly, M’s assessment is based upon her recalled experiences with D and her 
(re)consideration of D’s demeanour through a just and loving gaze. As explained within the 
previous section, this undertaking is within M’s consciousness and is not concerned with a 
change in the behaviour of either individual. Therefore, this undertaking cannot be viewed as 
a change in M’s externally observable actions. Murdoch writes, “M’s outward behaviour, 
beautiful from the start, in no way alters” (p. 313). The purpose of this is to defend the notion 
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of the inner life, for the predominant arguments Murdoch (1998) sought to refute represented 
the inner life as hazy and therefore “largely absent” (p. 311), meaning that only observable 
actions could be referred to as evidence of one’s morality. She likens this externally 
observable (and assessable) model of morality to the mechanisms of a machine, relentless and 
without the need of the agent until the moment of choosing, reducing individuality to the 
point of pure will. Murdoch seeks to resist an image of morality solely as movements or 
“salvation by works” (p. 311) and the determination that the ‘what’ of the moral decision is 
only discernible via external evaluations. In order to do this, she defends the ‘inner life’ of the 
human as something that does not necessarily need to be presentable nor explicable to others 
in order to exist28. Murdoch sought to rescue the notion that there is moral worth in this form 
of internal activity and, in doing so, reclaim the authority of the real impenetrable person 
beyond the assessments of external observers. Here there is a connection to aroha that can be 
explored further. Aroha is described by Johansen29 (cited in Benton et al., 2012) as a “pure 
feeling in the sense that it can be quivering in the mind…without giving birth to any will” (p. 
48). Aroha can then be appreciated as something that can be contained within the self, 
without being only measured by action in the world. Where attention supports an idea of 
conscious reflection within the mind, Johansen’s description of ‘quivering’ in the mind could 
be enhanced further to include an appreciation of the sensory aspect of aroha, as an embodied 
feeling of “overwhelming passion” (Benton et al., 2012, p. 48). As Murdoch (1998) stated 
“where virtue is concerned we often apprehend more that we clearly understand and grow by 
looking” (p. 324). The interconnections between the conscious mind and the emotions 
through desire to know are culminated in attention and aroha; alongside each other, these 
concepts enhance another understanding of the nuances of pedagogy.  
Furthermore, and essential to the argument being built within this study, M’s 
assessment of D would not have occurred without this notion of inner privacy. Murdoch 
(1998) contends, “M could not do this thing in conversation with another person” (p. 317, 
original emphasis). The task of attention is not only dependent upon M’s inner workings of 
the mind, but her wholly impenetrable self. Where rational assessment would seek M to 
present a defence based upon impersonal reason, Murdoch argues for the individual 
                                                 
28 Although it is also important to note that Murdoch also defended the necessity for moral actions within life and not simply the 
predominance of moral thought. Yet, the purpose of the defence of the inner life is to demonstrate the dependence of actions upon 
the inner workings of our mind including our moral vision and that these aspects of existence are necessarily and inextricability 
interrelated 
29 While there is the necessity to remain sensitive to this statement as written by a Danish scholar, its containment within the book Te 
Mātāpunenga: A Compendium of References to the Concepts and Institutions of Maori Customary Law (Benton et al., 2012) offers some credence. 
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consciousness underpinned by personal and private concepts (Antonaccio, 2000, p. 98-9). 
When M asserts, “‘I can’t explain. You’d have to know her’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 326), M’s 
inability to explain her assessment is something Murdoch hastens to defend, not as irrational, 
but as a demonstration of the ways in which human beings are necessarily obscure to each 
other. M’s development of moral assessment in relation to D, through the moral task of 
attention, is entirely and utterly unique to M and undertaken from the singular positon M has 
built through her life experiences and relationship with D. The act of reassessing and 
redefining her position in relation to D is wholly a function of an individual history 
(Murdoch, 1998, p. 320). Language could not fully explicate the movements that have taken 
her to ultimately land on the conclusion that D is not ‘undignified but refreshingly simple’ 
(etc.), and therefore this position would not be defendable through the forms of rational or 
linguistic analysis Murdoch seeks to refute. Language cannot convey the sense of quivering 
of aroha that would guide the moral imagination. M would be demanded to make a true and 
accurate – and rational – defence for the change in her position through the use of language, 
in reference to empirical evidence, and justifiable by external observers. Yet as Murdoch 
argues, such a view of ‘objective reality’ requires modification if it is to be considered 
according to the impenetrable, historical and progressive individual. To demand M to accede 
to the notion of ‘objectivity’ impedes M’s claim that she is unable to fully explain the 
motivation for this decision, not solely because she is incapable of using language to defend 
it, but because language itself is unsuitable to wholly represent what M experienced to make 
this shift.  
As articulated earlier in this study, Attention cannot be understood or undertaken 
without the notion of surrender (as discussed in Chapter Two) and likewise, aroha contains an 
aspect of sacrifice. However, it is important to understand what is to be surrendered. In 
Chapter One, some differences between Murdochian attention and Weilian attention were 
described.  In Weilian attention, there is a more comprehensive relinquishment of the ‘self’ to 
the focus of attention, but in Murdochian attention, the individual self is defended and 
history, moral concepts, and progress are not only defended but also considered necessary to 
reveal reality. Reality is a complex notion, which cannot be defined simply when in relation 
to human experience and existence. Apprehension of reality is considered as an ideal end 
point, and similarly individuals are conceived as progressively developing towards an ideal. 
Our end goal is the fullness of te tapu i, the fullness of tapu within, without and between us 
and others. Our apprehension of goodness is also eternally developing and the interplay 
between reality, goodness, and the progressive individual intertwine to illustrate a complex 
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and inextricable matrix of moral value. We move towards understanding goodness not 
because it is dependent upon our predilections, will or choices, but because of the “difficulty 
of the task of apprehending a magnetic but inexhaustible reality” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 333), 
and insomuch as reality is inexhaustible, goodness is a part of this reality and therefore a part 
of this elusiveness. Humans, as a part of this reality must also be considered according to this 
metaphysical image. Furthermore, we can only appreciate others as real impenetrable people. 
That a person is impenetrable is indivisible from the ‘real-ness’ of that person and, more 
generally, to a wider understanding and appreciation of a ‘reality’ outside of oneself. It is 
important to note that it is easy for the notion of reality to become confused with the 
scientific notion – as ‘photographic’. Murdoch argues that scientific language seeks to be 
impersonal and exact, to represent the ‘truth’ of the situation, but moral language is infinitely 
complex, “often unavoidably idiosyncratic and inaccessible” (p. 326). Scientific language 
cannot contain an understanding of aroha as a response to te tapu i. Reason is based upon the 
language of the scientific: rational, detached from emotion, and universally accessible, but 
morality precedes our scientific consideration of the world. Any claims to an ‘objective 
reality’ of humanity must move cautiously to comprehend the inability of language to 
represent the universality of the good (as argued above) and appreciate sensory aspects as a 
part of human experience. A more accurate appreciation of reality is developed through 
loving attention and aroha, which imbues reality with the sensory aspects necessary to 
perceive it. An image of reality that disregards the emotive and the sensory domains is not an 
image of reality at all.  
Here, Murdoch (1998) asserts that it is of no use to defend an ‘inner reality’ in the same 
way that reality has been crudely represented through empirical sciences: as something 
externally representable, objective, and open to all viewers. Instead, the inner life should be 
characterised as inherently and necessarily personalised and contingent. Our appreciation of 
reality outside ourselves builds from this notion of a particular and singular consciousness. 
However Murdoch cautions, it is important to note that this claim to authority must be 
mediated by a necessary humility, which moves against the assertion of infallible inner 
knowledge. Individuals can be mistaken in determining their thoughts and emotions (as is the 
initial case with M) and furthermore be unclear about the contents of their thoughts (p. 316). 
Yet, Murdoch maintains the advantage of the inner life lies in how individuals can be 
encouraged to account for their state of mind and the qualities of their thoughts (Antonaccio, 
2007, p. 18). The moral task of attention enables the individual to refine conscious clarity, 
which through ongoing practice, becomes increasingly apparent to the individual. It is 
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important to reiterate that this inner clarity is still hazy to external evaluation, because it is 
incrementally developed over time and contingent upon individual human experience. This 
inner reflection cannot be represented externally because it is a part of the slow incremental 
processes of attention that builds the moral vision of the individual, which are difficult to 
articulate. Despite the inability to externally represent this inner life, the incapacity to 
produce a ‘report’ of such moral work does not mean that the attentive moral individual has 
remained inactive. As Murdoch (1998) asserts, “‘not a report’ need not entail ‘not an 
activity’” (p. 318). There is value in this inner work beyond the values of what can be 
externally evaluated and measured (this will be expanded upon later in the chapter).  
The responsivity of the attentive teacher to the child will appear at times immediate and 
almost instinctive. Due to the small and incremental processes that have formed the wholly 
individual consciousness of the teacher, coupled with the specific moral language of this 
teacher, these actions cannot be fully explicated others. Nor will these processes be fully 
comprehended by others. Objective externalised assessment of teachers’ actions comes into 
question here, due to the slippages in conceptual understandings between individuals. When 
it is assumed that teaching is a set of actions without this inner life, which is replicable by any 
individual who can perform these actions, the ‘background’ to the moral act of teaching can 
be lost. Eradicating the inner life through an externalised ‘behaviouristic’ description, lessens 
the appreciation (and arguably the value) of the work of the attentive teacher.  
The defence of the inner life is expanded through Murdoch’s argument that moral 
language is conceptual, personalised, and specialised over time. The moral individual makes 
use of conceptual language in making moral decisions and this conceptual language is 
necessary to all inner thought and development of moral ideas and potential moral actions. 
This is the second aspect of the dovetailing argument outlined above. As articulated 
previously, language is not only defined within the common world, but is taken within and 
made personal according to how it is related and (re)defined through personal experience and 
reflection upon these experiences; through the medium of consciousness, language is 
individually refined. Murdoch (1992) asserts:  
…language depends upon areas of ‘agreement’, but is also continuously lived by 
persons. Fine shades of behaviour, imponderable evidence, looks, glances, gestures, 
tones, whistling. Such modes of human communication are everywhere fundamental, 
defeating general ‘exactness’, but performing precise jobs in individual contexts. 
Thinking, communicating, must admit the individual, the moral, the aesthetic. (p. 281) 
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In holding to this argument, the reason that M cannot fully explain her opinion of D is not 
only due to the small and incremental processes that have formed her wholly individual 
consciousness but also because the moral language M needs to explain this understanding is 
not fully comprehensible to others. ‘Objective’ observers will hold their own personalised 
and individual notions of the terms M will use, they will not be privy to the definitions unique 
to M. Furthermore, these ‘objective’ observers would not necessarily be a part of the 
relationship between M and D and therefore would not hold the contextual knowledge 
appropriate M’s experience. Although M may do her utmost to explain herself to others, there 
will always be slippages. These slippages produce tensions between the idea that the truth of 
the human can be captured through empirical means and the image of the real, impenetrable 
person. Murdoch, (1998) illustrates this through M’s statement “’I can’t explain, you’d have 
to know her’” (p. 326). Furthermore, understanding of M’s assessment is contingent upon not 
only knowing D, but knowing M as well. M’s reassessment of D is built from her specific life 
experiences and her individual inner reflections upon these experiences over the course of her 
life (as explained in Chapter Four). Murdoch (1992) writes “we know very little even about 
the people who are closest to us. We depend upon intuition and rightly accept many things as 
mysteries” (p. 282). Within education, teachers make decisions within moments of teaching 
that respond immediately to the movements of the child; in the case of the attentive teacher, 
these responses are built from a just and loving gaze. There is an inner life to teaching beyond 
the expression of words. The reflective and experiential background of the teacher, which 
works to inform moral decisions and actions, must be dually considered for its influence upon 
the individual and its inability to be transferred fully to others. Even if this experiential 
background was able to be translated, M’s emotive and sensory experiences saturate 
cognition and cannot be replicated; if these experiences were laid out like a film, they would 
be incomprehensible without the sensory experiences that comprise conscious lived 
experience. As articulated earlier, the quivering of aroha within the mind cannot be 
explicated either. As is the case with M, attentive teachers who draw from aroha might not 
fully explain their motivations for decisions or subsequent actions within teaching, but “‘not a 
report’ need not entail ‘not an activity’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 318). There is value in this inner 
work beyond that can be externally evaluated and measured. 
As Murdoch articulates within the example, M’s behaviours are entirely separate from 
this inner life: before and after M undertakes the task of attention, M behaves beautifully with 
D. The behaviours of individuals within the world are not fully representative of their inner 
‘private thought-being’, an inner state beheld by every individual through the sense of 
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separation which Murdoch (1992) claims is one of our deepest experiences. Although actions 
are contemplated within this ‘private thought-being’ they may never be brought to fruition. 
Viewing M from a linguistic-descriptive perspective, or from an observational perspective, 
eradicates the inner life that is essential to every individual. Furthermore, in reducing M to 
what can be seen and described we limit her whole experience to a set of behaviours, 
producing a behaviouristic picture. This form of behaviourism denies the holism of M, and 
diminishes the awareness of the inner life necessary to our moral development. More 
worryingly, the behaviouristic view reduces our perception and awareness of the moral 
necessity to regard others as ‘impenetrable’. In recognising that we are continually 
confronted by something other than ourselves, and that this other is obscure to us, we can be 
morally moved to a position of humility, and observe this individual with respect through a 
just and loving gaze. Assuming that individuals can be understood through clear, precise 
language and observation is to invoke an arrogance of ‘knowledge’ about inner motivation, 
and a compartmentalisation of their being. This is a part of the ‘too grand’ image of 
ourselves, which Murdoch (1998) accuses us of holding, bolstered by a misguided faith in 
empirical science to produce a ‘truth’ about the world (p. 338); human reality is more 
complex that can be observed and described. 
 
The ‘Ordinary and Everyday’ Task of Attention and the Value of the Inner Life 
Although the explanations one may give for moral decisions may be difficult or even 
impossible to fully explicate, the deliberation of consciousness is described by Murdoch 
(1998) as “exceedingly familiar” (p. 317). Communication about the workings of the inner 
life may break down, but the activity itself is a part of a “perfectly familiar kind of moral 
discipline” (p. 330). Of the great merits of Murdoch’s philosophy, the accessibility of 
sustained moral reflection to anyone and the notion that philosophy is able to be ‘lived’, are 
considered to be foremost (Antonaccio, 2012, p. 3). According to Murdoch (1992), moral 
philosophy should be ‘inhabited’ and critical moral reflection is accessible to all due to the 
pervasiveness of morality and the ways in which human consciousness is tied to evaluation. 
Value is seen everywhere, unavoidable, and inevitable within human existence. The nature of 
this ubiquity demonstrates the unbounded nature of morality within humanity (Brugmans, 
2001, p. 48). Morality is not the exclusive property of philosophers, but accessible and 
enacted by everyday people.  
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Goodness is apprehended through the moral task of attention when due recognition is 
paid to the combination of intuited unity and complexity/detail (Murdoch, 1998, p. 379). 
There is a ‘double revelation’ explored by Murdoch in which attention to detail in the world 
reveals a greater unity of excellence. Although unity is beyond us and the whole can only be 
seen from the top, we can only achieve a sense of this unity through a keen appreciation of 
the diversity, difference and detail within the world. This sensitivity to the detail alone cannot 
be relied upon to set us in the right direction towards a greater understanding of the whole, 
we must rely upon intuition to aid our further progress. Such intuition can be attained by the 
ordinary person, and can be a part of our everyday discernment when it is informed by paying 
attention outside of ourselves towards an external reality through a just and loving gaze (p. 
383). This form of attention is not concerned with the planning of specific moral actions, but 
rather about looking outside of the self towards an externalised perfection. Attention is kept 
in alignment through the magnetic pull of love towards goodness, as Murdoch (1992) states 
“I intuitively know and grasp more than I can yet explain” (p. 393). Widdows (2005) expands 
upon Murdoch’s arguments for the ordinary and everyday nature of intuition, describing the 
intuitive (and equally transcendental) expansion of moral knowledge as “a familiar method 
by which we comprehend the world” (p. 94). Moral progress enhances the concepts of the 
‘ordinary’ person, not to indicate a conclusion but to offer the possibilities of transformation. 
Yet, to transform we need to move beyond the rational consideration of knowledge and listen 
to the intuitive part of our consciousness, bringing us closer to the good.  
The ordinary and everyday nature of attention supports the view that philosophy should 
be ‘inhabited’. Philosophical ideas are not to be considered separate from life but an integral 
aspect of existence and a deeper appreciation of philosophical concepts is wrought through 
their enactment within life. Attention is a moral task set before us, but it is also a practice. To 
develop moral vision, attention needs to be practiced. This may or may not occasion 
subsequent actions; M’s behaviour to D remained the same throughout. However, actions are 
not the sum totality of morality (Murdoch, 1998, p. 357), there is value to the ‘inner life’ not 
only with externally assessable ‘action’, but also inner contemplation. The fundamental 
nature of the inner life to existence and the invaluable role of consciousness “may be elusive 
or hard to describe but it is not unimportant” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 265). The work of M is a 
form of activity unlike externally observable activity. According to the stance that morally 
appropriate action can be viewed externally and assessed by others, this form of activity 
would be disregarded unless it became ‘action’. Yet Murdoch seeks to reclaim ‘inner’ activity 
as something of value irrespective of the ability for external observers to comprehend it. It is 
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an experience that is active, not observable and nonetheless valuable. It is “the function of the 
progressive attempt to see a particular object clearly” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 317), but does not 
need to be viewed by others as ‘active’ in order to be considered worthwhile. Such 
conceptions of ‘activity’ are maintained within the arguments Murdoch seeks to refute and 
cannot be patched or reworked into a philosophical grounding that ‘works’. Lesser 
philosophical ideas “cannot by tinkering be made, the philosophy we need” (p.337). Instead, 
it is a different form of ‘activity’ that needs to be expanded upon, as a “patient and just 
discernment and exploration of what really confronts one, which is the result not simply of 
opening one’s eyes, but of a certainly perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline” (p. 330).  
 
Defending the Ordinary, Everyday, and Intuitive Nature of Education 
In this study so far, the educational relationship has been conceived as a series of movements 
between two (or multiple) beings with a history lived experiences. The educator draws upon 
the moral imagination within this experience, a way of thinking and being that affects how 
they engage in the moral task of education. The moral imagination is difficult to quantify, but 
it is essential to the way in which the educational relationship is experienced and the way in 
which it progresses over time. Within this chapter, some points have been argued for. First, 
the turn to askesis, which seeks to redeem the applicability of moral inquiry to everyday 
lives, is enhanced by Murdoch’s reflexivity. The moral imagination focuses upon the outer 
world, building structures of value around us incrementally, but only when the initial notion 
of askesis as a practice is maintained. With the concept of aroha, the ongoing practice of 
attention is reinforced as a lived experience of philosophy, one that considers tangata 
(people), whenua (place) and atua (spirituality) as essential parts of the lived experience. 
Second, the work of attention undertakn by the ‘real impenetrable person’ must be defended. 
The notion of impenetrability is a valued part of the individual that leads them to a moral 
vision, formed as a part of a just and loving gaze. Some considerations need to be made 
regarding the worldedness of people – the separate and absolute nature of the individual – 
that is not a part of mātauranga Māori. Third, that linguistic analysis is insufficient to defend 
the position of the attentive individual, as moral concepts are taken internally and move 
beyond ‘common’ understanding. Morality is “not the words, but the words occurring in a 
certain way with… a certain force and colour” (p. 34). Attention and aroha hold a substance, 
a ‘quivering’, a ‘force and colour’ that is beyond linguistic expression; something felt and 
experienced. Furthermore, the attentive individual’s position is based upon an intuition of 
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goodness as a part of a ‘double revelation’, in which the unifying and particular nature of 
goodness is revealed. Fourth, reality is progressively revealed through attention and are akin 
and bound to love and goodness when considered in light of the idea of perfection. The light 
of te tapu i is attended to when one attends with aroha, but the progression of knowledge is a 
shedding of old ideas to reveal the new (Barlow, 1991). Finally, that all perception is ‘soaked 
in the sensible’, resisting the idea that reality is only comprehensible through the empirical 
sciences, or rational thought, but accessible to the ordinary individual through the everyday 
practice of attention. Again, the ‘quivering’ of aroha is brought to the fore. At this point, it is 
necessary to bring these points into further conversation with the notion of teaching within 
neoliberal models of early childhood education in order to illuminate some limitations and 
alternate possibilities.  
The notion of an ‘inhabited’ philosophy and the idea of the ‘real impenetrable person’ 
are the concepts this chapter seeks to defend for varying reasons and from varying positions. 
The impenetrability of the teacher must be defended against evaluative techniques of 
governance that would limit understandings of the act of education. It is critical to defend the 
impenetrability of the child in order to defend his or her right to be depicted as more than a 
quantifiable object, knowable through empirical science. Furthermore it is crucial to defend 
the relationship between the teacher and child as a part of a moral vision of education that 
resists technical approaches to education. These points have been touched upon over the 
course of the chapter. At this point, the purposes for such a defence will be explicated in 
more depth to describe the benefits of Murdoch’s philosophical vision for human engagement 
through the practice of attention, and the synergistic value of aroha with attention.   
As Murdoch (1992) writes, “we know very little even about the people who are closest 
to us. We depend upon intuition and rightly accept many things as mysteries” (p. 282). This 
is true of the act of education as much as other aspects of human existence. The intuitive 
moments within teaching that inform practice are built from the relationship the teacher 
builds with the child and the historical knowledge the teacher brings to pedagogy. As 
explained by Murdoch, although moral actions are important within life, they cannot be the 
sole concern; the focus of the act of attention is to reflexively meditate upon our ‘knowledge’ 
with an appreciation of an externalised perfection. Likewise, teaching cannot consist solely of 
the planning of actions, but must be responsive to the growing knowledge of the child, 
pedagogy, and the moral concepts that underpin education. Space must be made for 
responding to the tapu within the child as a basis for educational choices, which may or may 
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not be explicable to others. Although there is a place for ‘intentional’ teaching, it must not 
overtake the role that ‘intuitive’ teaching can play within education.  
It is important to assert that this is not a claim to omniscient knowledge of the child. 
Murdoch was careful to assert that humans are wholly unknowable to each other. Yet neither 
is the role of the ‘intuitive’ to be dismissed simply because it is unable to be fully explicated. 
The intuition built from attention should not be considered ‘immeasurable’ and therefore 
worthless. Through a just and loving gaze, a moral vision of pedagogy is progressively 
developing in the light of the good, and there is value in this progress. Pedagogical practice is 
then built from a more realistic image of the child; one that resists movements to standardise 
teaching approaches or ‘quantify’ children’s experiences in order to make a claim to 
knowledge of the child. Attention motivates teachers to see their progressive movements as 
an endless task which resists quantifiable finality and is necessarily fallible, but not unworthy 
for it. 
As articulated above, Murdoch appreciated that individuals are wholly obscure to each 
other and, insomuch as children can express themselves outwardly, children are still wholly 
obscure to the teacher. However, Murdoch is also careful to situate this obscurity not as a 
‘problem’ to be solved, but demands individuals to respond to the moral task of attention, and 
approach each other with a necessary humility. Responding with aroha to the tapu within 
another being pays respect to the tapu within ourselves, which is beyond conscious 
comprehension but is nonetheless extant. Through tapu we are interconnected, but no matter 
how well we know other individuals, we can never fully know the contents of their inner 
thoughts. This is not a flaw but an opportunity. Through attention and aroha we can open 
ourselves towards another person, to see them justly and lovingly, to develop a connection 
with aro as the seat of our emotions and to enhance our own personal moral vision. There are 
possibilities for education within Murdoch’s presentation of the moral life. If obscurity is not 
a ‘problem’ to be solved, but an opportunity for developing moral vision, then it is an 
opening to reconsider the purpose of education beyond economic rationality promoted 
through neoliberal modes of governance. As articulated within other chapters, the fact/value 
divide promotes a scientistic vision of appropriate ‘knowledge’, relegating the moral, 
metaphysical, and sometimes the ethical to the periphery. When the lived experience of 
teaching is viewed as a possibility to enhance the moral concepts of pedagogy and the overall 
moral vision of education, what is of ‘value’ within education can be shifted to acknowledge 
aspects which may have otherwise been deemed immeasurable and therefore useless. The 
notion of the child as a real impenetrable person creates the space to resist modes of 
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education which consider children akin to vessels waiting to be filled similar to the notion of 
banking education denigrated by Freire (1970), or the industrial model of education criticised 
by Robinson and Aronica (2015). When education is guided by a just and loving gaze, there 
is substantive philosophical support for those who seek to resist a vision of education as 
determining boundaries, regulation of management, and the assessment of predetermined 
learning outcomes. Instead, the ‘ordinary and everyday’ moments between the teacher and 
the child can be brought to the fore. There is value within the intangible, sensory, and 
transcendental aspects of human experience, which are difficult to quantify, but invaluable 
within the educational encounter.  
But there is more than this at play. The teacher and the child will develop and share a 
lived historical experience. Within the responsibilities of the early childhood teacher, as 
determined by Te Whāriki (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2017) there is a necessity to 
develop a clearer understanding of the child by gaining knowledge of the contextual setting – 
the home and life outside the centre. There is also an experienced life within the centre, one 
that is incrementally built from the teacher and child’s interactions with each other. M is 
unable to explain her assessment of D. This is something Murdoch (1998) critically defends, 
as earlier explicated M asserts “‘I can’t explain. You’d have to know her’” (p. 326). This is 
due to the ways in which humans are necessarily obscure to each other and the inability of 
language to fully communicate the motivations for a moral position without a deeper 
understanding of the contextual basis for the decision. Murdoch argues that the work of 
attention imperceptibly builds up structures of value around us and, through a just and loving 
gaze, an understanding of ‘choices’ is different to that which views moral decisions as a 
function of the will. It is through this loving, patient regard that much of the ‘decisions’ of 
education can be made, but they must stem from an appreciation that in many cases the 
‘decisions’ of education are already made through attentive relationships. Murdoch argues 
that through the imperceptible structures of value and the compulsions which are generated 
through attentive relationships, much of our moral ‘decisions’ lie elsewhere (p. 331). Aroha is 
also appreciated as something that can be contained within the self, but is not necessarily 
directly connected to will and outward expression. For the teacher, decisions can be made 
through the an appreciation that much of the pedagogical direction will be generated from the 
child; much of the ‘decision making’ lies beyond the control of the teacher, and this is not 
only an acceptable experience, but welcomed and desired. As Murdoch (1998) says, “If I 
attend properly, I will have no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at” (p. 
331). Pre-determined teaching ‘choices’ are less important and less obviously something to 
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be ‘cultivated’ when there is an ‘obedience’ to the child; an attention to the tapu of the child, 
a just and loving approach that is not rendered from a fantastical idealisation, nor an 
egotistical desire for control, but a patient and just regard for what really confronts one. 
Standardised processes can be likened to the ego – they seek to control, contain, and akin to 
the moral movement refuted by Murdoch, they are like a ‘grandiose leaping about’. There is 
no room for the intuitive within standardised practice. Murdoch advocates for including the 
intuitive; education is built through the small and incremental moments that build 
relationships. When they are built from the moral task of attention, small and incremental 
moments hone moral vision and moral development. These small and incremental moments 
build a deeper appreciation of the intuitive nature of teaching which is necessary to the life of 
the attentive teacher.  
Attention holds the potential to reconsider the value of the teacher within pedagogical 
practice. Neoliberal measurement aimed at the child can be equally aimed at the teacher, 
impacting upon an understanding of teaching. Roberts and Saeverot (2018) articulate, “It is 
the logic of performativity, the drive to assess and measure everything, that is the problem” 
(p. 40). Murdoch argues that viewing individuals from a linguistic-descriptive perspective, or 
from an observational perspective, eradicates the inner life. Reducing pedagogy to what can 
be seen and described limits the ‘lived’ aspect of teaching and advances a 
behaviouristic/technical picture of education; the aro of aroha is diminished and relegated to 
the background. The limitations of this picture invoke a reduction of whole individuals to 
observable ‘parts’ and may elicit the view that an inner life is unnecessary to teaching. An 
unintended extension of this behaviouristic view is the claim to ‘knowledge’ of the teacher 
through observed behaviours. Murdoch counters this claim, arguing that the assumption that 
individuals can be understood through clear, precise language and observation is to invoke an 
arrogance and compartmentalisation of others’ being. This is a part of the ‘too grand’ image 
of ourselves that Murdoch (1998) accuses us of holding through a misguided faith that 
empirical science produces ‘truths’ about the world. The inner life of teaching is more 
complex than can be observed and described.  
The crucial movements of the inner life are lost when teaching is understood as a set of 
behaviours or written words. As argued above, M cannot fully explain her change in opinion 
for D because the moral language M needs to explain this change cannot be fully 
apprehended by others. Although she may be able to use the common language, her 
interpretation of moral concepts are contextually grounded and unique to M. When the 
teacher is involved in explicating his or her motivations for decisions undertaken in the early 
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childhood context, these suffer similar issues of obscurity to external observers. The 
slippages between ‘what happened’ and ‘what is explained’ will be vast, and innumerable. 
These slippages reveal the inability to capture the ‘truth’ of the teacher through an 
observational or linguistic form of analysis (quantitative analysis even less so). The stance I 
am arguing for is not seeking to disregard the value of reflective explanation, for there are 
benefits in reflecting upon one’s decisions as the case of M and D illustrates. Rather, it is to 
challenge instances where reflections are conducted for external evaluation rather than inner 
moral progress. Linguistic explanations (verbal or written) are not the sum totality of the 
educational experience and cannot be the primary means of evaluating the effectiveness of 
teaching. The performative nature of such an undertaking will limit opportunities for an 
enhancement of moral vision and the appreciation of pedagogy as a philosophical 
investigation which is lived. 
 
Conclusion 
Teaching can be understood as a moral task guided by aroha and the just and loving gaze. 
The reflexive nature of Murdoch’s concept of attention aids the teacher to develop a clearer 
understanding of the threat of the ego and the paths that lead us away from aroha. Within 
early childhood education, these alternate routes can be understood through the desire to 
promote forms of educational practice that are not generated from a just and loving vision of 
the child. There can be moments when a ‘pendulum of reciprocity’ can swing away from the 
carefully negotiated space where the teacher works from a deep understanding of the 
individual child, towards an approach which is more generalised and ‘technical’. Procedural 
practices that occlude the child from the teacher can be realigned by the focus of aroha and 
attention. Threats to the reciprocal relationship of education can be mitigated by realigning 
our moral compass to lovingly view what is truly in front of us, a form of understanding that 
resists controlling or containing the other. Through the attentive gaze, teachers are not pushed 
back into the ‘cave’ but pulled outwards into the light of the sun; they are not immobilised by 
the hard shell, but are drawing from the power of aroha to shed old understandings for the 
new. Through attention and aroha, the possibilities of moving away from pre-determined, 
structured ‘intentions’ as a sole basis for pedagogy, and responding to the reality of the child 
can be revealed. The opportunities for teachers to extend their thoughts further about 
pedagogical practice need to be guided by this vision and expectation; a vision of attending to 
the child with justice, love, and aroha.   
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A behaviouristic vision of education limits the possibilities that the inner life can offer 
and the moral responsibility of teachers to regard others as equally ‘impenetrable’. If teachers 
appreciate that they are continually confronted by something other than themselves – the 
child as an ‘other’ which is obscure and impenetrable – then there is a strong motivation to 
move to a position of humility. There are benefits to approaching education with humility, 
and a just and loving orientation. These have been argued for in relation to teachers and 
children, but there are arguably similar benefits to be anticipated for external evaluators; 
when assessing others, humility and an appreciation of moral vision needs to be brought to 
the fore to mitigate the trappings of the ego. The behaviouristic assumption that children or 
teachers could be wholly understood through evaluation of behaviours described with clear, 
precise language compartmentalises the individual and invokes an arrogance of ‘knowledge’ 
about inner motivation. This invokes the ‘too grand’ image of empirical science as producing 
a ‘truth’ about the world. Attention and aroha are is not concerned with this form of ‘truth’ 
nor the notion of objectivity. Attention illuminates the tensions between the complexity of 
lived experiences of teachers and children and contesting ideas that would otherwise 
represent life as homogeneous and uniform.  
Technocratic notions of teaching – that teaching is a series of behaviours and actions 
underpinned by an assumption of the objective truth of reality, revealed by rational and 
impersonal observation – will inform one interpretation of how to understand education. 
Attention and aroha offer another view of life saturated with moral concepts. Consequently, 
teaching is a moral endeavour. Neoliberal approaches to education assume that educational 
practices are translatable and interchangeable. When the act of education is informed by the 
aroha and attention, the teacher is called to appreciate the way that experience and 
consciousness is ‘soaked in the sensible’, the power of ‘aro’, and the  ‘force and colour’ of 
emotions for both the teacher and the children in the educational space. Murdoch was 
concerned with “the qualities that individuals possess in attending to and caring for other 
individuals and the truth” (Browning, 2018, p. 175). If education is concerned only with 
actions and how those actions can be explained, then the inner life of the teacher will be 
disregarded and education will be the lesser for it.  
It is the role of the ‘ordinary and everyday’ teacher to resist simplistic observational 
and objective claims to knowledge that would contain the child. Through aroha and attention, 
teachers can (re)claim the validity of unmeasurable pedagogical practices; teachers can lay 
claim to the benefits of remaining attentive to children. Murdoch’s argument for the obscurity 
of the inner life of the individual is as true for children as it is for adults. If this understanding 
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of the human is appreciated, teachers’ intuitive responses to this obscurity can be validated 
despite the problems of explication. As articulated earlier, Murdoch (1992) states “I 
intuitively know and grasp more than I can yet explain” (p. 393). The intuitive nature of 
everyday experience is familiar, but not necessarily rational or fully explicable. Despite its 
inability to be codified, the value of the lived experience of teaching is integral to the act of 
education. The lived experience is built from the knowledge the teacher brings to pedagogy 
and a shared history of experiences between the teacher and child. These aspects are integral 
to the act of education. Intentional teaching can be a part of education, but intuitive teaching 
cannot be excluded simply because it cannot be measured. Despite the ways in which the 





Over the course of this study, a philosophical investigation into the concept of attention has 
supported an argument against the limitations of a performative, technical, scientistic view of 
education and promoted a vision of education that respects the role of the inner life of 
teaching, guided by a just and loving gaze. Neoliberal ideas enacted through multiple forms 
of policies, practices and lived experiences were outlined with a view to developing a 
different understanding of the ethical and moral task of education. This understanding is not 
limited by objective, measureable and scientific understandings of the world. This study has 
argued that the ethical and moral domains are significant, despite their marginalised status 
and the ways in which they resist codification. The ethical and moral domains support a 
vision of education as a uniquely human endeavour. As articulated within the introduction, 
Murdoch (1998) writes, “Man is a creature who makes pictures of himself and then comes to 
resemble the picture” (p. 75). It is clear from the argument developed over the chapters that 
neoliberal visions are not the only ways of seeing early childhood education. There are 
alternate visions for supporting differing pedagogical directions. Murdoch’s philosophy 
offers a harmonising yet distinct voice to add to those who are already prominent.  
Over the course of this study, important points have been made in order to articulate 
particular tensions and illustrate a Murdochian response. In Chapter Three, the neoliberal 
agenda in education was brought into question through Murdoch’s defence of the inner life 
and the role of freedom within self-determination. Murdoch was clear to argue against images 
of the human that misrepresent the role of morality within human life. Arguing against a 
dominant iteration of the liberal individual, Murdoch fought against the ‘shallow and flimsy’ 
notion of the human as confidently rational, yet alienated from the world through the 
‘objective’ vision of scientific empiricism. Such an image produces a twofold failure: the 
failure to represent the human realistically, and the failure to support the metaphysical 
background necessary to understanding the reality of the human. The ‘ideal’ depiction of 
humanity needs to be reconsidered entirely. Murdoch (1998) defends the liberal individual as 
“substantial, impenetrable, individual, indefinable, and valuable” (p. 294) but also identifies 
that the image of the ‘ideally rational individual’ is built from false premises, affecting the 
validity of this image from the outset. This depiction is too skewed to be rescued and a new 
image is needed.  
Murdoch develops the image of the ‘real impenetrable individual’: an individual who 
humbly acknowledges his or her slight control over moral vision, but who works to enhance 
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it in order to see the world as it really is and obediently respond to it. The moral individual is 
capable of more than conceited self-reflection or unrealistic judgements, but it takes humility 
to admit that one may be wrong. Furthermore, it takes modesty to acknowledge that moral 
work is continuous and only incrementally achieved. It is through obedience to the ties that 
bind us to others in the world that we can be shaped by changes within us and the changing 
view of the world around us.  
Murdoch’s concept of attention holds exciting possibilities for a new understanding of 
the role of the teacher within the ethical and moral dimensions of early childhood education. 
As attention positions individuals as moral beings developing their innate moral imagination, 
it can support a vision of education in which teachers can be encouraged to enhance 
pedagogy through love, justice, humility. Through such an understanding of pedagogy, the 
enlivening energy of goodness will develop the conditions for both children and teachers to 
flourish.  
Although the image of freedom can be suggested to be a ‘systematic’ failure rather than 
a moral one – a failure to operate the machinery of will-desire-belief-reason in such a way as 
to enjoy the detachment of rational thought – a different understanding of the role of freedom 
can be conceived to shift the notion that education is directive, externally derived, and 
standardised. Through the concept of attention, an understanding of freedom can make room 
for interdependence, responsibility, obedience and humility. Through a just and loving gaze, 
goodness is not a matter of choice but a magnetic force we are drawn towards, revealing 
reality beyond the pull of the ego. This is not the ‘reality’ of standardised pedagogy or 
assessment and evaluation, but an understanding of education as a small and incremental 
process. Through attention, education can be viewed as a process in which the teacher 
attempts to see the child and respond to them. Understanding the critical role of the moral 
imagination in education is challenging. It is not something that can be developed quickly, to 
expect such expedition is to misunderstand the idea of perfection and moral progress that 
underpins the task of attention: that attention is built from ongoing practice.  
Neoliberal ideas elicit a tension between individualism and community; while many 
expectations for entrepreneurial activity are within the realm of the individual, the benefits 
are situated as gains for all. Equally, while the individual is free to operate within the market, 
the government sets conditions to ensure that such participation limits the selfish, lazy and 
indolent nature of the individual. The strategies of neoliberalism are varied, but the message 
is clear: individuals are to be given the ‘freedom’, encouragement, and tools to become ‘self-
reliant’ competitors. Murdoch also argued that individuals are naturally selfish, and 
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recognised the tension between individualism and community, supporting the notion of real 
impenetrable person and the rights of the individual, but a significant point of departure is 
within the neoliberal encouragement of the individualistic nature. Although Murdoch’s 
writing was primarily prior to the advent of neoliberalism, Murdoch’s philosophical position 
would clearly have expressed reservations about the selfish drives of the ‘rational optimiser’ 
as the ideal citizen of the neoliberal state. The problems of the early childhood ‘market’ 
would also be brought into question: when children are created in an image of their future 
entrepreneurial selves, and education is set up to optimise this (possible) future, does this 
accurately represent the reality of the child? Even more importantly, Murdoch would ask, 
does this look upon the child with love and justice? As educational relationships are lived 
experiences, education cannot be considered a finalised ‘product’. The notion of the finalised 
‘product’ is not representative of the reality of human existence, nor of education. 
Furthermore, to view an individual in light of a future possibility is not an accurate 
representation of the reality in front of us. Situating children as future workers to “compete in 
the global economy” (World Bank Staff, 2003, p. xvii) can be brought into question by the 
Murdochian demand for justice and love. As Murdoch argues, when we apprehend real 
instances of love we can immediately distinguish them from lesser forms and work to 
reimagine the world illuminated by the light of goodness through this love. Through the 
‘patient eye of love’, the economic vision of the child can be seen as a lesser form and 
rejected due to the fantastical image it projects. 
We can utilise our moral imagination in order to enhance our vision of the world, but to 
understand the function of the moral imagination is to also support a respect for the 
contingent. As Murdoch rightly argues reality is not a ‘given whole, it is through an 
appreciation of the particulars – the small details of life – that our moral vision is pulled away 
from fantasy and the ‘fire-light’ of the ego. The neoliberal fantasy is far removed from the 
Murdochian imagination, but through the concept of attention, teachers hold the power to 
realign education, supported by a substantive theoretical backing for this vision.  
Within Chapter Four, the role of the moral imagination was highlighted as a critical 
element to resist scientistic images of the inherently moral human being. Current movements 
to promote the role of the teacher as technician, to situate education as a quantifiable 
endeavour, and to see the child or teacher as ‘knowable’, denies the role of moral vision 
within education. These movements uphold a scientistic vision of human life, delimiting 
moral concepts. Murdoch argues that scientistic delineations of the moral erodes the depth 
and breadth of concepts necessary to comprehending the intricate reality of human life. This 
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thesis has argued that a similar effect could be rendered through the dominance of scientism 
in education. Reality is comprehended through the ‘force and colour’ of morality and the 
medium of consciousness. Moral concepts add hue and tone to envisioning the world and 
colours all aspects of our lives. Educational relationships are not exempt from moral values 
and, despite the designation of an ‘objective’ view of education, relationships are preceded by 
moral vision. How the teacher sees the world and how the teacher sees the child are affected 
by moral concepts. When morality is segmented from ‘fact’, and the ‘mechanical’ brain is 
situated as the seat of all knowledge, there are suppressed premises that distort the drive, 
focus, and accurate depiction of pedagogy. Scientistic and technical approaches that interpret 
teaching as a procedural undertaking lessen education. A neuroscientific view can denude the 
powerful background of values that enrich the educational experience. Obscuring the role of 
morality within the educational experience does not obliterate its existence, but leads to an 
‘understanding’ of education that is markedly impoverished.  
Within Chapter Five, the critical role of love within attention was highlighted with a 
view to promoting the potent possibilities of love within pedagogy. Education is not simply 
the act of doing, it is also an undertaking of moral vision. Education is not only the concern 
of ‘doing things right’ but an endeavour to discover the right things to do. Such a move 
reorients the undertaking of education from a process primarily governed by moral action, to 
one concerned with moral vision. Murdoch argues that the human is “a unified being who 
sees, and who desires in accordance with what he sees, and who has some continual slight 
control over the direction and focus of his vision” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 322). This continual 
control over vision – however slight – is the aspect of teaching which is sovereign over other 
aspects of teaching; all other aspects of the education flow from this initial step. If this initial 
aspect is glossed over or undertaken without due consideration, then the potent potential of 
education as a deeper development of our comprehension of life is lessened. But love offers a 
way to navigate the moral task of education, and respond to others in a way that humbly 
accepts the impenetrability of other beings, and the way in which to attempt to ‘see’ others 
through a just and loving gaze.  
The moral vision to underpin pedagogy is a vision of love: love is the way to attain an 
accurate perception of reality and hone our moral vision of the good of education. Through 
love, we are drawn to the light of the ‘sun’ and enriched through this magnetic tension, we 
are rewarded by an accuracy of vision and personal growth. Furthermore, this capacity is 
wholly innate – every individual holds the capacity to enhance an understanding of goodness 
through the task and practice of attention. Through the medium of consciousness and the 
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appreciation of love as a metaxu, we can develop pedagogy to move beyond the notion of 
ethical principles and appreciate moral concepts through the idea of perfection: incrementally 
developed, constantly refined, and limitless. When brought into dialogue with Murdoch’s 
philosophy, arguments against the ‘performativity’ of the early childhood teacher are 
supported and enhanced. The professional and loving teacher is a vision, one that can be 
argued for with Murdoch’s concept of attention.  
As attention is not completed but continually enacted, it must be brought into 
conversation with other similar lines of thought that support parallel ideas within the domain 
of education. Chapter Six was an endeavour into seeking the synergies between attention and 
aroha. Attention and aroha both resist the pull of the ego, look towards humility, and deepen 
our appreciation of the ties that bind us to others in the world. When brought into dialogue 
with aroha, the notion of removing the veil is appreciated as a ‘shedding’ action, and the 
forward momentum of the pilgrim must be reconsidered in light of the way in which we walk 
backward into the future in order to keep our sights on the past. Murdoch appreciates the 
inability to encapsulate concepts such as love; keeping our sights set on the past supports us 
to appreciate ‘the future’ as an unknowable space. A deeper appreciation of the nuances of 
aroha and attention can aid the teacher’s appreciation of the educational relationship as a 
space which is not only dynamic and unpredictable, but one we need to enter with an 
appreciation of the history and lived experiences that are brought to pedagogy. The moral 
task of attention highlights the necessity to see education as an endeavour that focusses upon 
what is in front of us. Between aroha and attention we can negotiate between the knowledge 
our past affords us and an attentive orientation to the present. Attention must be continually 
undertaken, with the opportunity to look and relook over the time spent with the child. 
Through attention and aroha, the educator has the opportunity to resist the egotistical pull of 
educational visions that would lessen our appreciation of reality; the neoliberal, economic, 
scientific. We are encouraged to draw from our historical understanding of the child and 
move towards an appreciation of pedagogy as an act of humble acquiescence; an act of aroha, 
love, and attention.  
Education can include the experiential and ‘intuitive’ aspects of teaching. The role of 
attention as an ‘inhabited’ philosophy was considered within Chapter Seven, with a view to 
defending the ‘ordinary and everyday’ experience of teaching, and the role of intuition. 
Aroha was brought in alongside attention at points to develop the notion of synergy between 
these concepts. The educator needs to work constantly to enhance moral vision. As an 
ordinary and everyday experience, attention and aroha are constant undertakings honed 
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through ongoing practice. Attention is a moral training, which has the capacity to be 
developed and can be strengthened through correct enactment, but this is not an exercise of 
force through the will, as a ‘grandiose leaping about’. Attention is an acquiescence to the ties 
that bind us to others in the world and the necessity to respond to these attachments 
appropriately. Likewise, aroha was identified in this chapter as a ‘quivering’ within the mind 
that may not be directly connected to will. These are inner processes, resisting arguments that 
diminish the role of inner thought. Murdoch’s philosophy vehemently defends the inner life 
and the necessity of consciousness to discern reality from fantasy through the work of the 
moral imagination. The feelings generated through aroha, and the conscious understanding 
wrought by the moral imagination cannot be replicated nor fully explicated, but are “none the 
worse for that” (p. 326). This does not mean that teachers’ decisions should be 
unquestioningly accepted, but it does bring into question any measurement systems that 
prioritise written and verbal justifications as the sole means to defining and defending 
pedagogical actions. Murdochian attention defends the particulars of the situation, and the 
inner knowledge of the individuals involved. There are small details which are difficult to 
surmise without understanding the slow incremental work and processes of attention that are 
difficult to represent to others. There is value to the intangible aspects of human experience 
which are a part of the education. Moments between the teacher and the child – a look, a 
sound, a touch, a feeling, the ‘aro’ of aroha – can inform pedagogical decisions and be built 
from uncountable prior moments. For the attentive teacher, these decisions may be 
considered unquantifiable through evaluative strategies, but as Murdoch argued “‘not a 
report’ need not entail ‘not an activity’” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 318). Although many aspects of 
moral human relationships cannot be codified, this in no way detracts from their worthiness.  
If the role of the educator is diminished in order to ensure that more predictable 
‘outcomes’ are met and the ‘messy’ aspects of education are minimised, a deeper 
appreciation of the possibilities of the education relationship will be lost. Although in many 
countries what can be externally discerned, measured, assessed and predicted is of value, this 
study has been an attempt to support an alternate vision of early childhood education that 
maintains the invaluable place of the teacher to enhance education through pedagogy. In 
developing an argument for the role of the moral imagination, aroha and attention can be 
understood as means to resist fantastical visions and appreciate the reality of education. 
Education can be built from a ‘ground-up’ defence of what pedagogy is (and can be) as a 
lived experience, we can look again at early childhood education with a just and loving gaze; 
we can open ourselves to the possibilities of aroha. We can not only consider morality as a 
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fundamental aspect of human life, but also appreciate education as a moral and ethical 
undertaking. We can support teaching as an experience that develops moral vision, and 
understand education as a practice that enhances humility, aroha, love and an appreciation of 
the world illuminated by goodness.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
This study focused upon investigating early childhood education from a philosophical 
position. Although empirical research was not the focus of this study, the lack of applying 
these ideas within an early childhood setting with teachers, whanau, and children is a 
limitation. This is also a potential area of future investigation (and will be explained in more 
depth below).  
Another potential limitation has been outlined within Chapter Six. Mātauranga Māori 
has been drawn upon to illustrate the synergy between aroha and attention, but it is 
undertaken from a pākehā position, not as tangata whenua. Although I have sought to remain 
respectful to the notion of knowledge as a taonga, it is a limitation that this knowledge is not 
a part of my whakapapa, nor my tipuna, but is something I have embraced as a part of my 
pedagogical and personal development. This experience has been bolstered by the 
opportunities extended to me by others to explore mātauranga Māori, and my personal desire 
to do it. However, it must be recognised that these understandings are not a part of my familia 
and are rendered through my own Mexican/American/Pākehā vision. Furthermore it is a 
limitation of the study that the representation of mātauranga Māori is within a fixed (static) 
linguistic form that belies its lived worldedness. The lived and breathed nature of this 
philosophy is difficult to contain within the words on a page.  
Another limitation is of a philosophical nature; while I have explored Murdoch’s 
extensive discussion on overcoming the ego I have offered no clear ideas on how the 
development of the moral imagination would support individuals to discern morally 
questionable works or deeds through a just and loving gaze. The primary focus of the 
investigation has been upon how to resist the inner pull of the ego, and not to identify when 
others are acting upon selfish desires (potentially under the guise of ‘goodness’). The closest 
understanding which is rendered within this study is the articulation that lesser forms of love, 
due to their possessive and self-absorbed nature, are eclipsed when we are in the presence of 
real instances of love; through these real instances, we can immediately distinguish false from 
real, understand how goodness is present within the world through love. The connections 
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between fantasy and delusion, and goodness and love may support an appreciation of looking 
at others with ‘justice’ in order to determine whether their actions are guided by love and 
goodness or fantasy and the ego.  
 
Other Possible Areas for Investigation 
An important connection explored in this thesis is the relationship between aroha and 
attention. This connection warrants further exploration, particularly in relation to teachers’ 
‘ground-up’ conceptualisations of love in education. This would be particularly interesting to 
explore with both English-medium and Māori-medium teachers to find commonalties in 
‘ground-up’ conceptualisations and encourage deeper and broader notions of aroha and love. 
Attention would support this conversation as a means through which love can be developed 
and enhanced with children. Attention supports the concept of love as a necessary means 
through which to ‘see’ the other. An understanding of the role of love can be developed with 
teachers to progress the notion of an early childhood understanding of love in pedagogy.  
There is ample space to consider the correlations between Weilian attention, and 
Murdochian attention, specifically where the ‘self’ is present or removed in the act of 
deference. Firstly, there is a line of thought that was not pursued in this study, and that is the 
relationship of happiness and the good. A quote by Ariana Huffington, ‘giving is a shortcut to 
happiness’ is extended by the world business forum to “There is a lot of neuroscience that 
shows that giving is a shortcut to happiness” (WOBI, 2017). There is some importance in 
considering the wave of ‘feeling good’ through philanthropy which is arguably about 
enacting the good, but the motivating desires are to be reconsidered in light of Murdoch’s 
division of selfishness and the good. Where there is a ‘feel good’ aspect to the new 
philanthropy, questions need to be asked about whether this ‘feeling good’ is tied to the ego 
and the desire to feel good through ‘good’ acts is a new form of selfishness or a way in which 
to ignite the genesis of attention, in the act of looking at others and trying to do ‘good’.  
There are practical applications of the concept of attention that would be fascinating to 
explore with teachers following the completion of this thesis. It would be very interesting to 
investigate how the concept of attention can enhance teachers’ moral vision of early 
childhood education as an ethical and moral undertaking and the motivation to consider 
‘ground-up’ theories of education as valid and necessary to enhancing broader 
understandings of pedagogical practice.  
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Another possible area of investigation would include the notion of the pilgrimage and 
personal history of the individual. There is something in the concept of attention, particularly 
in the notion of the pilgrimage and personal history that could inform another way of looking 
at pedagogy. Teaching and learning experiences can be reviewed in light of the moral 
pilgrimage as another way of looking at ‘learning’. Of course, these are not limited to 
pedagogy and would have implications for a broader interpretations of education (political, 
policy, governance).  
I also appreciate the image Murdoch gives of the virtuous peasant, who may have left 
the cave without even noticing the fire. It would be interesting to investigate this area further 
and construct a philosophical argument which would seek to conceptualise children as 
individuals who are not in ‘need’ of moral instruction, but can be situated as individuals who 
can offer philosophical ideas to others.  
Finally, the notion of the moral pilgrimage itself could be explored in more depth in 
relation to the journey that the teacher can undertake over the course of their career. It would 
be interesting to collaborate with ‘end of career’ teachers who may see some correlations 
between their pedagogical journey and the notion of the moral pilgrimage. This journey 
would be interesting to explore and it would be interesting to see if teachers can identify with 
the idea that moral concepts can be deepened over time and experience within education.  
 
Final Thoughts 
Murdoch (1998) was concerned with the image of the ‘ideal’ moral agent and argued that the 
search for an ideal needs to be guided by the central question, “How can we make ourselves 
better?” (p. 364). Murdoch’s response was to develop the concept of attention, supporting 
individuals to enhance the moral imagination and gain clarity of vision when viewing others 
in the world. This study has drawn from the concept of attention to enhance an understanding 
of teaching as a critical responsibility, shaped by moral concepts and guided by the central 
Murdochian drive to make ourselves better.  
Although Murdoch was responding to different issues in different times, this thesis has 
argued that the concept of attention complements the contemporary vision of early childhood 
education as an endeavour to see and respond to children. Attention explores teaching as an 
inner movement supported by the moral imagination. Our understanding of education can be 
refined through the practice of attention. Each teacher builds pedagogical understandings 
from his or her unique consciousness and personal experiences, attention supports the 
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individual to reflect upon these experiences and hone his or her appreciation of reality beyond 
the self. Through the concept of attention there are possibilities to resist externalised demands 
that lessen the educational relationship; to contest neoliberal, technical, standardised, and 
economically-driven forms of practice and remain attentive to the particulars. Although 
attention is concerned with inner movements it is important to pay attention to small and 
incremental moments between individuals in the everyday life of teaching. Through 
Murdochian attention, the small and sometimes ‘messy and chaotic’ (Murdoch 1992) aspects 
of education can be understood to inform rationality in new, unexpected and invigorating 
ways. Attention supports an understanding of education as a complex and uniquely human 
endeavour that is difficult to quantify, resistant to standardisation and built from lived 
experiences.  
Early childhood education in Aotearoa New Zealand is unique and supports teachers to 
see children from a strengths-based perspective that upholds their individuality. These 
philosophical ideas align closely with Murdochian ideals. As argued over this study, the 
concept of attention has much to offer early childhood education to support a deeper 
philosophical understanding of the role of the moral imagination in pedagogy. Education can 
be enriched when this critical aspect is appreciated for its potent potentiality. This is where a 
point of resistance against limited forms of measurement can be established, for each teacher 
holds the power to enhance their moral imagination through his or her attention to the world, 
through the just and loving gaze. This is something entirely inner and, when further 
developed, can support teachers to discern when pedagogy is being turned away from seeing 
children in the light of the sun; when external directives are imposing a particular image of 
the child, rather than enhancing a vision of the child as he or she ‘really is’.  
A deep investigation of the concept of attention can enhance our appreciation of the 
unique nature of pedagogical relationships between teachers and children. The critical 
importance of approaching pedagogy as an ethical and moral undertaking becomes more 
apparent, and we are better able to defend the intricate and inimitable nature of pedagogy as 
something beyond simple quantification. The careful study of attention opens up myriad 
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